Brexit: why did it happen?

The years seem to be in competition for the title of most memorable winner. So far this month, January looks set to prove that 2021 may be worse than 2020: we have seen an assault on the Congress of the world's most powerful country and new strains of COVID-19. Between these two major events, there is one that, although it has not gone unnoticed, has not been analysed in the detail it deserves: the definitive exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union.

Now that Brexit is over (after four years of difficult negotiations that resembled a rollercoaster ride), the United Kingdom has become the first country to leave the European Union (EU). Europeans can finally breathe a sigh of relief, because if there is any winner in this process it is - believe it or not - the European Union, which has used the negotiation to improve its unity, something that was seen in the bloc's stance on issues such as Ireland, Gibraltar or how the future relationship should be. The British are the clear losers, as throughout the process the country has disintegrated internally due to early elections in 2017 and the rude discovery by the government and Leave voters of the social and economic benefits of the Union. 

With Brexit over, it is worth looking at why it happened. This is important for the EU, as future generations will want to know how it was possible for such a significant country to decide, after 43 years, to leave a club that many countries on the continent aspire to join. 

To do so, we must not conclude that it was an event sponsored by David Cameron and Nigel Farage to satisfy the anti-European chauvinism of conservatives and those nostalgic for the British Empire. Brexit is the conclusion of the UK's turbulent relationship with the European Economic Community (the embryo of the EU) since its attempt to join in the 1960s, the 1973 entry, the 1975 referendum and the creation of a discourse where Europe's agricultural, industrial and migration failings towards the UK created a climate of mistrust that led to Euroscepticism and the 2016 referendum.

The distrust began before 1973, the year of the UK's entry into what was then the European Economic Community. In 1963 and 1967 it tried to join the club, but was vetoed by Charles de Gaulle, famously suspicious of the Anglo-Saxon world. Such rejection initiated London's distrust of Europe, generating a relationship based on a desire to belong to the club (motivated by the end of empire and the need to counter the economic growth of France and Germany), but based on a rejection of any attempt at economic, political and social homogenisation by Europe. This principle was demonstrated when in 1975 (just two years after joining the EEC) there was a referendum to vote on whether to remain in the bloc: remain won with 67.2%. Despite the triumph of permanence, the foundations of the relationship remained in place, and not for the better. 

After 1975, media coverage of the impact of EEC policies in the UK was seen as harmful to British interests, at the same time as the country underwent a profound de-industrialisation. This process (which the country suffered in the 1970s and 1980s) was due not only to EEC membership, but also to low productivity and lack of modernisation (purely domestic factors), but were masked as results of London's EEC membership: the decline of the car industry due to the importation of cheaper (and better) Volkswagen and Fiat and the disappearance of the shoe industry due to Italian competition. 

The same can be said for agricultural policy and fisheries (the main stumbling block in the Brexit negotiations), especially regarding the mountains of agricultural surpluses and fishing rights in British waters. London never understood why it could not use its agricultural surpluses (the famous mountains of meat, butter and wine lakes) for itself and determine who could fish and the quota for EU and non-EU vessels. It is important to note that in the 1970s and 1980s the EEC exported its agricultural surpluses behind the Iron Curtain and that vessels from these countries were entitled to receive part of the catch from EEC waters, in addition to the British obligation to allow EU countries the right to fish in their waters.

These economic fears worsened when Brussels decided in the 1990s to move beyond trade integration into the economic and political realm, becoming the European Union. The nightmare of a United States of Europe seemed to be confirmed with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, which laid the foundations for monetary union and a common foreign policy. This only increased London's doubts about the viability of remaining in the bloc, even though Margaret Thatcher secured special status for London in terms of its contribution to the EU coffers and London did not join the Schengen agreement. This was reinforced in the tabloids, where the tabloids (a chapter apart in what is peculiar to the UK) talked about the impositions of "evil" Brussels on dishes and customs dear to the British¹. The serious press did the same. In these years a journalist called Boris Johnson wrote about these issues in the Daily Telegraph: that journalist is the current Prime Minister of the UK. 

The eastward expansion in the 2000s was the culmination of British Euroscepticism. The arrival of immigrants from these countries in large numbers, attracted by offers of jobs and better living standards in London, was seen as a Brussels-sponsored invasion rather than a benefit to the country. The fact that these countries were more aligned with London in defending their national interests than in joining European institutions (as we are seeing with Hungary and Poland) was glossed over to give rise to the sensationalism described above, ignoring the fact that not only cheap labour was coming to the UK, but also academics and students who benefit British universities, the big losers from Brexit.

The stage was already set when on 22 February 2016, David Cameron (the prime minister at the time) announced the referendum for 23 June of that year. The Eurosceptic campaign had an easy time of it, exploiting the ills described above. This, coupled with Labour's mistake of not promoting Remain (which could have changed the outcome in Labour strongholds such as Wales² and the North East of England) explains the final result. 

What we end up with is a chronicle of how the promotion of the benefits or harms of EU membership end up influencing popular perceptions of Brussels. The UK's exit from the EU was due to London's poor coverage of its relationship with Europe, which served to mask the industrial decline of the 1970s and 1980s and the fears of a United States of Europe in the 1990s and 2000s.

What will happen next remains to be seen, but the EU might take note of the construction of a negative image of its work by the British and consider how its policies are interpreted in countries such as Greece, Poland and Hungary, which have become the hotspots of the last decade for the EU.

References:

1 - “The 10 best Euro myths-from custard creams to condoms.”. The Guardian, 23 de junio de 2016. The 10 best Euro myths – from custard creams to condoms | Politics | The Guardian

2 - The Welsh First Minister (Leader of the Welsh region) at the time, Carwyn Jones (Labour) was sympathetic to remain. Britain's Labour leader - Jeremy Corbyn - a Eurosceptic, took a lukewarm stance during the referendum campaign on remaining in the EU.