The financing of Daesh and the Spanish jihadist networks: the 'hawala' system
El día 26 de noviembre, la Policía Nacional española detuvo a dos individuos por su presunta participación en un delito de financiación de actividades terroristas. Estos dos detenidos forman parte de la célula de remedadores de Daesh, que pertenecen a la red de banqueros del grupo yihadista. Los dos individuos, provenientes de Yuncos (Toledo) y Fuenlabrada (Madrid), han entrado en prisión preventiva. En la operación participaron agentes de las Brigadas Provinciales de Información de Madrid y Toledo con colaboración de la Europol. Los agentes especializados en lucha antiterrorista llevaban investigando esta célula que financia a los combatientes en Siria desde España desde hacía meses. Entre sus evidencias, los agentes averiguaron contactos entre combatientes de Daesh en Oriente Medio y los dos detenidos. Los combatientes usan las redes sociales para contactar a consumidores de su propaganda ofreciéndoles la posibilidad de ser elementos para financiar la yihad a cambio de una comisión.
On November 26, the Spanish National Police arrested two individuals for their alleged participation in a crime of financing terrorist activities. These two detainees are part of Daesh's remand cell, which belongs to the Jihadist group's network of bankers. The two individuals, who came from Yuncos (Toledo) and Fuenlabrada (Madrid), have been remanded in custody. Agents of the Provincial Intelligence Brigades of Madrid and Toledo took part in the operation with the collaboration of Europol. For months, agents specialised in combating terrorism had been investigating this cell, which finances fighters in Syria from Spain. Among their evidence, the agents found contacts between Daesh's fighters in the Middle East and the two detainees. The fighters use social networks to contact consumers of their propaganda, offering them the possibility of becoming elements to finance the Jihad in exchange for a commission.
El sistema que utilizan es el sistema tradicional de la ‘hawala’, originario del sudeste asiático y que se expandió por el mundo musulmán en el siglo octavo. Este tipo de sistemas se utilizan para enviar remesas de inmigrantes a sus países de manera más rápida y sin tener que pasar por el sistema bancario, que, para algunos, es inaccesible debido al coste. Este método tradicional se basa en la confianza y en una red de ‘hawaladores’ por todo el mundo que llevan un diario de cuentas del dinero que reciben y que envían, llevándose una comisión por cada transacción. Para poner un ejemplo concreto, si Juan, de Madrid quiere enviar dinero a Pedro de Cuenca, Juan irá a su ‘hawalador’ de confianza (José) y le dará 50€ en efectivo. José llamará a su contacto en Cuenca (Gabriel) y pedirá que él de en efectivo los 50€ a Pedro. Pedro le proporcionará un código a Gabriel que sólo conocería en principio Juan, para asegurarse de la identidad. Cuando otra persona necesite enviar dinero de Cuenca a Madrid, utilizará el mismo sistema. No existe ninguna transacción monetaria entre José y Gabriel ni entre Juan y Pedro. Las deudas entre ‘hawaladores’ no es necesario que se paguen inmediatamente y pueden pagarse en dinero, propiedades o servicios. Tradicionalmente, si un ‘hawalador’ no paga, pierde su honor en la comunidad. Este sistema permite a los terroristas enviar dinero de un país al otro de manera anónima y sin pasar por ningún medio bancario o electrónico que dejaría un rastro por cada transacción.
They use the traditional hawala system, which originated in Southeast Asia and spread throughout the Muslim world in the eighth century. This type of system is used to send immigrant remittances to their countries more quickly and without having to go through the banking system, which, for some, is inaccessible due to cost. This traditional method is based on trust and a network of 'hawaladars" around the world who keep a record of the money they receive and send, taking a commission on each transaction. To give a concrete example, if John, from Madrid wants to send money to Peter, from Cuenca, John will go to his trusted 'hawalador' (Joseph) and give him 50 euros cash. Joseph will call his contact in Cuenca (Gabriel) and ask him to give the 50 Euros in cash to Peter. Peter will provide Gabriel with a code that only John would know in principle, to ensure identity. When another person needs to send money from Cuenca to Madrid, he will use the same system. There is no monetary transaction between Joseph and Gabriel or between John and Peter. Debts between 'hawaladars' do not need to be paid immediately and can be paid in money, property or services. Traditionally, if a 'hawalador' does not pay, he loses his honour in the community. This system allows terrorists to send money from one country to another anonymously and without going through any banking or electronic means that would leave a trail for each transaction.
Both in Europe, through the directives on money laundering and the financing of terrorism (the latest directive 2018/843), and in Spain, with the Money Laundering Regulations 2019, the financing of illegal activities is made extremely difficult. The obligations in the field of Prevention of Money Laundering oblige companies such as financial institutions, notaries public, currency exchange companies, jewellery and real estate businesses to impose normal and reinforced diligence measures with respect to the identity of the parties, the object of the business and the monitoring of operations with the obligation to the SEPBLAC and the conservation of documents. The Spanish law also reinforces preventive measures in transactions with countries that have notable deficiencies in the fight against money laundering, as would be the case with Syria. The system of 'hawaladars' is capable of preventing any type of entity that may be subject to these regulations. Apart from the complex task of tracking the transaction between 'hawaladars', the two detained individuals belonging to this cell took additional security measures in their activities to avoid detection, such as using encrypted communication channels between 'hawaladars'. The money comes from different Daesh supporters, in cash, not always from the same people who donate to the network. The amounts also vary from a few hundred euros to hundreds of thousands on rare occasions.
In June 2020, May and June 2019 and December 2018, three more operations took place to break up Daesh's remand network, with the detainees accused of sending and receiving money between European and Middle Eastern countries for Daesh's funding. According to the National Police, the funds are used to strengthen Daesh's operational capacity in the most weakened regions of Syria and to finance the return of foreign fighters to Europe. All three operations have common links and contacts and belong to the same network of 'hawaladars' with cells in Europe, the Middle East and North Africa. The profiles of these 'hawaladars' are men over 40, with no work activity, settled in Spain for years, without specific financial knowledge and with a good standard of living, though never ostentatious. As identifying 'hawaladars' is extremely complicated, the police focus on following radicalised individuals who wish to donate to the Jihad. Although Daesh does not obtain a large part of its funds through this method, the 'hawala' system allows them to launder money from the Middle East to Europe and pay some of their operational expenses, particularly those related to foreign fighters. The network of 'hawaladars' is not exclusive to Spain, where five individuals have been arrested, but there have also been arrests in Germany and France.