Gustavo de Arístegui: Geopolitical Analysis 1 December
- US-Ukraine talks in Florida: Trump's peace plan enters decisive phase
- Trump-Maduro call: transactional geopolitics in the Caribbean
- Russia's shadow fleet: oil, sanctions and hybrid warfare
- China: eight months of manufacturing contraction
- Kazakhstan-Ukraine: the clash over the CPC terminal
- Airbus A320 software crisis: the invisible face of digital aviation
- Elections in Honduras: polls under the shadow of Trump and drug traffickers
- Netanyahu and the presidential pardon: the clash between power and the rule of law
- Pope Leo XIV's visit to Lebanon: the Vatican's commitment to the last Christian frontier in the Middle East
- Joint US-Syria operations against ISIS: tactical convergence, strategic contradiction
- Media rack
US-Ukraine talks in Florida: Trump's peace plan enters decisive phase
Facts:
Negotiations between representatives of the United States and Ukraine concluded on 30 November at the Shell Bay Club in Hallandale Beach, Florida, owned by tycoon and special envoy Steve Witkoff. The meeting was attended by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Witkoff and Jared Kushner on the US side, and a delegation led by Rustem Umerov, secretary of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine.
Both sides described the talks as ‘productive but difficult,’ noting that progress had been made in revising the initial 28-point peace plan, which had been heavily criticised in Kyiv and European capitals. As a result, the outline has been reduced to 19 points, leaving the most sensitive issues on hold: borders, the status of occupied territories and security guarantees, which have been deferred to a possible meeting between Trump and Zelensky.
According to the economic and general press, the spirit of this round is to accommodate some of the Ukrainian and European objections without renouncing Washington's central logic: a rapid ceasefire and an ‘orderly’ end to the war that would allow Trump to present himself as a peacemaker, even if the resulting territorial balance is clearly favourable to Moscow. Witkoff will travel to Moscow on 2 December to present the revised text to Vladimir Putin, in a visit that is part of a series of discreet contacts between American and Russian emissaries.
On the Ukrainian side, Umerov has insisted that he will not accept any agreement that legitimises annexations or leaves Ukraine defenceless against future aggression, while in Kiev, the resignation of Andriy Yermak, Zelensky's influential chief of staff, has opened an internal debate on how far concessions can be made without fracturing public opinion and the army. In Europe, Le Monde and other newspapers highlight the mixture of relief and concern: relief that the most egregious excesses of the first version have been corrected; concern because Washington retains the main leverage and could harden its position towards Kiev again if Moscow blocks the agreement.
Implications:
The Florida process reveals that ‘Trumpism for peace’ is not a humanitarian shift, but a pragmatic imperial retreat: reducing the costs of a distant war in exchange for an unbalanced peace. The United States has tested how far it could pressure Ukraine and its European allies, has noted the risk of political rupture, and is now recalibrating, but without renouncing its central objective: to close the Ukraine file in order to focus on China and the US domestic front.
Russia benefits from this dynamic without paying any price. The Kremlin has maintained its hard line and is watching as the US mediator himself scales back the plan in a direction more favourable to the fait accompli on the ground. Putin is in no hurry: each month of war consolidates occupations, wears down Ukraine and erodes the patience of Western taxpayers.
Zelensky, for his part, is caught between a battlefield that offers no spectacular victories, increasingly weary Western public opinion and a Ukrainian society that is unwilling to accept a peace perceived as covert surrender.
Yermak's departure reinforces the idea that the power architecture in Kyiv is adjusting to the new negotiating phase, where the real dilemma will be choosing what Ukraine loses: territory, military sovereignty or Western support. Europe appears to be a silent guest: it protests, qualifies, filters criticism through its major newspapers, but does not have its own strategic instruments to impose an alternative line.
As long as the EU continues to depend on the US security umbrella, its scope to counterbalance Trump's policy towards Ukraine will be limited, no matter how much Paris, Berlin or Warsaw seek to correct the course.
Trump-Maduro call: transactional geopolitics in the Caribbean
Facts:
Donald Trump confirmed that he spoke on the phone with Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, although he refused to describe the call as a success or a failure: ‘I wouldn't say it went well or badly, it was a phone call,’ he said. The conversation, leaked by the US press, reportedly took place in late November and involved Marco Rubio, a key figure in the hard line towards Caracas.
According to leaks, Trump offered Maduro and his entourage a safe exit in exchange for his immediate resignation and an agreed political transition. Days later, the US administration announced the designation of Maduro as the leader of a terrorist organisation linked to the Cartel of the Suns, and maintained the narrative of maximum pressure, while deploying military assets in the Caribbean and advancing the so-called Operation Southern Spear.
The media highlights the apparent contradiction: negotiating directly with someone who is described as a narco-terrorist, playing simultaneously with the stick and the carrot, and de facto reopening the file on a possible ‘regime change’ in Caracas, albeit without a clear commitment to military intervention. But in reality, the Honduran president imprisoned in the US is one of the most effective sources of relevant information about Maduro and the Cartel of the Suns. One cannot rush into criticism without having all the facts. In this context, the pardon of the former Honduran president makes perfect sense.
Implications:
The call to Maduro confirms what Latin America already knew: Washington's policy towards the region is eminently transactional, not moral. A leader can be demonised, sanctioned, isolated, and the next day offered a golden safe conduct if that outcome suits the interests of the moment. The message to regional elites is clear: what matters is not ethics, but usefulness to US strategic design.
For Maduro, the offer is both a recognition of his internal strength and a sign of external vulnerability. If Washington offers exile, it is because it sees no quick way to bring him down without prohibitive costs. If Caracas rejects it, it consolidates its internal image of resistance to imperial pressure, reinforced by the support of China, Russia, Iran and Cuba, and by sufficient oil revenues to maintain the regime's patronage machinery.
The region, meanwhile, watches with scepticism. Trump's rhetorical intervention in Honduras and his willingness to pardon a former president convicted of drug trafficking in the United States fit into the same logic: the rule of law becomes a geopolitical bargaining chip, not an immutable principle. It is a pattern that undermines Washington's credibility when it talks about democracy, anti-corruption or the fight against drug trafficking.
Russia's shadow fleet: oil, sanctions and hybrid warfare
Facts:
Over the weekend, Ukraine intensified its attacks on ships linked to Russia's ‘shadow fleet’ in the Black Sea, hitting at least two tankers near the Turkish coast: the Virat and the Kairos were damaged by naval drone attacks, forcing crews to evacuate and raising concerns about the security of key energy routes.
Recent investigations by the BBC and specialised media describe a shadow fleet of hundreds of ageing tankers transporting Russian crude oil in defiance of Western sanctions. A substantial proportion of these vessels sail without recognised insurance, under flags of convenience and with dubious safety records; they are estimated to handle around 10% of Russian oil exports.
Several European governments have also detected the use of these ships as platforms for espionage and sabotage activities, including cases of interference with submarine cables and oil pipelines. The tanker Eagle S was investigated by Finland after damage to communication cables between Finland and Estonia, and France detained the Boracay, suspected of involvement in drone operations over its maritime space. In response, a dozen European countries have coordinated to try to ‘disrupt and deter’ the activities of this fleet, combining sanctions and stricter control measures.
Implications:
The shadow fleet is the maritime manifestation of Russia's war economy: an ecosystem of semi-clandestine ships that combines oil smuggling, intelligence operations and sabotage capabilities in a single operational package. It is the dark side of energy globalisation: the same logistics chains that feed the global crude oil market become instruments of geopolitical pressure and hybrid warfare.
Europe has reacted late. For years, ships without adequate insurance, with opaque histories and unclear ownership, were tolerated because the market needed their cargo. Only when incidents multiplied—from damaged submarine cables to spills—did awareness of the systemic risk grow: an environmental catastrophe or critical sabotage could trigger a major economic and security crisis on the continent.[37] [36]
Ukrainian attacks on shadow fleet tankers are understandable from a war logic perspective: to strike at the financing of the Russian military machine. But they expose Kyiv to a strategic dilemma: the wider the radius of its operations, the more likely it is to affect the interests of third countries and open diplomatic fronts with actors such as Turkey, Greece or even Asian partners that import this crude oil. It is a delicate balance between military effectiveness and the political sustainability of the campaign.
China: eight months of manufacturing contraction
Facts:
China's official manufacturing PMI stood at 49.2 in November, slightly above October's 49.0 but below the 50 threshold that signals expansion, marking eight consecutive months of contraction. The private manufacturing index compiled by S&P Global fell to 49.9 from 50.6, surprising analysts and reinforcing the impression of structural weakness in the sector.
The services PMI also slipped below 50 for the first time since 2024, with the non-manufacturing aggregate standing at 49.5, indicating that the slowdown is no longer confined to factories but is spreading to the service sector. New orders and export orders improved marginally but remain in contraction territory, while October industrial profit data reflects a return to negative rates after several months of growth.
This dynamic comes despite a trade truce with the United States and selective stimulus efforts by Beijing. The trade war, the collapse of the property sector and weak domestic consumption are combining to weigh on investment, employment and business expectations.
Implications:
Eight months of contraction are not a temporary ‘bump’; they are a symptom of the Chinese model of investment- and export-intensive growth reaching its limits. The country is entering a phase of ‘structural slowdown’, where the debate is no longer whether it will grow at 8% or 6%, but whether it can sustain 4-5% without generating internal social and political tensions.
The fall in the services PMI indicates that consumption is not compensating for the exhaustion of the real estate cycle and lower global demand. With high youth unemployment and declining expectations, Chinese households are reducing spending and increasing precautionary savings, which in turn weakens domestic sales.
On the geopolitical front, a China that is growing less but maintaining its superpower ambitions is potentially more assertive, not less. History offers examples of powers that react to a loss of internal dynamism with more aggressive foreign policies, seeking to compensate for domestic weaknesses with symbolic external successes. The combination of economic slowdown, demographic pressure and strategic rivalry with the United States is a cocktail that calls for caution: the incentives to use nationalism as an escape valve are increasing.
Kazakhstan-Ukraine: the clash over the CPC terminal
Facts:
Kazakhstan has formally asked Ukraine to cease its attacks on the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) terminal in Novorossiysk, on the Russian Black Sea coast, after a naval drone attack forced the suspension of operations at the SPM-2 mooring, which is critical for crude oil loading. The CPC handles around 80% of Kazakh oil exports and more than 1% of global supply.
The Astana Foreign Ministry has stated that this is the ‘third instance of hostility’ against a ‘purely civilian’ infrastructure whose operation is protected by international law. Ukraine, for its part, has intensified its attacks on Russian refineries and oil terminals with the aim of eroding Moscow's ability to finance the war, including recent strikes against oil tankers linked to the shadow fleet.
Kazakhstan is attempting to redirect part of its exports, but its dependence on the CPC corridor remains high, and each day of disruption translates into significant revenue losses and strains on its external balance.
Implications:
This crisis illustrates the inevitable collision between Ukraine's strictly military logic and the complex economic network inherited from the USSR, where infrastructure now controlled by Russia also serves the vital interests of third countries. From Kiev's perspective, the CPC is a legitimate target: it channels crude oil via a Russian port and contributes to Moscow's revenues. From Astana, it is an essential economic artery that allows it to maintain a foreign policy that is relatively autonomous from the Kremlin.
Striking that artery penalises Russia, but also a partner that has tried to maintain a delicate balance between Moscow, Beijing and the West. Kazakhstan has avoided aligning itself with Russian aggression, has sought alternative partners and has allowed Ukraine some diplomatic leeway. Seeing its exports now threatened by Ukrainian attacks may push it towards a more distant or ambivalent stance towards Kyiv.
For Ukraine, this is a warning: the more it expands its campaign against ‘Russia-linked’ energy infrastructure, the more it risks eroding sympathy and support in a neighbourhood where many countries depend on mixed routes inherited from the Soviet era. The legitimacy of Ukraine's defensive war is not in question; what will be questioned is the perception of its conduct if innocent third parties bear part of the cost.
Airbus A320 software crisis: the invisible face of digital aviation
Facts:
A fault linked to solar radiation in ELAC (Elevator Aileron Computer) computers has forced Airbus to launch a software and, in some cases, hardware update campaign affecting around 6,000 A320 family aircraft, more than half of the global fleet of that model. The measure was precipitated by an incident on a JetBlue flight between Cancun and Newark, which suffered an uncommanded sudden descent and had to divert to Tampa, with several injuries.
European authorities issued an emergency directive prohibiting the affected aircraft from flying until the safe version of the software was installed or technical adjustments were made, causing massive cancellations and delays in the middle of the peak travel season. Approximately 4,000 aircraft can be resolved with a simple software update, while more than 1,000 require more extensive interventions.
Airlines such as American, Delta, Air France, Lufthansa, Avianca and ANA were forced to cancel or reschedule hundreds of flights, with the greatest impact on those whose fleets are based almost entirely on the A320 family. Airbus claims to have already completed the update on most aircraft, reducing the operational impact, but the episode has exposed unforeseen weaknesses in the design.
Implications:
The incident demonstrates that technological sophistication does not eliminate risks, it merely displaces them. Modern aviation relies on fly-by-wire architectures where each layer of software adds redundant safety... until it introduces a bug that no one had imagined, such as the susceptibility of certain computers to solar radiation spikes. The old comfort of mechanical redundancy is being replaced by reliance on algorithms whose full interaction even the manufacturers do not yet fully understand.
The immediate economic impact is significant but manageable. More worrying is the realisation that even a manufacturer as proven as Airbus can suddenly discover that a critical flight control element was vulnerable to a predictable natural phenomenon. If this can happen in a system as thoroughly audited as the A320, one wonders how many similar latent problems exist in other families of aircraft from other manufacturers.
There is a lesson here in technical and regulatory governance: the certification of digital systems must consider not only their operation under ideal conditions, but also their resistance to predictable physical attacks. This is an area where the authorities must be ahead of the industry, not behind it.
Elections in Honduras: polls under the shadow of Trump and drug traffickers
Facts:
Honduras held general elections on 30 November, with a polarised presidential race and multiple accusations of fraud even before the polls opened. Three candidates are vying for the presidency with real chances of winning: Rixi Moncada, former finance and defence minister and candidate for the left-wing LIBRE party; Nasry ‘Tito’ Asfura, from the National Party; and Salvador Nasralla, a television personality running with the Liberal Party.
Donald Trump intervened in the race by explicitly endorsing Asfura and announcing his intention to pardon former President Juan Orlando Hernández, sentenced to 45 years in prison in the United States for drug trafficking, adding an explosive component to the electoral context. At the same time, the Honduran Public Prosecutor's Office has denounced possible fraud conspiracies, and leaked recordings implicate figures from the National Party in conversations with military commanders about manipulating the process.
International observers point to a climate of widespread distrust of institutions, with poverty affecting around 60% of the population and a structural presence of drug trafficking and organised crime that conditions national politics.
Implications:
Trump's intervention in the Honduran campaign is a brutal reminder of the asymmetry of power: Washington claims the right to bless candidates and condition the judicial future of key figures in the country. Announcing a pardon for a former president convicted of drug trafficking in a US court, in the middle of the campaign, is the crudest expression of a double standard: justice is flexible when it serves a geopolitical or electoral objective.
For Honduras, the elections do not solve the underlying problems. Whoever wins will inherit a state partially co-opted by criminal networks, a subsistence economy and a society exhausted by violence and corruption. Moncada inherits both the wear and tear and the expectations of LIBRE's experience in power; Asfura carries the baggage of a National Party linked to drug trafficking; Nasralla offers an anti-establishment narrative with no clear guarantees of governability.
In this context, the legitimacy of the result will depend less on the vote count than on social perception. If allegations of fraud become the dominant narrative, the next government will be questioned from the outset.
Netanyahu and the presidential pardon: the clash between power and the rule of law
Facts:
Benjamin Netanyahu has officially requested a pardon from President Isaac Herzog to end his criminal trial on charges of fraud, breach of trust and bribery, which has been ongoing since 2019. In a letter and a voluminous legal memorandum sent to the presidency, his lawyers argue that the trial is ‘paralysing the political life’ of the country and that stopping it would serve ‘national unity’.
Netanyahu does not admit any guilt or commit to leaving political life. On the contrary, he continues to insist that he is the victim of politically motivated judicial persecution. Traditionally, pardons in Israel are granted after a final sentence and, on occasion, with the beneficiary's express admission of responsibility; Netanyahu's request breaks with both elements of this practice.
The request comes after Donald Trump sent a letter to Herzog asking for clemency for the prime minister, calling the case an example of ‘lawfare’ and ‘persecution.’ The ruling coalition is closing ranks and presenting the pardon as an instrument of ‘national reconciliation,’ while the opposition denounces it as an attempt to place the head of government above the law.
Implications:
Netanyahu's request is a head-on collision between two visions of democracy. For the prime minister and his entourage, electoral legitimacy — having won elections — grants immunity from judicial checks and balances. For a significant part of Israeli society, the essence of the rule of law is precisely that no leader, no matter how strongly supported at the polls, can escape the scrutiny of justice.
Herzog faces a dilemma with no easy solution. If he grants the pardon, he enshrines the idea that a leader can avoid trial by claiming ‘national interest’, almost irreversibly weakening the credibility of the judicial system. If he denies it, he will become the target of the Likud's media and political apparatus and will be accused of ‘betraying’ the nation at a time of regional crisis. Either decision will further fracture an already polarised country.
Beyond the specific case, Israel is gambling with something essential: whether its democracy will continue to be a combination of ballot boxes and separation of powers and checks and balances, or whether it will slide towards a plebiscitary model in which the leader legitimised by the elections is, de facto, on a different level from the rest of the citizens. This battle will determine not only Netanyahu's future, but also the nature of the Israeli regime in the coming decade.
Pope Leo XIV's visit to Lebanon: the Vatican's commitment to the last Christian frontier in the Middle East
Facts:
Pope Leo XIV has begun the second stage of his first international trip in Lebanon, after spending three days in Turkey. It is a highly symbolic visit: the first American pontiff is visiting the Arab country with the highest proportion of Christians and the only one with a Christian president, in the midst of an unprecedented economic, political and security crisis.
In Beirut, Leo XIV met with the authorities, called for peace to be put ‘above all else’ and insisted that Lebanon has not been forgotten by the international community. The highlight will be his silent prayer at the port of Beirut, the scene of the devastating explosion in 2020, the investigation into which remains blocked, a symbol of the structural impunity of the Lebanese system.
Throughout the trip, the Pope has warned that ‘the future of humanity is at stake’ if the escalation of conflicts is not contained, and has called on Israel and Hezbollah to seek dialogue rather than armed confrontation, in a context of growing tensions on the border and sporadic attacks that keep the country on tenterhooks.
Implications:
The Vatican sees Lebanon as more than just a state in crisis: it perceives it as the last frontier of Eastern Christianity, cornered by wars, persecution and mass emigration. If Lebanon collapses definitively or loses its Christian influence, the symbolic and demographic impact on the region as a whole would be devastating. In this sense, Leo XIV's visit is an operation of spiritual containment in the face of a deteriorating political and economic reality.
There should be no illusions: the Pope is not going to unblock Lebanon's institutional paralysis overnight, nor is he going to resolve the latent conflict between Israel and Hezbollah. But he can have a significant effect on the morale of an exhausted population and on the perception that the world has abandoned Lebanon. Faith is no substitute for the state, but in a country where the state has deserted its people, the Church also becomes an agent of moral resistance.
For Europe, Lebanese stability is more than just a humanitarian issue: it is a fragile barrier against new flows of refugees and the spread of instability to the Mediterranean. Ignoring this dimension while cutting aid and outsourcing migration management is a luxury that the continent may not be able to afford.
Joint US-Syria operations against ISIS: tactical convergence, strategic contradiction
Facts:
The US Central Command has reported more than twenty recent operations against Islamic State cells in Syria, carried out alongside local forces and, more indirectly, in political coordination with Damascus. In the south of the country, a series of air strikes and ground operations have destroyed some 15 weapons depots, containing more than 130 mortars, rockets, light weapons, mines and materials for improvised explosives.
At the same time, Syria has been formally incorporated as the 90th member of the Global Coalition against ISIS, which represents a minimal but significant political recognition after years of international isolation of the regime. At the same time, Washington maintains severe sanctions on the country and does not recognise the legitimacy of its government, while continuing to support the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces in the north-east.
US officials stress that the ISIS threat persists, with around 2,500 active fighters between Syria and Iraq, and that detention camps such as al-Hol and al-Roj are hotbeds of radicalisation if countries of origin do not repatriate their nationals.
Implications:
Cooperation against ISIS lays bare the schizophrenia of Western policy in Syria: the same enemy is being fought in de facto coordination with a regime that has been targeted for overthrow for more than a decade, without publicly acknowledging this convergence. It is realpolitik in its purest form: when the common enemy is sufficiently dangerous, regime change agendas are set aside, at least tactically.
However, this convergence does not resolve the underlying dilemmas. Assad remains in power, supported by Russia and Iran, and the territorial fragmentation of the country has consolidated into a mosaic of zones of influence. The US military presence in the northeast, the Turkish presence in the north, and the Russian presence at several key bases paint a picture of a multi-level semi-protectorate. In this context, operations against ISIS are necessary but not sufficient to stabilise Syria or to prevent the jihadist organisation from mutating again and exploiting power vacuums in the medium term.
The issue of ISIS detainees and their families is the most obvious time bomb. Western countries do not want to repatriate their nationals for security and domestic policy reasons, but keeping them indefinitely in camps with no legal prospects is a sure recipe for the radicalisation of a new generation. It is the 21st-century version of the mistakes made after Iraq and Afghanistan: fighting the symptom, not the conditions that feed the disease.
Media rack
Liberal Anglo-Saxon press (NYT, Washington Post, The Guardian, CNN, BBC, AP)
They give extensive coverage to the Florida talks, emphasising the concessions demanded by the US plan for Ukraine and the controversial figures of Witkoff and Kushner. They highlight the risks of legitimising Russian annexation, but also the weariness of Western public opinion in the face of an endless war. On Honduras, the focus is on Trump's interference and the precedent of pardoning Hernández. In the Netanyahu case, most of the analysis speaks openly of ‘democratic erosion’.
Western economic and conservative press (WSJ, Financial Times, The Times, Telegraph, Fox, CNBC)
The emphasis is on the markets: the impact of the A320 crisis on airlines, the risk of disruption to crude oil supplies due to the attack on CPC and the shadow fleet, and warning signs of weakness in Asian manufacturing. On the political front, they tend to see the peace plan as an opportunity to ‘close’ the Ukrainian front and focus on the rivalry with China, with some understanding of the positions of Trump and Rubio.
French-speaking world (Le Monde, Le Figaro, Libération, La Tribune de Genève)
They see the Ukraine negotiations as yet another symptom of Europe's marginalisation on its own periphery. At the same time, they highlight the Pope's visit to Lebanon and the risk of that country's definitive collapse. On energy issues, they are following with interest the shadow fleet and the ambiguous role of European shipowners.
German and Nordic press (FAZ, Die Welt, Die Zeit, Helsingin Sanomat)
Very concerned about energy security: the attack on the CPC, the Ukrainian strikes on the shadow fleet and European dependence on vulnerable routes dominate the economic headlines. In politics, there is a certain fatalism: the feeling that the future European security framework will be decided between Washington and Moscow, with Ukraine in the middle and the EU as a nervous spectator.
Israeli media (Yedioth Ahronoth, Haaretz, Israel Hayom, Jerusalem Post)
Divided almost down to the last millimetre: the more conservative see Netanyahu's pardon as a lesser evil to preserve stability in a multi-war environment; the more critical speak of a ‘blow to the separation of powers’. They also devote space to the Pope's statements on the two states, which some interpret as added moral pressure on Jerusalem.
Arab and regional media (Al Jazeera, Al Arabiya, Asharq al Awsat, An-Nahar, Jordan Times)
Al Jazeera emphasises the geopolitical dimension of the peace plan for Ukraine and the Pope's visit as a gesture towards Lebanon and Palestine, while Gulf networks are more interested in the impact of the shadow fleet and the CPC on oil prices and the rivalry with Russia within OPEC+. US-Syria military cooperation against Daesh is presented as confirmation of the absolute priority of the fight against terrorism over any ideological considerations.
Echoes in Ukraine, Russia and Eastern Europe (Kyiv Independent, Ukrinform, Ukrainska Pravda, TASS, RT)
The Ukrainian media speak of ‘difficult negotiations’ and fear that the final outcome will freeze a status quo that is very favourable to Russia. They do, however, emphasise that attacks on Russian oil infrastructure, including the shadow fleet and the CPC terminal, are part of an indispensable pressure strategy. The official Russian press presents the process as confirmation that the West has finally accepted the ‘realities on the ground’.
Latin America (Clarín, El Mercurio, Reforma, Honduran press)
A very critical view of Hernández's pardon: it is interpreted as the consecration of a US double standard in the fight against drug trafficking. In Honduras, the media are divided according to their partisan alignment, but all agree that Trump has turned the election into a plebiscite on his power of interference.