Russian ghost fleet, hypocrisy and risks
In recent months, for various reasons, several news stories mentioning the ‘Russian ghost fleet’ have occasionally appeared in the media. However, although this is a very important issue (and one that is not exclusive to Russia), it does not seem to have received the attention it deserves.
But before delving into everything related to Russia, let's look at the phenomenon in more general terms.
So-called ghost fleets operate covertly in global maritime trade and have become a major challenge for international regulatory frameworks and trade policies.
Ghost fleets, which operate under the cover of international law, have long been a circumstantial and clandestine element. Although this is not a new phenomenon, these fleets have taken on unprecedented importance and magnitude in recent years, especially in the wake of recent geopolitical events and the proliferation of international sanctions.
Definition of a ghost fleet
The International Maritime Organisation defines a “dark fleet” or “ghost fleet” as vessels engaged in illegal operations designed to circumvent sanctions, evade safety or environmental compliance, avoid insurance costs or engage in other illegal activities. These activities may include conducting unsafe operations that do not comply with international standards and established industry norms. Ships in these fleets intentionally avoid flag State and port State control inspections, as well as commercial controls or inspections. They often lack adequate liability insurance or other financial guarantees. One of their key characteristics is a deliberate effort to avoid detection, often by turning off their automatic identification system (AIS) or long-range identification and tracking (LRIT) transmissions. They also do so by concealing the true identity of the ships without a legitimate cause or safety issue to justify such action.
If we focus on crude oil shipping, we quickly realise that the use of covert tankers is not new in this type of trade, as countries such as Iran and Venezuela have a long history of employing similar tactics in their respective oil export operations. This sets a historical precedent for current operations.
The period between 2022 and 2024 has been marked by an unprecedented expansion of ghost fleet activities, obviously motivated by the sanctions imposed on Russia following its invasion of Ukraine. And here we must make an interesting observation about an unintended effect of those sanctions. As major shipping and insurance companies withdrew from Russian oil trade operations to comply with these sanctions, the resulting vacuum facilitated the emergence of a new ecosystem of opaque operators to facilitate sanctions evasion on an unprecedented scale.
Despite the growing importance of ghost fleets in global maritime trade, and not just in oil, there remains a significant gap in research on the precise definition and categorisation of this constantly evolving phenomenon. The evolution of the geopolitical landscape and recent events in key areas of the world have not only expanded the scale of these assets' operations, but also diversified their nature and tactics, exceeding existing conceptual frameworks.
‘Dark fleets’ and ‘grey fleets’ and the Russian case
The so-called ‘dark fleets’ and ‘grey fleets’ represent two distinct categories of covert maritime operations that operate on the fringes or at the limits of international regulations.
‘Dark fleets’ are vessels engaged in entirely illicit activities, deliberately avoiding detection and compliance with regulations by deactivating their Automatic Identification System (AIS) transmitters, falsifying documentation, and frequently changing flags to evade regulatory oversight. These vessels operate completely outside legal frameworks and often engage in activities such as sanctions evasion, illegal trade, and unregulated fishing. In contrast, so-called ‘grey fleets’ exploit legal ambiguities and regulatory loopholes to operate in a zone of questionable legality. Although these vessels usually keep their AIS transmitters active and appear to comply with regulations, they manipulate data and engage in practices that border on the limits of international law. ‘Grey fleets’ often carry out operations that, while not entirely illegal, push the boundaries of what is legally acceptable, which, at the very least, complicates control efforts.
With regard to Russia more specifically, this diversification and distribution of activities allows it to adapt its tactics according to the pressure of sanctions. While the dark fleet is used for transactions that flagrantly violate price caps, the grey fleet serves as a logistical buffer that can be reincorporated into more regulated markets if price conditions allow. The revenue stream generated by these illicit activities is crucial to sustaining the Russian economy and its war effort in the face of Western sanctions, as well as helping Moscow spread its narrative that sanctions are ineffective.
But we must take other aspects into account. The creation of the ghost fleet would not have been possible without the complicity, voluntary or involuntary, of the secondary ship markets. Since 2022, Russia has invested approximately $10 billion in the purchase of second-hand oil tankers, prioritising very old vessels that would otherwise have been destined for scrapping. This massive transfer of assets has allowed Western shipowners to capitalise on the Kremlin's urgent need, selling ships over 15 or 20 years old at prices well above their scrap value. Ironically, most of these ships originate in Europe. Detailed research reveals that almost 60% of the tankers identified in the ghost fleet were sold by companies based in countries that theoretically support sanctions against Russia.
Greek shipping companies are at the forefront of this phenomenon, having sold at least 127 tankers that ended up in the Russian logistics network, earning them more than $3.7 billion. This secondary market has allowed Russia to circumvent bans on the construction of new ships and lack of access to Western shipyards.
The vessels acquired are typically Aframax and Suezmax class tankers, ideal for operating in Baltic ports and conducting transfers on the high seas, as well as very large crude carriers (VLCCs) for long-distance routes to Asia. The age of the fleet is one of its distinctive features and one of its greatest dangers: it is estimated that in 2025, 11% of the world's tanker fleet was over 20 years old, compared to only 3% before the start of the war. These figures are the result of the distortion caused by Russia's accumulation of very old assets. What is relevant about all this is the enormous contradiction that countries such as Greece, the United Kingdom, Norway, Germany and even the United States itself are the main suppliers of old ships that help Russia to circumvent sanctions and thus finance a war in which those same countries are collaborating with the other contender, Ukraine, by supplying it with all kinds of military equipment.
But it is not just the ships. To protect the ultimate beneficial owners and avoid the direct action of sanctions, whether imposed by the US or the European Union, the ghost fleet operates through a labyrinth of shell companies registered in countries where transparency in such matters is not exactly their greatest virtue. The management model is based on the creation of single-ship companies, where each tanker is owned by a separate legal entity, often managed by companies with no previous history in the maritime sector. This pattern of generating management companies allows Russia to keep its ships operational even when a specific entity is sanctioned. Dubai has established itself as the nerve centre of the ghost fleet's commercial management, taking advantage of a regulatory environment that offers resistance to Western pressure and facilitates the creation of complex financial structures.
In carrying out its illicit activities, the ghost fleet not only evades trade sanctions, but also violates fundamental maritime safety and transparency protocols. The tactics employed have evolved from simple transponder shutdowns to sophisticated electronic manipulations requiring advanced technological capabilities, often provided by the Russian state itself. All of this not only renders the sanctions ineffective, but also poses a huge risk to the environment, as the vessels used usually do not meet the minimum safety requirements for the transport of crude oil or its derivatives.
Many of these ships sail very close to Spanish waters and coasts, and this does not seem to have set off any alarms or prompted any measures to protect us from a possible accident.
In recent weeks, both the United States and France have captured and confiscated several of these vessels, the latest in the waters of the Strait of Gibraltar. But that is only the tip of the iceberg. If we do not react sooner rather than later, there will be cause for regret. Not to mention the tremendous hypocrisy of some countries looking the other way when their companies are the main suppliers of these ships. This is undoubtedly an issue that should not be overlooked and one that needs to be explored further.