Gustavo de Arístegui: Geopolitical Analysis 27 November

1. United States: Jihadist terrorism and the spectre of 9/11
2. Ukraine: transactional diplomacy and the pragmatism of desperation
3. Indo-Pacific: China redistributes pressure and Tokyo faces impossible dilemma
4. Middle East: Pope Leo XIV and the diplomacy of hope in hostile territory
5. Tragedy in Hong Kong: the Wang Fuk Court fire
6. Indo-Pacific tensions: Taiwan rearms, Trump calls for restraint from Japan and Beijing threatens
7. Nigeria: Tinubu declares security emergency and orders mass recruitment
8. Coup in Guinea-Bissau
9. Venezuela: clash with six airlines in the midst of escalating tensions with the US.
10. Peru: 14 years in prison for former President Martín Vizcarra
11. Myanmar: mass amnesty ahead of elections branded a ‘farce’
12. Editorial conclusion

The last twenty-four hours have clearly exposed the fault lines in the international order that I have been systematically analysing. Washington faces a terrorist attack that lays bare the consequences of reckless immigration policies; negotiations on Ukraine reveal the transactional nature of Trumpian diplomacy; the Indo-Pacific witnesses how China redistributes geopolitical pressure towards manageable targets; and Pope Leo XIV embarks on a pilgrimage to the Middle East in circumstances that demand more than liturgical gestures. These are not isolated anomalies, but rather the consolidation of a new paradigm in which force, not law, dictates the terms of the game.

United States: Jihadist terrorism and the spectre of 9/11

Facts:

On 26 November, Rahmanullah Lakanwal, a 29-year-old Afghan national who entered the United States in September 2021 during the Biden administration's chaotic airlift from Kabul, ambushed and shot two members of the West Virginia National Guard who were patrolling near the White House. The two soldiers remain in critical condition. Lakanwal, who applied for asylum in 2024 and was granted it in April 2025 under the Trump administration, was also injured and arrested.

The FBI is investigating the incident as a possible act of international terrorism, although the specific motive has not yet been publicly clarified. President Trump called the attack ‘an act of evil, hatred and terror,’ ordered the mobilisation of 500 additional National Guard troops to Washington, suspended indefinitely the processing of immigration applications from Afghan nationals, and announced that his administration will thoroughly review all Afghans admitted during the Biden administration.

Implications:

This attack is not a statistical aberration, but the materialisation of warnings that have been systematically ignored by sectors of the American political power group. Jihadism, as I have argued in my books and articles, was not defeated; it mutated. The Lernaean Hydra grows new heads when the previous ones are cut off.

The hasty withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 not only represented a monumental strategic defeat for the West, but also opened the floodgates to a process of mass admission of Afghan refugees characterised by critical failures in security verification mechanisms, as documented by the Department of Homeland Security's Office of the Inspector General in its 2022 report.

The granting of asylum to Lakanwal in April 2025, already under the Trump administration, reveals that systemic problems in the screening of Afghan applicants were not corrected with the arrival of the new government, an implicit but devastating admission for the ‘security first’ narrative championed by the White House. Trump has responded with his characteristic forcefulness: a total suspension of the processing of Afghan applications, a massive review of those admitted during the Biden era, and unequivocal rhetoric about migration as ‘the greatest threat to national security.’ However, the political damage is considerable. Democrats, from Biden to Obama, have expressed their dismay, but their responsibility for the genesis of this crisis is indisputable: it was they who executed the chaotic withdrawal and who lacked adequate security protocols.

Beyond US domestic politics, this attack confirms that jihadist terrorism remains a persistent and evolving threat. The simplistic narrative that jihadism was ‘defeated’ with the physical elimination of leaders such as Osama bin Laden or Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi ignores the ideological and decentralised nature of this phenomenon.

The attack also highlights the failure of immigration policies that prioritise abstract humanitarian considerations over concrete national security imperatives. The United States, as I have repeatedly argued, has a moral obligation to protect those who risked their lives by collaborating with US forces in Afghanistan, but that obligation cannot be exercised at the expense of the safety of US citizens. The balance between compassion and prudence is non-negotiable.

Finally, the attack reinforces Trump's policy of militarising American cities under Democratic administrations. The presence of more than 2,000 National Guard troops in Washington has been fiercely criticised by Mayor Muriel Bowser and civil rights groups, who denounce it as an authoritarian and unconstitutional measure.

However, this attack, ironic as it may seem, partially validates Trump's logic: if two National Guardsmen deployed preventively were attacked, what would have happened without their presence? The answer is speculative, but politically Trump has gained invaluable ammunition to justify his ‘law and order’ doctrine.

Ukraine: transactional diplomacy and the pragmatism of desperation

Facts:

Volodymyr Zelensky declared on 26 November that Ukraine is ‘ready to move forward’ with the peace plan promoted by the White House, although he emphasised that he will personally discuss the ‘sensitive points’ of the agreement with President Trump. According to US sources, Kiev has accepted ‘in principle’ the terms of the revised plan, which was reduced from 28 to approximately 19 points following last weekend's negotiations in Geneva between delegations from the United States, Ukraine and the European E3 countries (France, Germany, United Kingdom).

The initial plan, which was heavily criticised for being overly favourable to Moscow, has been modified to remove elements such as Russia's return to the G8 and the use of Russian assets frozen under US control in Europe. However, the revised plan still calls for Ukraine to cede territory in eastern Donbas, limit the size of its army (although it was increased from 600,000 to 800,000 troops from the initial draft), and formally renounce NATO membership.

At the same time, US Army Secretary Dan Driscoll held secret meetings in Abu Dhabi with Russian representatives on 26 November in an effort to finalise the outstanding details of the agreement. Trump has indicated that his special envoy Steve Witkoff will travel to Moscow next week to meet with Vladimir Putin, and that he hopes to organise meetings with both leaders, Zelensky and Putin, when the agreement is ‘in its final stages’.

However, Moscow has publicly stated that it has not yet received an official updated version of the plan and that, in any case, it refuses to make ‘major concessions’. Information leaked to Bloomberg reveals that Witkoff, in unofficial conversations with Russian representatives, allegedly advised Moscow on how to handle the negotiations to obtain the best possible outcome with Trump, an explosive revelation that suggests disturbing coordination between the US presidential envoy and the Kremlin.

Implications:

We are witnessing the consolidation of the ‘hard transactional diplomacy’ that has defined Trump's second presidency. Historic alliances are no longer assumed on the basis of shared values, but are renegotiated quarterly on the basis of capital flows, kinetic security guarantees and energy alignments. This paradigm, which I have analysed in my articles in La Razón and El Debate, represents the definitive abandonment of the pretensions of the rules-based liberal order that characterised the post-Cold War era.

The peace plan for Ukraine is not, as Trump insists on characterising it, a ‘win-win’. It is a partial capitulation disguised as pragmatism. Ukraine is being forced to cede territory, limit its military capacity and renounce the protection that NATO membership would provide, all under the explicit threat of losing US military and financial support. Trump has made it clear that if Kiev rejects the agreement, Washington will cut off aid. This is the very definition of coercive diplomacy, not impartial mediation.

The modification of the plan following the Geneva negotiations – removing elements such as Russia's return to the G8 and increasing the limit on the Ukrainian army – shows that European pressure still carries some weight, but it does not alter the fundamentals of the agreement: Russia consolidates territorial gains obtained by force, Ukraine loses the prospect of Euro-Atlantic integration, and Europe is relegated to the role of latecomers to the stage.

The E3 has achieved cosmetic changes, but has not altered the strategic architecture of the agreement. The revelation that Steve Witkoff allegedly advised Moscow on how to negotiate with Trump is absolutely scandalous. If confirmed, it would constitute a flagrant violation of diplomatic protocols and raise serious questions about the presidential envoy's conflicts of interest.

Witkoff, a real estate entrepreneur with no previous diplomatic experience, has been Trump's business partner for years, which already raised doubts about his suitability for the position. The fact that he may also be acting as an informal adviser to the Kremlin represents an unacceptable level of conflict of interest. Congress should investigate this situation urgently, although given Republican control of both chambers, this is unlikely to happen.

From Zelensky's perspective, this is the most difficult moment of his presidency. He faces an impossible choice: accept a humiliating deal that betrays the principles Ukraine has fought for for nearly four years, or reject it and lose US support, which would likely lead to an even more devastating military defeat. Zelensky has opted for the former, not because he believes it is fair, but because he understands he has no alternative. His careful language about discussing ‘sensitive issues’ with Trump is a desperate attempt to preserve some dignity while capitulating to US pressure.

For Russia, this is a monumental strategic triumph. Putin consolidates territorial gains obtained through military aggression, neutralises the threat of a NATO-aligned Ukraine, and gains implicit recognition that he can use force to redraw borders without facing existential consequences. Moscow's declaration that it will not make ‘major concessions’ is not empty rhetoric; it reflects the reality that Russia is negotiating from a position of relative strength. The Kremlin knows that Trump needs a ‘deal’ in order to declare victory before the US midterm elections, and it is masterfully exploiting that need.

For Europe, this episode confirms its growing strategic irrelevance. Despite having invested billions of euros in military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine, Europeans have been sidelined in the negotiation process. Trump has dealt with Russia directly, relegating European allies to a secondary role.

The modification of the plan after Geneva is a meagre consolation that does not alter the fundamental dynamic: Washington and Moscow decide, Europe watches. This reality should be a brutal wake-up call for European capitals about the urgent need to develop autonomous strategic capabilities, but given the burden of decades of dependence on US security, it is unlikely that Europe will respond with the required urgency.

Finally, this agreement sets a dangerous precedent for the international order. If Russia can gain permanent territorial gains through military aggression without facing lasting consequences, what is to prevent other revisionist actors from attempting similar strategies? China is watching closely how the West responds to Russian aggression in Ukraine, drawing lessons about what it might expect if it decides to use force against Taiwan. The Western response to Ukraine not only determines that country's future, but sets precedents that will resonate throughout the international system for decades to come.

Indo-Pacific: China redistributes pressure and Tokyo faces impossible dilemma

Facts:

President Trump held back-to-back telephone conversations on 25 November with Chinese President Xi Jinping and Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi in an effort to contain the most serious diplomatic crisis between Beijing and Tokyo in years. The crisis was triggered when Takaichi told the Japanese Parliament in early November that a hypothetical Chinese attack on Taiwan could constitute a ‘survival-threatening situation’ for Japan and justify a Japanese military response. These statements, the most explicit ever made by a sitting Japanese prime minister on Taiwan, provoked a furious reaction from Beijing, which demanded Takaichi's retraction and unleashed a campaign of economic pressure against Japan, including warnings to Chinese citizens against travelling to Japan and threats of restrictions on Japanese seafood, films and concerts.

According to two Japanese government sources with direct knowledge of the matter, Trump urged Takaichi during their conversation to avoid further escalation of the dispute with China, although he did not make any specific demands. Trump's call with Takaichi came immediately after his conversation with Xi, in which the Chinese leader emphasised that ‘Taiwan's return to China’ is an integral part of the post-war international order, according to the official statement from the Chinese Foreign Ministry. Trump, for his part, did not mention Taiwan in his post on Truth Social after the call with Xi, limiting himself to stating that relations between the United States and China are ‘very good’ and that this is also ‘very good for Japan, which is our dear and close ally.’

China has stepped up its pressure on Japan beyond diplomatic rhetoric. The Chinese Communist Party published an editorial in the People's Daily on 27 November urging the United States to ‘restrain Japan’ to prevent ‘actions to revive militarism,’ invoking memories of World War II when China and the United States shared a common enemy.

China has also protested to the United Nations and warned that it will consider any Japanese deployment of missiles on islands near Taiwan as a deliberate attempt to ‘create regional tension and provoke military confrontation.’ For its part, Japan rejects China's demands for retraction, insists that its policy on Taiwan has not changed, and defends its preference for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue.

Implications:

This crisis represents a calculated redistribution of geopolitical pressure by Beijing following the trade truce reached with Washington at the summit in Busan, South Korea, in October. As I have consistently argued, China is a major geopolitical player whose strategy responds to a logic of hierarchical risk management. Beijing has strategically ‘cordoned off’ the United States in its foreign policy apparatus, stabilising that relationship to avoid a trade confrontation that could crash its economy, but the pressure does not simply disappear: it is redistributed towards targets that Beijing deems politically useful and manageable.

Japan and Taiwan have become the outlets for pressure that Beijing cannot direct against Washington without jeopardising the trade truce. This strategy is not new; China has historically used economic coercion against US allies—South Korea and Australia are recent examples—knowing that Washington rarely responds with the same level of commitment it would deploy if the target were US territory.

For Beijing, pressuring Japan has the added advantage of exploiting historical sensitivities related to World War II, a narrative that resonates both in China and elsewhere in East Asia, allowing Beijing to present itself as the defender of the ‘post-war international order’ against alleged ‘Japanese militarism.’

Takaichi's statements did not come out of a vacuum. The security debate in Japan has been evolving for a decade, driven by China's growing military power, North Korean threats, and the perception that the United States may not be willing to risk Los Angeles to defend Tokyo.

The strategy of ‘strategic ambiguity’ that both Japan and the United States have traditionally maintained on Taiwan — avoiding explicit commitments on military intervention — has been eroded by the reality that China has become more assertive and that Taiwan is now geographically and strategically inseparable from Japanese security. Japan's southernmost islands, such as Yonaguni, are less than 110 kilometres from Taiwan; a conflict in the Taiwan Strait would inevitably affect Japan.

However, Takaichi has crossed a critical line by making explicit what was previously implicit. Her statement that a Chinese attack on Taiwan could justify a Japanese military response represents the strongest position ever publicly taken by a sitting Japanese prime minister. This clarity has strategic advantages—it increases the credibility of Japanese deterrence and reduces the ambiguity that could invite miscalculation by Beijing—but it also has enormous costs. China has responded furiously because it understands that any normalisation of Japanese military involvement in a Taiwan crisis dramatically complicates Beijing's calculations about the use of force.

Takaichi's dilemma is that she cannot back down without suffering a devastating political blow at home, where her approval ratings hover around 70% precisely because the Japanese share her concerns about China. But if she does not back down, Chinese economic pressure will continue to intensify, with potentially significant costs for the Japanese economy. This is a classic foreign policy dilemma in which there are no easy solutions, only choices between bad options.

Trump's intervention adds an additional layer of complexity. By urging Takaichi to avoid escalation without making specific demands, Trump is sending mixed signals: on the one hand, he is reaffirming the alliance with Japan, but on the other, he is avoiding publicly backing the Japanese position, which constitutes a tactical victory for Beijing. If Xi believes that Trump has agreed to pressure Tokyo and nothing concrete materialises, the dispute could intensify further, potentially undermining the recent rapprochement between the United States and China. At the same time, the White House's silence on the China-Japan conflict, rather than explicitly backing its ally, is already a victory for Beijing.

Trump's admiration for Takaichi, a hardline nationalist who shares many of his positions on sovereignty and security, further complicates matters. Trump does not want to alienate an ally he personally admires, but he also does not want to jeopardise his truce with Xi. This is the classic trap of transactional diplomacy: when tactical agreements are prioritised over strategic principles, each new conflict becomes a precarious balancing act.

For China, Trump's satisfaction in calling Xi ‘a great leader’ and the prospect of future meetings may be enough for now, especially if Washington remains silent on the China-Japan conflict. But this situation is unsustainable in the long term. Japan is the United States' most important ally in Asia, and allowing Beijing to coerce it economically without consequences erodes the credibility of US security commitments throughout the region. If Washington is unwilling to back Japan in a dispute over Taiwan, why should other allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific trust US security guarantees?

Finally, this crisis exposes the limitations of the ‘summit diplomacy’ that Trump favours. Telephone conversations between leaders may ease momentary tensions, but they do not resolve deep structural differences on issues such as Taiwan. China considers Taiwan an inalienable part of its territory and has made clear that it is prepared to use force if necessary to prevent the island's permanent independence. Japan, for both strategic and ideological reasons, cannot remain indifferent to a forced change in the status quo in Taiwan.

And the United States, regardless of who occupies the White House, has legal and moral commitments to Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act. These positions are fundamentally incompatible, and no amount of presidential phone calls will reconcile them. The most that can be hoped for is to manage tensions to avoid an outbreak in the short term, but the long-term trajectory points toward an increasingly likely confrontation.

Middle East: Pope Leo XIV and the diplomacy of hope in hostile territory

Facts:

Pope Leo XIV began his first apostolic trip abroad on 27 November, a six-day pilgrimage to Turkey (27-30 November) and Lebanon (30 November-2 December). The trip, inherited from the plans of the late Pope Francis, has as its main objective to commemorate the 1,700th anniversary of the Council of Nicaea, where the Nicene Creed, the cornerstone of the Christian faith, was formulated. In Turkey, Leo XIV will meet with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Ankara, visit the Blue Mosque in Istanbul, and make a pilgrimage with Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I to Nicaea, where both Christian leaders will sign a joint declaration in a visible gesture of Christian unity.

The visit to Lebanon, where Leo XIV is the fourth pontiff to visit the country after Paul VI, John Paul II and Benedict XVI, seeks to revitalise a hard-hit Christian community and offer solidarity to all Lebanese who are still demanding justice for the devastating explosion at the port of Beirut in 2020, which left 218 dead and more than 7,000 injured. The Pope will meet with political leaders, celebrate a mass on the Beirut seafront that is expected to draw 100,000 people, participate in an interfaith meeting with Muslim and Druze leaders, and pray in silence at the site of the port explosion.

Significantly, Leo XIV will not visit southern Lebanon, which was devastated by the 2024 war between Israel and Hezbollah and has been the target of intensified Israeli attacks in recent weeks. Christian groups in southern Lebanon had pressed for the Pope to visit the area, but security considerations prevented the inclusion of that region in the itinerary.

The regional context remains extremely volatile. On 23 November, just four days before the Pope's arrival, Israel launched an air strike in Beirut that killed Hezbollah's chief of staff and four other people, wounding 28. Despite this, organisers insist that Leo XIV will be safe and that no extraordinary security measures have been taken, although they have not clarified whether the Pope's vehicles are armoured. The Vatican has emphasised that this trip represents a call for peace and reconciliation in a region ravaged by conflict.

Implications:

Leo XIV's trip to Turkey and Lebanon represents an act of pastoral courage in extremely difficult circumstances. Unlike his predecessors, who travelled in relatively stable contexts, Leo XIV arrives in a Middle East in flames, where the wounds of the Gaza war, the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, and broader regional tensions remain open and festering.

His decision to proceed with the trip despite security threats—including the Israeli attack on Beirut just days before his arrival—sends a clear message: the Church does not abandon its children in times of crisis.

However, it is imperative not to fall into the temptation of romanticising this trip as a solution to the structural problems of the Middle East. Pontifical diplomacy has very clear limits. The Pope can offer moral solidarity, highlight the suffering of civilian populations and make emotional appeals for peace, but he cannot alter the power dynamics that drive regional conflicts. Israel will continue its operations against Hezbollah regardless of papal exhortations. Iran will continue to support its proxies. And regional powers will continue to compete for influence without paying much attention to Vatican homilies.

The ecumenical component of the trip — the joint pilgrimage with Patriarch Bartholomew I to Nicaea — is significant from a historical and theological perspective. The East-West Schism of 1054 divided Christianity between the Catholic and Orthodox churches, a rift that persists a millennium later. Efforts by recent popes to heal this division have progressed slowly, and the signing of a joint declaration at the site where the Nicene Creed was formulated has considerable symbolic value. However, doctrinal and ecclesiological differences between Catholics and Orthodox remain deep, especially on issues such as papal primacy and the filioque. The road to Christian unity will be long and arduous, and a papal visit, important as it is, will not shorten it significantly.

In Lebanon, the Pope faces an even more complex challenge. The country is mired in a devastating political, economic and social crisis. The 2020 port explosion was only the most visible symptom of a dysfunctional political system characterised by sectarianism, endemic corruption and the capture of the state by predatory elites. Five years after the explosion, justice has not been served; investigations have been systematically obstructed by the very elites responsible for the criminal negligence that caused the tragedy. The Pope will pray at the site of the explosion, but prayers will not bring justice to the victims or hold the guilty accountable. Only sustained political pressure, both domestic and international, can achieve that, and so far that pressure has been insufficient.

The Lebanese Christian community, once vibrant and politically influential, has been decimated by decades of civil war, instability and mass emigration. Christians made up more than 50% of the Lebanese population in the mid-20th century; today they are approximately 30%, and that proportion continues to decline. Many young Lebanese Christians see little future in their country and emigrate in search of opportunities in Europe, North America and the Gulf. The Pope will seek to revitalise the spirit of this community, but words of encouragement do not create jobs, restore destroyed infrastructure or reform a corrupt political system.

The interfaith meeting that the Pope will hold with Muslim and Druze leaders in Beirut is commendable and necessary. Lebanon has historically been a model of religious coexistence in the Middle East, and preserving that model is crucial not only for Lebanon but for the entire region. However, interfaith coexistence in Lebanon has always been fragile, subject to political tensions and interference from external powers. Hezbollah, a Shiite organisation backed by Iran, dominates large swathes of Lebanese territory and has more military power than the national army. Its agenda is not peaceful coexistence, but perpetual conflict with Israel and the imposition of its ideological vision. The Pope can engage in dialogue with moderate Muslim religious leaders, but those leaders do not speak for Hezbollah or control its behaviour.

The exclusion of southern Lebanon from the papal itinerary is understandable from a security standpoint, but it is also problematic. Southern Lebanon has suffered disproportionately in conflicts with Israel, and the Christian population in that region feels marginalised and forgotten. By not visiting the south, the Pope unwittingly reinforces that perception of abandonment. Organisers argue that security considerations made the visit impossible, and it is true that Israel continues to carry out attacks in southern Lebanon, but the decision to exclude that region from the itinerary sends an unintended message that some victims deserve papal attention and others do not.

Finally, Leo XIV's trip must be understood in the broader context of his pontificate. As the first American pope in history, Leo XIV carries with him both the expectations and prejudices associated with his nationality. For many in the Middle East, the United States is seen as an unwavering ally of Israel and, by extension, as an accomplice to Israeli policies that have caused so much suffering to Palestinians and Lebanese. Leo XIV will need to carefully navigate these perceptions, emphasising his role as universal pastor rather than representative of American interests. His credibility in the region will depend on his ability to speak candidly about the injustices affecting all parties, including the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories and the actions of groups such as Hezbollah that perpetuate the cycle of violence.

In short, Pope Leo XIV's trip to Turkey and Lebanon is a courageous and necessary gesture of solidarity with beleaguered Christian communities and with all the peoples of the Middle East who yearn for peace. However, we should not expect miracles. Papal diplomacy can enlighten consciences, offer comfort to the afflicted, and remind the world that there are moral principles that cannot be sacrificed on the altar of political realism. But it cannot, on its own, resolve conflicts rooted in decades of history, fuelled by deep geopolitical rivalries, and sustained by actors who recognise no moral authority. The Pope can plant seeds of hope, but whether those seeds germinate will depend on the willingness of political leaders and communities across the region to break with the destructive patterns of the past and build a different future.

Tragedy in Hong Kong: the Wang Fuk Court fire

Facts:

A massive fire at the Wang Fuk Court residential complex in the Tai Po district of Hong Kong has left at least 55 people dead and nearly 300 missing in what is already considered one of the worst urban disasters in the city in decades. The fire spread rapidly through the framework of bamboo scaffolding and insulating materials used in renovation work. The police have arrested officials from a construction company whom they accuse of ‘gross negligence’ for using flammable materials and failing to implement adequate safety measures.

Implications:

For years, Hong Kong was a symbol of efficiency and the rule of law under the ‘one country, two systems’ framework. Today, following Beijing's authoritarian offensive and the imposition of the national security law, the territory combines political repression with regulatory deterioration. The fire lays bare the reality of a city with an extreme property bubble, ageing buildings and a supervisory system in which collusion between developers, contractors and authorities has too often been the norm.

From a geopolitical perspective, the tragedy will affect the narrative of ‘harmonious modernity’ that China wants to project. While Beijing lectures Japan and the West on security and social order, a disaster of this magnitude, linked to corruption and lax regulations, serves as a reminder that the Chinese model combines control with opacity, impunity and contempt for individual responsibility. For the markets, the direct impact will be limited, but the episode fuels the mistrust of a Hong Kong middle class already traumatised by political repression, the pandemic and the erosion of freedoms.

Indo-Pacific tensions: Taiwan rearms, Trump calls for restraint from Japan and Beijing threatens

Facts:

The Taiwanese government has announced a supplementary defence budget of $40 billion for the period 2026-2033, aimed at strengthening its capabilities in the face of growing Chinese military pressure. A key part of the package will be new purchases of US weapons; Taipei has already begun preliminary talks with the Pentagon and has received information on prices and delivery schedules. China, for its part, has warned that it will ‘crush’ any foreign attempt to ‘interfere with Taiwan’ and has reacted furiously to Japan's plan to deploy missiles on islands near the strait.

At the same time, it has been leaked that President Trump asked Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi ‘not to provoke’ China in relation to Taiwan, in a call following his conversation with Xi Jinping. Tokyo qualifies that the US version is ‘inaccurate’ but admits to contacts at the highest level.

Implications:

Washington is attempting to strike a delicate balance: containing China without precipitating a major crisis in the midst of trade negotiations and the war in Ukraine. Trump's private message to Takaichi suggests a clear priority: to avoid unilateral steps by allies that could derail the difficult ‘entente’ with Beijing on tariffs and financial stability. For Japan, a leading democratic power, the feeling that the US umbrella may subordinate regional security to short-term interests in trade and domestic politics is deeply unsettling.

Taiwan's rearmament is, in principle, a step in the right direction: increasing the cost of any Chinese aggression. But a budgetary effort of this magnitude will only make sense if it is accompanied by profound reforms in reservists, territorial defence, civil resilience and real coordination with the United States and allies, including Australia, the United Kingdom and, to a lesser extent, the European Union itself. The message that should come out of the West is clear: there will be no ‘Ukraine 2.0’ in the Taiwan Strait because the cost to Beijing would be prohibitive. For now, that message remains ambiguous, and Beijing exploits that ambiguity with calculated threats and provocative military manoeuvres.

Nigeria: Tinubu declares security emergency and orders mass recruitment

Facts:

Nigerian President Bola Tinubu has declared a ‘national security emergency’ following a wave of killings and kidnappings in several states across the country. He has ordered the recruitment of 20,000 new police officers – bringing their total number to 50,000 – authorised the army to increase its ranks and ordered the withdrawal of bodyguards from politicians and VIPs to deploy them to conflict zones, once they have been retrained. In addition, he has enabled National Youth Service camps to be used as training centres and given the green light to deploy forest rangers against armed groups operating from remote forests.

Implications:

Nigeria is Africa's demographic and economic giant, but also the epicentre of an explosive cocktail: Islamist insurgencies (Boko Haram and Islamic State franchises), rural banditry, conflicts between herders and farmers, organised crime and endemic corruption. Tinubu's decision is a belated recognition that the state has lost its monopoly on the use of force in large areas.

Quantitative reinforcement of security forces may be necessary, but it is not sufficient. If corruption within the security apparatus itself, collusion between local politicians and armed gangs, and the lack of economic opportunities for a massive and frustrated youth are not addressed, the ‘security shock’ risks remaining a mere gesture. For Europe – which talks so much about the ‘roots of irregular migration’ – Nigeria is key: a major collapse of internal order would have direct effects on migration flows to the Mediterranean and on the expansion of jihadist and drug trafficking networks towards the Sahel and the Atlantic. Once again, the EU is watching from the sidelines, while Russia, China and Turkey deepen their respective presences in Africa.

Coup in Guinea-Bissau

Facts:

A group of senior Guinea-Bissau army officers has announced that it has deposed President Umaro Sissoco Embaló and suspended the electoral process, citing the need to ‘clarify the situation’ before returning to constitutional order. The announcement comes in a country with a long history of coups, instability and strong penetration by drug trafficking networks, which have turned it into a veritable narco-state of transit to Europe.

Implications:

The coup in Guinea-Bissau is yet another link in the chain of democratic regression in West Africa (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Gabon, etc.). The region is sliding towards a constellation of military juntas, many of which tolerate the presence of jihadist groups while negotiating their survival with external actors, from Russia (via Wagner-type militias) to Latin American criminal networks.

For Europe, the relevance goes beyond regional stability: Guinea-Bissau is a critical point on the route of Latin American cocaine to the Old Continent. Each coup, each institutional breakdown, further weakens control mechanisms and makes it easier for cartels to do business. It is a perfect example of how organised crime, corruption and state fragility feed off each other. In response, Europe's response remains rhetorical, fragmented and belated, while some governments in the region play the “anti-Western” card to justify their own abuses.

Venezuela: clash with six airlines in the midst of escalating tensions with the US.

Facts:

Venezuela's despicable Chavista narco-dictatorial and terrorist regime has revoked the operating permits of six major international airlines – Iberia, TAP, Avianca, Latam Colombia, Turkish Airlines and Gol – for suspending their flights following a warning from the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) about the existence of a ‘potentially dangerous security environment’ in Venezuelan airspace. The regime accuses the companies of ‘joining in acts of state terrorism promoted by the United States’ and sanctions them for not resuming flights within the 48-hour deadline given by the government.

Implications:

The move fits with the Maduro regime's neo-Castroist pattern: verbal escalation, anti-American victimhood and punishment of private actors – in this case airlines, many of them European – for propaganda purposes. In practice, the main victims are Venezuelans themselves, who see their opportunities to travel, trade or simply meet with their families further restricted.

From a security standpoint, the FAA warning reflects concern about increased Venezuelan military activity, including naval presence in the Caribbean, in a context of US accusations about the regime's role in drug trafficking. Maduro's response raises the risk of incidents in Caribbean airspace and waters, and further complicates any prospect of an orderly transition in a country whose massive diaspora destabilises the entire region. The fact that part of the radical left in the United States and Europe continues to view Caracas with indulgence, if not complicity, is yet another example of the moral blindness of a certain selective anti-Americanism.

Peru: 14 years in prison for former President Martín Vizcarra

Facts:

A Peruvian court has sentenced former President Martín Vizcarra to 14 years in prison for accepting bribes from construction companies worth around $676,000 while he was governor of the Moquegua region (2011-2014), in exchange for the awarding of public works contracts. The sentence also includes a nine-year ban on holding public office. Vizcarra, who has always presented himself as a champion of anti-corruption, denies the charges and denounces ‘political persecution’, while his lawyers announce an appeal.

Implications:

Peru has become an extreme laboratory for Latin American political pathology: almost all of its recent presidents have been investigated, prosecuted or imprisoned for corruption. Vizcarra's conviction can be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, it shows that, at least in part, the justice system is capable of bringing the highest authorities to court for systemic corrupt practices. On the other, it reflects a political system so fragmented and polarised that almost any criminal case is seen as a vendetta between factions.

For the region, the case reinforces an uncomfortable conclusion: neither the self-proclaimed ‘progressive’ left nor the traditional right have been able to build solid institutions that respect the rule of law. Many leaders have used anti-corruption rhetoric as a tactical weapon, while keeping their patronage networks intact. Without profound reform of parties, political financing and the justice system, Latin America will remain trapped between left-wing and right-wing populism and authoritarian adventurism that uses public discontent as leverage.

Myanmar: mass amnesty ahead of elections branded a ‘farce’

Facts:

Myanmar's military junta has announced the pardon or withdrawal of charges against 8,665 people, arguing that this will allow them to vote in the upcoming elections, which Western governments and human rights organisations have described as a ‘farce’. Among those benefiting are more than 3,000 people convicted under Section 505A of the Penal Code, which criminalises comments considered to generate fear or spread ‘fake news’, and another 5,580 people with pending cases. It is unclear how many actual political prisoners will be released or when.

Implications:

The junta is attempting to cloak a regime born of a coup d'état and responsible for massive crimes against the civilian population, especially against minorities such as the Rohingya, in electoral legitimacy. Selective amnesty serves several purposes: to ease international pressure, divide the internal opposition, and offer some detainees the false promise of ‘normalisation’ in exchange for silence.

It is the kind of manoeuvre that certain authoritarian governments – from Asia to Latin America – use to simulate controlled openings that do not challenge the real power of the armed forces and associated economic elites. Meanwhile, the international community is largely limited to symbolic statements and sanctions, without a serious strategy to support civil society and victims. For Myanmar's large neighbours – China and India – the priority remains stability and access to resources, not democracy or human rights.

Editorial conclusion

This is the picture of the last 24 hours: a world where the fires in Hong Kong, the gunshots a few metres from the White House and the invisible threads of the negotiations on Ukraine are all part of the same crisis of leadership and meaning in the West. While dictatorships – from Caracas to Moscow, from Naypyidaw to Tehran – move with cold consistency in defence of their interests, democracies seem caught between empty political correctness, strident populism and a worrying lack of strategic vision.