Iran maintains military backing for Russia with ballistic missile shipment
Military cooperation between Russia and the Islamic Republic of Iran is intensifying. Now, in addition to drones, the Islamic Republic of Iran has sent Russia short-range ballistic missiles that will be used against Ukraine in a matter of weeks. This was confirmed by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken before he travelled with UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy to Kiev.
Blinken's remarks coincide with the announcement of new sanctions on Russian and Iranian individuals and entities, including Iran Air, by the US Treasury Department.
The US views ‘any transfer of Iranian ballistic missiles to Russia’ as ‘a dramatic escalation in Iran's support’ for Moscow's invasion of Ukraine, National Security Council spokesman Sean Savett told CNN.
‘We have been warning of the deepening security partnership between Russia and Iran since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and we are alarmed by these reports,’ Savett said, noting that both the US and its partners have made clear at G7 and NATO summits that 'together we are prepared to have significant consequences'.
The supply of ballistic missiles deepens ties between Moscow and Tehran, which has already provided the Kremlin with hundreds of drones that Russian forces have used in their offensive against Ukraine.
Moreover, this new partnership highlights Russia's dependence on Iran, first with armed drones and now with short-range ballistic missiles. Also, according to Jean Loup Samaan, senior fellow at the Middle East Institute, this rapprochement could be the latest clue to Russia's domestic production problems.
‘This may also indicate, as with North Korea's involvement, that the Russian defence industry is having difficulty keeping pace with the production of weapons used by Russian forces,’ Samaan tells Breaking Defence.
Regarding the use of Iranian missiles, the analyst believes that they are ‘relevant to the kind of battles we see in the border area between Russian and Ukrainian troops, so at the tactical level they will be used to wear down the Ukrainians’.
Another question about this strategic partnership relates to the benefits that can accrue to Tehran, which has long been asking Russia for S-400 fighter jets and air defence missiles, as well as other types of systems and technologies.
However, as Atlantic Council analyst Mark N. Katz points out, Moscow will be reluctant to transfer weapons to Iran that might jeopardise its good relations with the ayatollah regime's regional rivals, such as Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates, which could move closer to the US and even Israel for military support.
Indeed, according to Katz, Iran itself may not want this to happen. ‘Saudi-Russian cooperation in the OPEC+ format, which keeps world oil prices relatively high, also serves Iranian interests,’ he notes.
Both Russia and Iran have to sell their oil at a discount due to Western sanctions, so if Riyadh feels that Moscow has become a strong ally of Tehran it may decide to increase oil production, so lower prices would hurt both Russia and Iran.
On the other hand, Katz points out that while Tehran may want Moscow to transfer weapons systems and technologies to it, receiving them immediately may not be the Iranian leadership's primary objective. The Islamic Republic often does not attack its enemies directly, preferring instead to act through proxies such as Hezbollah, the Houthis and militias in Iraq and Syria.
For this reason, Tehran may see Russia not so much as a great power but as another proxy fighting a common enemy. Ukraine, of course, does not pose a threat to Iran, but it serves to focus US and other Western nations' attention and resources on supporting Kiev, leaving fewer resources available to deal with Iran.
Indeed, Tehran's great fear could be that Russia will lose its war with Ukraine, as it would allow the US and its Western allies to focus on the Iranian regime. ‘The transfer of armed drones and now ballistic missiles with missiles to Russia, therefore, may be seen as a good investment by Tehran, whether or not it receives Russian weapons systems in return. This attitude would also be in line with Iran's preference for supporting intermediaries fighting a common adversary rather than taking up the fight itself,’ concludes Katz.