The aerospace boomerang of Brussels' sanctions and Moscow's retaliation

Moscow's countermeasures to the sanctions imposed by Brussels on Russia's economy for its 24 February invasion of Ukraine have severely wounded European plans to repair the damage caused by the pandemic. Among the areas that have been derailed are cooperation within the global space ecosystem, the launch schedule and, again, the aviation sector.

On the aviation front, the Kremlin has taken a decision in response to Brussels' illegal decision to seize the accounts, property and yachts of Russian tycoons, a move supported by many of the 27 EU nations. In the same vein, President Vladimir Putin has just signed a decree granting Russian airlines the ability to register aircraft leased from third-country companies in their own names.

The measure, which is contrary to civil and international law, means the possibility of appropriating nearly 500 passenger aircraft, almost a third of the nearly 1,400 commercial aircraft operated by Russian airlines. The initiative will have an impact on the balance sheets of the companies that own the aircraft, which will suffer an estimated $10-12 billion in asset losses.

Although Russia accounts for a very small share of global air passenger traffic (1.3 %) and Ukraine's share is even smaller (0.8 %), according to the International Air Transport Association (IATA), the decision carries huge risks for the Kremlin. Russian airlines will find it difficult to maintain insurance policies and keep aircraft in flying condition in the face of an expected lack of spare parts supplies and software upgrades.

But that is not all. Rising oil and paraffin prices have a direct impact on the rising costs of Western airlines. This is especially true for air cargo airlines, which are prevented by the closure of Russian airspace from flying over Siberia and taking the shortest routes on the Europe-China route, thus lengthening their journeys and increasing fuel consumption.

On the production side, the European aerospace industry is desperately seeking an alternative to the supplies of titanium it imports from Ukraine and, above all, from Russia - the world's second largest producer - whose use has increased due to its growing use in the manufacture of aerostructures, engines and piping for launchers and new-generation aircraft.

In global terms, European manufacturers are dependent on Russian and Ukrainian metal in the order of 40%, which in the Airbus corporation is more than 50% and for some of its subcontractors is even around 80%. The solution that has been found is to turn to sources in Japan, Kazakhstan, India, China and the United States, as well as to promote the recycling of material that is wasted in production processes.

The space ecosystem has also suffered a setback. Before the crisis, the European Space Agency (ESA), Brussels and companies had full confidence in continuing to use the Russian Soyuz and Proton launchers to put their most prized scientific, communications and observation platforms into space. They also relied on the smaller European Vega launchers for smaller payloads. But the first two rockets are Moscow-owned and the second relies in part on Russian and Ukrainian rocket engine technology.

So when the invasion of Ukraine occurred and the European Union applied restrictive measures to its relations with Moscow, the Director General of the Russian Federal Space Agency (Roscosmos), Dimitri Rogozin, decreed on 26 February the suspension of commercial operations in French Guiana of the veteran Russian Soyuz launcher, which dates back to February 1999. Shortly afterwards, he halted take-offs at the Baikonur Cosmodrome - a base leased from the Republic of Kazakhstan - and at Vostochny in Siberia.

The decision has hit the waterline of the expectations of Brussels, ESA, the British satellite communications company OneWeb and France, whose satellites were due to fly into space in 2022 on Russian rockets. Now they are all in search of a launcher that can take them into space. We are talking about a total of no less than 222 satellites, a difficult task to reprogramme in the short term.

For the time being, flights of 216 OneWeb satellites have been put on hold for six launches from Guyana. In addition, two platforms of the European Galileo navigation constellation scheduled for launch in April and two more in September are blocked in Baikonur. The French spy satellite CSO-3, scheduled for December from French Guiana, is also stalled. And the Russian-European exploration mission ExoMars 2022, which a Russian Proton rocket was to launch on its way to Mars from the Baikonur Cosmodrome between 20 September and 1 October, is considered "highly unlikely", according to an ESA communiqué. Satellites from Korea, Japan, Sweden, etc. are also on standby.

But it doesn't end there. Next May's maiden flight of the Vega-C launcher manufactured by the Italian company Avio is due to carry the Italian satellite LARES 2. Later in the summer, the French Pleiades Neo 5 and 6 and then the Thai Theos 2 HR. However, its RD-869 rocket engines are Ukrainian-made and its fuel tanks are Russian. Except for the few stocks Avio has in storage, the problem is serious. In short, all those due to fly on Soyuz, Proton and many on Vega will have to delay their plans. 

As a result, the institutions and companies affected by Moscow have knocked on the doors of those who can help them travel into space. They are Elon Musk's private US company Space X, with its Falcon 9 launcher in the lead; India's state-owned launch services company Antrix, with its PSLV and GSLV rockets; and China Great Wall Industrial Corporation (CGWIC), which markets the extensive Long March family of launchers. However, their order books are virtually full and other alternatives on the market are risky.

But problems are piling up. Putin's order to his military forces to move beyond Ukraine's borders has been triggered as veteran US and European launchers are in the process of being replaced. The American Atlas V and the European Ariane 5 are at the end of their lives, with their production lines shut down, and their replacements - Vulcan and Ariane 6 - have yet to make their maiden flights. Their reliability is therefore unknown and their insurance policies are consequently very high.

Europe's leading launch services company, Arianespace, has at least the final flights of Ariane 5 scheduled and contracted, and Ariane 6 will not actually enter service until 2023 at the earliest. In short, an accumulation of headaches that are difficult to solve, which only a return to international cooperation and stability can gradually channel an ecosystem in which demand is far greater than supply.