Tehran refloats its oil exports thanks to Syria

The alliance between the Iranian theocracy and the Bachar al-Asad dictatorship is also sealed in oil. According to the specialist portal Tanker Trackers, the regime of the ayatollahs has significantly increased its exports to Syria in the course of the last few weeks. In particular, it has become clear that Iran is sending more than three times the usual volume of oil to the Levantine country.

The barrels are shipped off the coast of the Persian Gulf and reach Syria via the Mediterranean. Specifically, according to Radio Farda, the cargo ships have been docking in the port of Baniyas, located in the most northern zone of the province of Tartus. From there, the cargo has been distributed through the parts of the territory controlled by the Syrian Arab Army. According to an estimate made in mid-April by the Middle East Economic Survey (MEES) think tank, each ship has been moving about 6.8 million barrels in its hold.

The figures provided by MEES indicate that, during the months of January and February, for the first time in history, Syria became the leading importer of Iranian oil. Until now, that position had been monopolised by China, but the economic paralysis brought about by the coronavirus pandemic caused demand from the Asian giant to plummet. Although Beijing has begun to reactivate its foreign trade since March, the Al-Asad Executive continues to import, on average, some 230,000 barrels per day.

How can the sudden increase be explained? Experts consulted by Radio Farda point out that Tehran has been forced to make a virtue of necessity: in the face of a situation of sharp decline in demand and the price of crude, they have had to dispose of the surplus production that is destined for export on a regular basis. According to estimates by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Tehran allocates some 340,000 barrels per day to foreign trade; a very modest amount compared to the two and a half million it sold before the sanctions imposed by the United States. 

Iran's public coffers, of course, are not going through a good time and any income that can be generated is welcome. In Damascus, Hassan Rohaní's executive has a fairly secure ally, so that, in order to sell oil at a low price, it is preferable for Tehran to do business with a country in its region.

The situation could be defined as a pact from which both parties benefit. Iran manages to oxygenate, even slightly, its economy and Syria obtains at a relatively low cost the oil resources it needs, since a significant part of its fields are under the effective control of the United States. 

For this reason, Damascus has also had to look elsewhere to ensure, as far as possible, the necessary supply both to continue its military campaign in the north of the country and to enable the population to carry on with its daily life.

Al-Asad has therefore strengthened its commercial ties with Tehran as early as 2019, although its cooperation is far from complete. The commitment of both administrations has increased considerably in recent years, since the Armed Forces loyal to Al-Asad began to recover the territory lost at the beginning of the civil war. Iran's political and strategic influence over Syria is therefore quite important and has been consolidated thanks, at least in part, to armed groups like Hezbollah, which are well connected to both players.

In fact, the Lebanese militia could be a tangential beneficiary of the massive imports of crude oil into Syria. Given the links that the organisation has been cultivating with the powers that be over the years, a fraction of the barrels could end up under its control, as Radio Farda suggests. 

This would open a difficult door to resale on the black market not only on Syrian soil, but also in Lebanon across the border. COVID-19 has further deepened the rampant economic crisis in the Cedar country. The situation of scarcity and even shortage of supplies has already led to social stability. Protests have resumed over the last week with unusual violence.

Hezbollah, which already played a dubious role in last autumn's mass demonstrations, is now in a more powerful position, with a relatively large presence in Hassan Diab's government. This, coupled with the strong networks it maintains throughout the region, could make it easier for some of the oil to end up being consumed in Lebanon, with the corresponding benefit to the Shiite fighters.