China accelerates its global control of strategic minerals
Over the last two years, the People's Republic of China has seen its biggest wave of overseas mineral asset purchases since 2013, in a race against time driven both by the urgency to secure supplies and by the toughening geopolitical climate in Canada, the United States and other traditional markets.
Wave of international investment
According to 2023 data collected by The Economist, Chinese companies spent around $16 billion on international mining projects, not including minority stakes. Among the most notable deals were $5 billion for a copper mine in Afghanistan, $1 billion for a gold mine in Ghana and a commitment to invest another $5 billion in Zambia over five years. They also acquired a stake in Tampakan, the largest copper deposit in the Philippines.
Copper has become one of the main targets of these investments, given its widespread use in construction, industry and electric vehicles. In fact, more than half of the capital that China devoted to foreign mining in 2023 went to copper projects. But it is not the only resource in their sights: critical minerals (lithium, cobalt, nickel, etc.) also account for a large part of operations.
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been at the centre of this strategy, as it is home to nearly 6 million tonnes of the 11 million tonnes of cobalt that exist on the planet. In addition, its copper deposits are four times higher than the global average. The DRC is also rich in rare earths and other vital elements, so it is not surprising that Chinese investors dominate the mining scene there.
Even so, China continues to diversify and expand its investments. A joint study by Chinese and Australian universities revealed that, under the Belt and Road Initiative, Chinese mining investments reached £18 billion in 2024, the highest level since the initiative was launched in 2013.
There are also no signs that this buying spree will slow down anytime soon. Despite growing concern in the West about Chinese dominance in these sectors, large Chinese companies continue to bet heavily on acquiring new assets. As Michael Sherb of Appian Capital Advisory explained, Chinese groups know that they ‘have a window of opportunity in the short term’ and are rushing to close deals before geopolitics further complicates the picture.
Looking ahead, analysts expect mining M&A activity from China to remain at high levels. Recent deals that exemplify this trend include Zijin Mining's $1.2 billion purchase of a gold mine in Kazakhstan and the Baiyin Nonferrous group's $420 million investment in the Brazilian mine Vale Verde. With these moves, Beijing is strengthening its position as the main driver of the global energy and technology transition.
Window of opportunity
Experts who spoke to the Financial Times agree that Chinese firms are racing against the clock. According to Michael Sherb, founder of Appian Capital Advisory, these groups are aware that ‘they only have a limited window of opportunity... which is why they are trying to close as many mergers and acquisitions as possible before the geopolitical situation becomes more complicated.’ This ‘geopolitics’ refers to the growing mistrust of Beijing among European and North American governments, a climate that is tightening investment rules, despite Europe's desire to strengthen cooperation with China in the field of energy transition.
Fostering rivalry between CMOC, MMG, Zijin and other firms multiplies the speed and scope of their mergers.By allowing several Chinese groups to bid simultaneously, the government pushes up tender prices and fine-tunes its best offer. In addition, these companies accept lower margins and operate in politically fragile areas—where Western multinationals do not risk capital—thus guaranteeing the award of projects. This model erodes the bargaining power of host states, which end up ceding control of strategic projects to companies with almost unlimited state backing.
Finally, this pattern of expansion is not isolated: it is part of a broader Chinese national strategy of transition to high-tech industries. As Christoph Nedopil, director of the Griffith Asia Institute, pointed out, the shift towards sectors such as electric vehicle batteries and renewable energy is pushing Chinese companies to seek direct control over key inputs. The Belt and Road Initiative, although focused on infrastructure, has facilitated this move, and mining investments remain a priority in that geo-economic roadmap.
Risks for the West
Chinese dominance in extraction and processing creates a ‘single point of failure’ in the global economy. If Beijing suffers an internal crisis—health, political or economic—that affects its refineries, the entire battery and high-tech market will suffer a supply cut. Furthermore, its power to set prices at key stages of processing (graphite, electrodes, cathodes) limits the responsiveness of other players. The West and emerging economies must urgently invest in diversifying sources, incentivising recycling and supporting their own refinery projects; otherwise, they will be at the mercy of purely political decisions in Beijing.
Only a coordinated, multidimensional strategy can eliminate the risk to access to critical minerals. Subsidies for local mining work in the short term, but without alliances with alternative suppliers (South America, Africa, India) and investment in refining capacity, the West will not be able to break China's monopoly. At the same time, promoting recycling and research into chemical and technological substitutes reduces pressure on deposits. Governments and companies must design an action plan that combines tax incentives, regional cooperation agreements and innovation programmes in materials to ensure more resilient and competitive supply chains.