Gustavo de Arístegui: Geopolitical Analysis 3 February

1. Introduction
2. US-India: lower tariffs in exchange for cutting off Russian oil
3. The great technological lever: SpaceX acquires xAI and an AI-space-communications complex is born
4. Ukraine: ‘multi-layered’ plan for a ceasefire with operational deterrence
5. Iran: a regime that mocks its dead and displays its panic
6. US launches Project Vault: strategic reserve of critical minerals
7. China courts Uruguay: ‘multipolar world’ and penetration in Latin America
8. Russia announces a 'world without nuclear limits' after the end of New START
9. Turkey and Saudi Arabia: Erdogan in Riyadh, economic pragmatism and regional realignment
10. Venezuela: Delcy Rodríguez meets with US envoy and opens diplomatic channel with energy dimension
11. US: House seeks to restore federal funding and avoid paralysis
12. Media rack
13. Editorial commentary

Introduction

The last 24 hours have consolidated a pattern of our times: Washington uses trade, tariffs and energy as instruments of strategic pressure; mega-mergers between space, communications and artificial intelligence are shaping a new technological-strategic complex; the nuclear arms control architecture is entering a dangerous phase of decomposition; dictatorships flaunt their own repressive obscenity; and revisionist powers exploit gaps in Western presence in Latin America and the developing world. 

Donald Trump's agreement with India turns access to the US market and tariff reductions into leverage to strangle Russian oil revenues; the SpaceX-xAI integration elevates geopolitical competition to the level of orbits and algorithms; Moscow bluntly announces its willingness to live in a world without verifiable nuclear limits; Tehran mocks its victims and shows how much it fears that fear will cease to work; Beijing redoubles its seductive offensive in Latin America; Washington builds a ‘critical minerals shield’ against China; and Caracas returns to the centre of hemispheric diplomacy with an institutional shift of enormous significance and energetic resonance. 

US-India: lower tariffs in exchange for cutting off Russian oil

Facts 

Reuters confirms that the United States has agreed to reduce tariffs on imports from India from 25% to 18% as part of an understanding linking trade, energy and strategic alignment. In exchange, Narendra Modi's government has committed to halting purchases of Russian oil and redirecting part of its imports towards US and, potentially, Venezuelan crude, with a complementary package of purchases of energy, technology, agricultural products and other US goods valued at more than £500 billion in the medium term. India, the world's third-largest crude oil importer, had already been gradually reducing its purchases of Russian oil and is preparing to bring them below one million barrels per day, according to market sources cited by Reuters. 

Implications 

Energy geopolitics in its purest form. India's decision, if implemented in a substantive manner, erodes one of Moscow's main financial lifelines since 2022: its ability to place discounted crude oil in Asia to compensate for the closure of Western markets. This is not moralising, but strategic accounting: less Russian volume to India means less cash flow to the Kremlin's war and repression machine, reducing its margin for sustaining a prolonged war of attrition against Ukraine. 

Trump unifies sanctions, trade and energy into a single pressure tool. The agreement reflects his method: the credible threat of raising tariffs (up to 50% in previous episodes) becomes a carrot when the partner agrees to align its geopolitical behaviour with Washington's priorities. This is not free trade; it is transactional negotiation based on the correlation of forces and the exploitation of the attractiveness of the US market. 

Domino effect on global crude oil flows and energy diplomacy. The combination of a greater presence of US crude oil in India and the eventual entry of Venezuelan volumes will reorder routes, transport premiums, discounts and, predictably, the relative position of OPEC+ vis-à-vis Washington. For Moscow, the loss of market share in India reinforces its dependence on China and other buyers willing to take reputational and sanction risks. 

Outlook and scenarios 

• Scenario A (likely): gradual reduction, negotiated with technical exceptions and a flexible timetable allowing Indian refineries to close existing contracts and reconfigure their crude mix without creating internal price tensions. 
• Scenario B (tense): if Russia responds with aggressive discounts or opaque triangulation via intermediaries, Washington will increase pressure through secondary sanctions, compliance controls and enhanced surveillance of maritime and financial flows. 
• Scenario C (strategic): with the shift consolidated, Europe would benefit indirectly from a reduction in Russian oil revenues and a Kremlin forced to negotiate from a weaker position, with less scope to finance military adventures and destabilisation operations. 

The great technological lever: SpaceX acquires xAI and an AI-space-communications complex is born

Facts

SpaceX has acquired xAI, the artificial intelligence company promoted by Elon Musk and creator of the Grok model, in a deal that values the combined entity at around 1.25 trillion dollars, the largest corporate agreement in history. 

Information from Bloomberg and Reuters, collected by specialised media, places the previous valuation of SpaceX at approximately 800 billion dollars and that of xAI in the range of 230 billion dollars. Information from Bloomberg and Reuters, reported by specialised media outlets, puts SpaceX's previous valuation at approximately 800 billion dollars and xAI's in the range of 230-250 billion, following a large Series E funding round. Musk's stated thesis is to converge launch capacity, satellite constellations (Starlink), data centres and AI models into a single corporate muscle capable of operating, in part, from orbit. 

Implications 

A new ‘technological-strategic complex’ is born. The combination of reusable rockets, mega satellite constellations, global communications networks and large-scale AI models makes the new entity a central player not only in the economy, but also in national security, intelligence and information control. The qualitative leap lies in the possibility of integrating observation, processing and communication capabilities in near real time, with dual civil and military applications. 

Intensification of systemic competition with China and the tech giants. The SpaceX-xAI merger foreshadows a duel with the Sino-technological ecosystem, where Beijing is advancing in the civil-military integration of space, AI and telecommunications, while at the same time putting pressure on other large US and European groups that lack their own aerospace platform. The risk for Europe, if it does not accelerate investment and joint projects, is that it will be relegated to the role of regulatory customer, without the ability to set technological standards or doctrines of use. 

Regulatory, security and power concentration risks. The clearly dual nature of the infrastructure (civil-military) makes intense scrutiny by the US authorities inevitable in terms of national security, competition and data protection. The accumulation of critical capabilities—launchers, global communications network, advanced computing and generative AI—in a single group raises questions about state dependence on a private provider, conflicts of interest and the need for contractual and regulatory firewalls. 

Outlook and scenarios 

• Scenario A (likely): the Musk ecosystem gains momentum, capital and integration capacity; Washington accepts the operation but imposes safeguards, compartmentalisation clauses and enhanced oversight on sensitive projects (defence, intelligence, critical infrastructure). 
• Scenario B (friction): intense debate in Congress and regulatory agencies about concentration and systemic risks, with pressure to limit the Pentagon's and other agencies' dependence on a virtually irreplaceable conglomerate. 
• Scenario C (systemic competition): China accelerates its own integration of constellations, computing and AI models, while Europe explores ‘technological sovereignty’ projects that, without critical mass or real coordination, risk falling by the wayside. 

Ukraine: ‘multi-layered’ plan for a ceasefire with operational deterrence

Facts 

According to reports in Reuters and the Financial Times, Kiev has agreed with its Western allies on a phased response to possible Russian violations of a future ceasefire. The plan has three levels: an initial response within 24 hours through diplomatic warnings and limited Ukrainian action; if the violations persist, activation of a European ‘coalition of the willing’ and other partners to support Ukraine with additional capabilities; and, in the event of a serious escalation, a third level with coordinated involvement of the United States within 72 hours. Meetings are planned in Abu Dhabi to specify the terms, modalities and rules of engagement. 

Implications 

Deterrence through mechanisms, not rhetoric. The relevant change is that Ukraine's security and Russia's containment no longer rest on generic statements but are structured in an operational ‘if-then’ system with defined deadlines and stages. Moscow has historically exploited ambiguity and the absence of clear costs for violating agreements; this framework seeks to close that gap. 

For the first time, Europe appears as an explicit part of the military solution. The notion of a ‘coalition of the willing’ points to a group of European states willing to take on additional risks—from air defence support and enhanced ISR capabilities to a presence in verification or protection tasks—breaking with the logic of indefinitely outsourcing security to Washington. 

Tension between credibility and control of escalation. For Russia, the formalised involvement of Western powers in guaranteeing the ceasefire will be unacceptable in terms of narrative and strategic calculation; it is likely to use it to justify its own rhetorical or tactical escalation. The fine line between ‘credible guarantee’ and ‘risk of direct confrontation’ becomes the heart of the problem. 

Outlook and scenarios 

• Scenario A (likely): the scheme is used as a framework for negotiating pressure; Russia tests it with “grey” violations, incidental incidents and electronic warfare, without initially crossing thresholds that would trigger the full activation of the coalition. 
• Scenario B (dangerous): a serious incident between Russian forces and European units on support or verification tasks, suddenly raising the threshold for escalation and testing allied cohesion. 
• Scenario C (desirable): the mere existence of a credible, graduated mechanism reduces Russia's incentives to break the rules, encourages less deceptive negotiations and improves Kiev's position at the table. 

Iran: a regime that mocks its dead and displays its panic

Facts 

The Financial Times describes a wave of internal outrage following Iranian state media broadcasts ridiculing victims of repression, with symbolic boycotts, protests and social pressure forcing partial rectifications. Reuters, citing internal sources, notes that there is a real fear within the regime that a limited US attack — for example, against infrastructure linked to proxies or military capabilities — could act as a psychological trigger for new mass protests, in a context of accumulated social discontent and erosion of the intimidating effect of terror. 

Implications 

Public cruelty as a symptom of weakness, not strength. The organised mockery of the victims reveals that the theocratic-revolutionary leadership no longer relies on obedience out of conviction or revolutionary legitimacy: it relies solely on fear. When a regime needs to humiliate the dead in order to try to rule the living, it confesses that it has lost the respect of large sectors of society. 

Tehran perceives the combination of ‘external blow + internal anger’ as an existential risk. The experience of previous waves of protest, amplified by social media and the diaspora, weighs heavily on the regime's calculations; even limited US military action could act as a catalyst for accumulated anger, calling into question the repressive capacity of the apparatus. 

Proxies, regional blackmail and the temptation to forge ahead. A regime that feels cornered will tend to activate its levers of pressure: allied militias in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon; attacks or sabotage against energy infrastructure and maritime routes; escalating rhetoric against Israel and the West. The West cannot afford another decade of looking the other way while the cost of inaction accumulates in the form of regional insecurity, proliferation and erosion of credibility. 

Outlook and scenarios 

• Scenario A (likely): Tehran buys time through delaying diplomacy—tactical concessions, endless negotiations—while perfecting mechanisms of selective repression and technological social control. 
• Scenario B (high risk): regional escalation if the United States significantly reinforces its military presence or responds to proxy attacks; asymmetric Iranian response with indirect attacks, cyber operations and maritime pressure. 
• Scenario C (rupture): convergence of external shock, fissures among the elites and a breakdown of the wall of fear, leading to a resurgence of mass protests with a cascade effect, difficult to manage even with extreme repression. 

US launches Project Vault: strategic reserve of critical minerals

Facts

The Financial Times and Reuters report the launch of ‘Project Vault’, a US initiative with a budget of around 12 billion dollars to build a strategic reserve of critical minerals — rare earths, lithium, copper and other basic inputs for energy transition and defence — equivalent to approximately 60 days of industrial consumption in key segments. 

The scheme is organised through a public-private consortium involving the US Export-Import Bank and large companies in the industrial, technological and defence sectors, which will participate in financing and management. The scheme is organised through a public-private consortium involving the US Export-Import Bank and large companies from the industrial, technology and defence sectors, which will participate in financing, stock management and procurement coordination. 

Implications 

A strategy that really hits home: dependence on China in the critical minerals value chain. Beijing not only extracts, but also concentrates a very substantial part of the global refining and processing capacity for rare earths and other minerals, which has allowed it to use export restrictions as a political tool. A strategic reserve does not eliminate structural dependence, but it significantly reduces immediate vulnerability to shocks or retaliation. 

Defensive industrialisation and competition for inputs. The energy transition (electric vehicles, grids, storage) and advanced military capabilities (sensors, electronics, weapons systems) compete for the same materials. Controlling stable access to critical minerals is now an essential component of national power, on a par with energy or semiconductor technology. 

Warning to Europe. If the European Union does not develop comparable instruments—purchasing consortia, coordinated strategic reserves, support for refining and recycling on European territory—it will remain exposed to ‘material blackouts’ just as it attempts to reindustrialise, decarbonise and strengthen its defence base. 

Outlook and scenarios 

• Scenario A (likely): the programme stabilises price volatility in specific crises and strengthens the bargaining power of US companies and authorities vis-à-vis dominant suppliers. 
• Scenario B (Chinese response): Beijing tightens export controls, uses selective licensing regimes to divide allies, and rewards or punishes companies based on their political alignment. 
• Scenario C (Atlantic): window for a coordinated transatlantic consortium, with the participation of Asian allies, combining financial muscle, refining capacity and standards of transparency and sustainability. 

China courts Uruguay: ‘multipolar world’ and penetration in Latin America

Facts 

Reuters reports on Xi Jinping's statements during his meeting with the Uruguayan president, in which the Chinese leader invokes an ‘equal and multipolar world’ and presents the relationship with Uruguay as an example of ‘win-win’ cooperation in Latin America. The visit is part of a long campaign of Chinese economic diplomacy in the region, based on investment in infrastructure, soft loans, preferential trade agreements and purchases of strategic raw materials. 

Implications 

Chinese ‘multipolarism’ is selective and asymmetrical. Beijing talks about equality and mutual respect, but pursues relationships of structural dependence: captive markets for its companies, guaranteed access to raw materials, political influence through debt and participation in strategic sectors (ports, energy, telecommunications). 

Latin America is returning to the centre of systemic competition. Uruguay, with its institutional stability and image of a relatively open and predictable economy, is a reputational trophy for China's narrative as a 'serious partner' in contrast to a West perceived as distant and moralising. Each new investment, credit or infrastructure agreement also reinforces Beijing's footprint in a region historically linked to Europe and the United States. 

Europe cannot limit itself to discourses on values. Without a financial presence, infrastructure projects, attractive trade agreements and real technical support, the rhetoric about the ‘European model’ loses credibility with governments that need tangible results. 

Outlook and scenarios 

• Scenario A (likely): China deepens trade and investment agreements in Uruguay, framing them as a ‘win-win’ narrative and one of respect for sovereignty, while consolidating its position in strategic sectors. 
• Scenario B (tension): The United States reacts with trade pressure, conditioning access to technologies or offering alternative incentives to counter Chinese presence. 
• Scenario C (desirable): a coordinated Western response—EU, US and democratic partners—combining competitive financing, technology and transparency standards, offering Montevideo and other partners a real alternative to dependence on Beijing. 

Russia announces a 'world without nuclear limits' after the end of New START

Facts 

Russian Deputy Minister Sergei Ryabkov stated that Russia is prepared to live in a world without nuclear arms control limits after the New START treaty expires on 5 February, in the absence of a last-minute agreement with Washington. The treaty, signed in 2010 by Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev, established verifiable limits on the strategic arsenals of the United States and Russia and, above all, inspection and transparency mechanisms that reduced mutual uncertainty. 

Implications 

Opening of a strategic black hole. Without verifiable limits or regular inspection channels, uncertainty, mistrust and the temptation to overreact to any sign of deployment or doctrinal change increase. The history of the Cold War shows that periods without arms control frameworks are conducive to arms races and perception crises. 

Destabilisation as a strategy. Putin does not need to fire a single missile to make Western security more expensive: it is enough to blow up the frameworks of predictability and force the US and its allies to invest more in nuclear capabilities, missile defence and complementary systems. The opportunity cost for open economies and democracies multiplies, while the Russian regime can justify its own militarisation internally. 

Europe must translate ‘deterrence’ into resources, industry and resilience. A world without New START forces NATO to review its doctrines, capabilities and degree of preparedness, and Europeans to accept that Atlanticism is not a sentiment, but an insurance policy that is paid for with budget, production and political will. 

Outlook and scenarios 

• Scenario A (likely): absence of a formal treaty, accompanied by occasional signs of unilateral self-restraint or non-binding 'minimum understandings', exploited for propaganda purposes by Moscow. 
• Scenario B (worst): open deployment race, accelerated modernisation of delivery systems, more aggressive doctrines and experimentation with emerging systems, increasing the risk of incidents or miscalculations. 
• Scenario C (difficult but necessary): search for a minimum framework of transparency, notification of exercises and time limits on certain systems, perhaps partially or regionally, as a bridge to a renewed control architecture. 

Turkey and Saudi Arabia: Erdogan in Riyadh, economic pragmatism and regional realignment

Facts 

According to The Economist and regional media, Recep Tayyip Erdogan is travelling to Riyadh to meet with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, with an agenda focused on trade, investment, defence cooperation and political coordination regarding the main regional theatres (Syria, Gaza, Red Sea). The visit is part of Turkey's strategy to attract foreign capital to alleviate internal imbalances and Saudi Arabia's agenda to diversify alliances and strengthen its position as a pole of relative stability in the Middle East. 

Implications 

Hard pragmatism in the Middle East. Ankara and Riyadh are leaving behind phases of acute rivalry (the Khashoggi case, differences over political Islam) to prioritise economic interests, macro stability and large-scale projects. For Erdogan, Saudi capital is oxygen; for MBS, Turkey is a player whose position on Syria, the Muslim Brotherhood and the eastern Mediterranean matters for the regional architecture. 

Impact on Syria, Gaza and the Red Sea. Coordination (or lack thereof) between Turkey and Saudi Arabia may affect the dynamics of proxy wars, the balance between Islamist and nationalist blocs, and the management of energy and trade routes. Riyadh aims to limit volatility, while Ankara seeks to maximise its influence without renouncing its ideological and security networks. 

Europe faces an uncomfortable but indispensable partner. Turkey is key to managing migration flows, the security of NATO's south-eastern flank, energy and crisis containment in its neighbourhood, but its foreign policy is often ambivalent and its internal drift worrying. Treating it only with moralism or, conversely, with blank cheques, will be equally counterproductive. 

Outlook and scenarios 

• Scenario A (likely): conclusion of economic agreements, investments and limited forms of defence cooperation, with messages of stability and coordination towards external partners. 
• Scenario B (friction): reopening of differences over political Islam, networks of influence and relations with Qatar, Iran and other actors, which would limit the depth of the alliance. 
• Scenario C (opportunity): if Ankara moderates certain positions and Riyadh maintains its gradual reform agenda, the relationship could contribute to a certain ‘pacification’ of some theatres; if not, it will add noise to an already saturated environment. 

Venezuela: Delcy Rodríguez meets with US envoy and opens diplomatic channel with energy dimension

Facts 

Reuters and Le Monde report on a meeting at the Miraflores Palace between interim President Delcy Rodríguez and US envoy Laura Dogu, as part of a process of gradually re-establishing diplomatic relations between Washington and Caracas. 

According to the same sources, a three-phase roadmap attributed to Secretary of State Marco Rubio (stabilisation, recovery and reconciliation, transition) is being implemented, linking gradual sanctions relief to verifiable reforms and concrete commitments on democracy, human rights and the fight against organised crime. The energy dimension is central: the US seeks to rebalance its supply matrix, offer alternatives to Russia and manage the regional effects of the Venezuelan crisis, especially in terms of migration and security. 

Implications 

The Venezuelan issue returns to the category of hard geopolitics. Beyond the humanitarian tragedy, Venezuela is now a hub where energy issues, transnational criminal networks, Russian, Chinese and Iranian presence, and the stability of the American continent intersect. The reactivation of dialogue with Washington alters the calculations of Havana, Managua and other allies of Chavismo. 

Indirect message to other dictatorships in the region. The signal is twofold: on the one hand, that sustained pressure has costs; on the other, that there is a negotiated way out if real reforms are accepted and the mafia component of the regime is deactivated (even if only partially). The risk for Washington and its allies is to confuse cosmetic gestures with structural changes. 

Danger of ‘laundering’ mafia structures and a simulated transition. The temptation to quickly close a deal for energy or migration reasons could lead to whitewashing criminal networks entrenched in the state apparatus and accepting a ‘showcase democratisation’ that perpetuates the same powers behind the scenes. 

Outlook and scenarios 

• Scenario A (probable): gradual progress, conditional on verifiable steps (release of prisoners, minimal electoral reforms, controlled opening of political spaces), with adjustments in sanctions linked to compliance. 
• Scenario B (risk): fractures within the regime, resistance from narco-criminal sectors and sabotage of the roadmap, leading to episodes of violence and abrupt setbacks. 
• Scenario C (desirable): negotiated transition with guarantees, progressive reinstitutionalisation and real dismantling of the narco-repressive network, with coordinated regional support. 

US: House seeks to restore federal funding and avoid paralysis

Facts 

Reuters reports that the US House of Representatives is preparing to vote on an agreement to restore federal government funding, following a new episode of budgetary tension that had brought the country close to a partial administrative shutdown. If successful, the compromise would offer temporary respite and avoid the interruption of essential services and programmes at a time when the Trump administration needs fiscal and political leeway to sustain its foreign agenda. 

Implications 

Domestic politics as a vector of geopolitics. Every budget crisis, every threat of a shutdown, is interpreted in Moscow, Beijing or Tehran as an indicator of systemic dysfunction in the leading Western democracy. The United States' ability to lead coalitions, uphold security commitments and project stability is eroded by the perception of recurring domestic chaos. 

Strategic credibility and institutional normality. Deterrence is exercised not only with aircraft carriers and missile systems, but also with the image of a state that functions, fulfils its commitments and is not regularly paralysed by partisan blockages. A Washington absorbed by internal crises conveys fragility and offers opportunities to revisionist actors. 

Trump's transactional approach needs a minimum of stability. In order to use tariffs, sanctions, trade incentives and military pressure as part of a coherent foreign strategy, the White House needs a Congress capable of passing reasonable budgets and avoiding the politics of permanent brinkmanship. 

Outlook and scenarios 

• Scenario A (likely): approval of the agreement and temporary relief, with mutual recriminations but recognition that a shutdown would be too costly politically. 
• Scenario B (repeat): reappearance of the same pattern of almost cyclical crises, fuelled by extreme polarisation and media and electoral incentives for permanent confrontation. 
• Scenario C (best): a more structural agreement that reduces the frequency of budgetary battles and improves the capacity for foreign and defence policy planning. 

Media rack

• Reuters, AP, AFP and DPA provide the factual backbone of the day: US-India agreement, ceasefire dynamics in Ukraine, Iran, New START and Venezuela; the British agency dominates the hard agenda with a focus on verifiable data and key quotes. 
• The Financial Times emphasises the intersection between economics and security, especially in critical minerals, Ukraine and the power architecture derived from the SpaceX-xAI mega-merger. 
• The Economist frames India, SpaceX-xAI and Erdogan's visit to Riyadh as pieces of the same epochal transition, where power is measured in supply chains, technological capabilities and flexible alliances. 
• Le Monde and other European media outlets emphasise the Venezuelan shift, the diplomatic dimension of the rapprochement with Washington and the regional reading in the EU. 
• The Straits Times and other Asian newspapers report on Russia's warning about the end of New START, a sign that the erosion of nuclear arms control is now perceived as a global problem, not just a Euro-Atlantic one. 

Editorial commentary

The day leaves Europe with an uncomfortable truth: the real world does not wait for powers that doubt themselves. While the EU remains mired in introspective debates, Washington has shown that a seemingly technical issue, such as tariff reductions, can become a powerful tool for stifling Russia's war profits. The method may be debatable, but it would be a form of wilful blindness to deny the strategic potential of the move: if the flow of Russian oil to India is significantly reduced, the Kremlin's coffers will shrink and, with them, its ability to sustain a long war in the heart of Europe. 

At the same time, the SpaceX–xAI mega-merger has made it clear that 21st-century geopolitics is no longer played out solely in foreign ministries, military headquarters or at the negotiating tables in Vienna. It is played out in satellite constellations, global communications infrastructures, continent-scale data centres, artificial intelligence models capable of processing and shaping public conversation, and supply chains of critical minerals without which there can be no energy transition or modern defence. Whoever controls this combination of orbits, cables, chips and algorithms will not only sell services or technology: they will have a structural influence on the security, economy and narrative of open societies. The risk for Europe is clear: without ambitious and coordinated projects in these areas, it will be reduced to a hybrid role as a demanding regulator and captive customer of foreign technological-strategic complexes. 

At the same time, Ryabkov's statement about a ‘world without nuclear limits’ after the end of New START should ring in European ears as what it is: a strategic alarm bell, not media hype. For decades, the arms control architecture – imperfect, fragile, but real – has provided a foundation of predictability on which nuclear stability between the two major atomic powers was based. If that foundation cracks completely and the verification mechanisms disappear, the relationship between the United States and Russia will slide into much more slippery terrain, where the temptation to overreact, doctrinal opacity and miscalculations combine in a dangerous cocktail. For a Europe that, to a large extent, lives under the umbrella of extended US deterrence, to think that this debate is irrelevant or purely technical would be historically irresponsible. 

The case of Iran adds another dimension, moral and political, to this landscape of risks. A regime that publicly mocks its own dead, that turns the victims of repression into objects of televised ridicule, is not displaying strength; it is showing fear. Fear that terror will cease to work, that younger generations will lose respect and that loyalty will turn into mere resignation. Precisely for this reason, the Islamic Republic is becoming more dangerous: internally, because it is intensifying selective repression and social control; externally, because it is resorting more frequently to its regional proxies, sabotaging infrastructure, straining maritime traffic and using asymmetric violence as a negotiating tool. This combination of internal fragility and external aggression will be one of the most delicate sources of instability in the coming years. 

All this is happening while China continues to weave, with strategic patience, its network of influence in Latin America, from the large countries to seemingly peripheral partners such as Uruguay, and while Venezuela is once again becoming a central player on the hemispheric stage by reopening a channel for structured dialogue with Washington. Beijing offers credit, infrastructure and a discourse of sovereign respect; Caracas seeks a lifeline that combines relief from sanctions, maintenance of internal power quotas and the opening of the energy tap to Western markets. If Europe and the United States do not articulate coordinated responses that combine principles with realism, investment with demands, and firmness with openness to agreed transitions, they will see historically like-minded spaces slip into orbits of dependency that are difficult to reverse. 

The conclusion is as simple in its formulation as it is demanding in its consequences: if Europe wants to remain more than just a stage on which others play, it must behave like a mature strategic actor. This means rearming itself intelligently—not only in terms of spending, but also in terms of industrial, technological and doctrinal capabilities—ensuring access to critical minerals and enabling technologies through active policies and robust alliances, and speaking to Washington from a position of Atlantic loyalty, yes, but also from a position of seriousness: an alliance between equals, not a relationship between protector and resigned protégé. The world has become harsher, more competitive and less forgiving of weakness; in this context, lukewarmness is not neutrality, but an early form of surrender.