Acusaciones a Marruecos
Pedro Canales, journalist and expert on geopolitics in the Maghreb, stopped by the microphones of De Cara al Mundo on Onda Madrid to analyse the strengthening of relations between Morocco and Spain after the speech of the Spanish President of the Government, Pedro Sánchez, before the Congress of Deputies. In an interview with Javier Fernández Arribas, the journalist also discussed the current tensions in the Maghreb.
Why doesn't Pedro Sánchez clearly state the reasons for his decision to support the Moroccan proposal for the Sahara?
I think there are several factors. The first is that this is a question of state, that is to say, it is not a political question of one party or another, of whether United Podemos or Sumar comes to power and recognises the Sahrawi Republic. The issue is a state policy, and state policies must be raised before the executive and legislative powers, before the parliament that represents the people, but there are many things that should not be said in public.
I think the president's mistake is not having a discreet and permanent meeting with the main opposition leaders. The fact that he is silent gives rise to a lot of speculation. He cannot advocate change because it is indeed quite profound, but not as profound as it could be. The US recognises sovereignty, but Spain, Germany or Italy have not. They recognise that this is a good formula, the most perceptible and the best way to solve the problem, but they do not recognise Moroccan sovereignty over the Sahara.
I don't know if the advisers put the president in a somewhat compromising situation, but their silence before parliament on the change of position is perceptible.
I was reading you in Atalayar when you mentioned the fact that Yolanda Díaz says Morocco is a dictatorship, although members of the Spanish government came out to deny it. Also, in response to the statements made by the president of the Moroccan Senate, you have to know this person and the political weight he has, to say that there is no option for Ceuta and Melilla, because they are Spanish and that is not in question.
I believe that these two insults should be read in an internal context. As for the statements made by Yolanda Díaz, who is the second vice-president of the Government, they are made because she wants to win the vote of Unidas Podemos, which has not yet secured it. Moreover, Sumar does not have a party that can stand up to Unidas Podemos, which does have a structure and which I believe is eager to return to the streets. They have grown and fed off the street, and their base and their power comes from the street, to which they are eager to return. Podemos' more or less thousand or so civil servants (directors general, ministers, councillors, etc.) are sucking on the cash cow of the state and do not prefer the street, but they do prefer the electoral base.
So Yolanda has an internal key, but so does Mayara. Mayara is a trade unionist, curiously enough, just like Yolanda; they have the same profile. Within the party they put him as the president of the Senate, as a new candidate, to make a balance between Istiqlal and the regrouping of independents, which now has the presidency of the government, with Akhannouch.
As for the statements on Ceuta and Melilla, I think he missed the point, but it must also be acknowledged that he did not say anything new. This has always been the position of the Istiqlal party and, in general, of the most important parties in the Moroccan political arc, and the position of the Palace. The issue of Ceuta and Melilla is sacred to them.
What they reproach him for, and they reproach him openly, is that it was neither the time, nor the place, nor the conditions to raise this problem, that is to say, he has made a major blunder. But if he had said something that went against the fundamentals and the general policy of the State, which is dictated by the Palace, the next day he would be dismissed. They put him on the street, replace him and put someone else in.
What happened is that he said something to the effect that yes, they agreed, but that it was not the right time because relations between Spain and Morocco were going through a good period. I believe that strategically they are quite firm, anchored and, despite the mistakes that President Sánchez may have made in his handling of relations with Morocco in both substance and form, he has managed to reassure the Moroccan state that Spain is serious.
We are awaiting a report from the UN special envoy for the Sahara, but will the UN be able to bring the parties back to Geneva to negotiate? The Moroccan proposal could happen as long as Algeria and the Polisario agree to sit down to negotiate again.
That is the million-dollar question. Logically, they would have to reach an agreement in principle. I think the Geneva formula is outdated, among other things because Algeria officially ruled it out, but perhaps they can find another formula. What is certain is that if there are no negotiations, discussions or talk, whatever you want to call it, between the four main actors - Morocco, the Polisario, Mauritania and Algeria - there is no solution.
Of these, it is mainly Algeria that is in the driver's seat, because it has gagged Polisario and has very close relations with Mauritania. Mauritania, despite the change in its orientation towards Morocco - where the Mauritanian president had his military training - has never been able to disavow recognition of the Saharawi Republic.
Without a dialogue between the four, I see it as very difficult to have international guarantees, which is where the Group of Friends of Western Sahara comes in.
I was struck by the fact that De Mistura presented the report within the Security Council. They had previously spoken with the permanent members and with the Group of Friends, but curiously China is not part of this group. And that is a bit strange because China wants to enter into the strategic equation in the Western Mediterranean. It has good relations with Morocco, good relations with Algeria, and does not want to be outside. It is in the Security Council, which is enough, but the Group of Friends has a bit more political weight because the opinion that the Group of Friends may have has a lot of influence on the rest of the discussions. We are talking about the United States, Russia, France and Spain as well.
However, I see this as difficult, especially given the current situation in Algeria, which has not yet managed to emerge triumphant from the crisis that has dragged on since the death of Bouteflika. I see it as very difficult for them to accept the discussions.
And Russia's invasion of Ukraine, with Algeria standing by Russia, which is its historical ally, could complicate matters further. We must also take into account the actions of terrorist groups in the Sahel, the activities of the Russian paramilitary group Wagner in Mali, Burkina Faso... There is a serious threat to the stability of the entire region.
Yes, I believe that the most serious threat, which is real, is that the interference that is taking place in the Sahel is increasingly paramilitary, because it is not the Russian state that is meddling, with which one could negotiate, but a group that is the executing arm of Putin's military empire. And it is an enforcement arm that has full support.
They can set the powder keg on fire and put the whole world in an explosive situation, and not just Europe, which is a conflict that concerns us directly. I fear that they could go off on their own. We have to bear in mind that Spain has many elections this year and I don't want to be pessimistic or a bad omen, but an attack on the Spaniards in Mali would be very delicate.
We also have Iran. China, after the last stage of the Saudi-Iranian negotiation, could arrogate itself as an important mediator and Beijing could intervene to stop Iran from doing so. There are speculations about Iranian drones in the Polisario, which is also a threat.
The old dream of Iran, of the military power of the Ayatollahs and the Islamic regime is to have an extension and reach the Atlantic. They have naval capacity, they have a very important naval force that they can project towards the Atlantic, but they have no foothold, except for what they can get in Lebanon with their matches with Hezbollah or Hamas, but all this part is the Eastern Mediterranean.
They have no serious foothold in the Western Mediterranean as a rear base for their projection into the Atlantic, and that is the old dream they want to achieve. Iran has built up a very substantial naval force, and a force of its own; they haven't bought it from anybody. They have a great capacity for scientific, technical and military development that is quite important.
In the end, I think the United States is going to come out on top. It has already stopped the Algerians who wanted to make a mega arms purchase of 20 billion dollars from Russia, and they stopped it.
Yes, because we are talking about the rearmament of Morocco, those missiles that the United States has delivered, but the rearmament of Algeria is also quite important.
Yes, especially in terms of quantity. I believe that Morocco, according to the experts who know more about it, is greatly increasing its offensive and medium offensive capacity, with very modern weapons and a very high capability. On the other hand, Algeria follows the old pattern of quantity, the one with the most tanks, the one with the most aircraft, but lacks quality. That change that the Algerian army has seen has largely come about with the agreements between Morocco and Israel. Israel provides a very high level of quality in terms of intelligence, in terms of communications and so on.
You mentioned earlier something that from my point of view is the key to everything we are talking about, and that is Algeria's ambition for an exit to the Atlantic, which would of course include Russia. The United States and the European Union have refused, although this has not come up so far. The Soviet Union and now Russia have already tried to have an outlet to the Atlantic at such a strategic point that would give Russia the capacity and that would be a threat to European and American interests. This would be the Sahara area.
Yes, that is Russia's old dream. The only possible exit it had after decolonisation was too far south, in Angola, but they want to be much closer militarily to the entrance to the Mediterranean at the Strait of Gibraltar and closer to Europe. They have some outlets in support points in the fishing grounds and there is always a spy ship, that is, they have a naval intelligence and information base, but not a military base. And in this respect, it should be borne in mind that the Algerians have always opposed it.
The Russians have done everything possible to convince the Algerians to at least give them the support of the Mers El-Kebir base, which the French had near Oran, so that it could serve as a base for the Russian fleet, as they have in Syria. And the Algerians have never given in.
Algeria breaks with Spain, but does not break with other countries, why? There are Spanish businessmen who have already lost almost a billion euros as a result of a decision by the Algerian regime that affects Spain, but why not Germany or other countries that are also supporting the Moroccan response?
Algeria has taken the weakest, that is, the one that cannot cope in any way. I believe there are no secret dossiers in relations. Algeria has always been quite annoyed with the support that Spain, both the Popular Party government and the Socialist government, has given to high-ranking officials seeking asylum or leaving the country. They have not only been allowed to stay in Spain, but to work in Spain and invest in Spain, and the Algerians have never swallowed that. They consider it a betrayal when someone is condemned to death, comes to Spain and is given asylum.
The Spanish government, in a rather bad way, I think, has not got it right there. Last year it sent back to Algeria an army officer who was a member of Hirak. He was held in the foreigner internment centre in Valencia for a while and was sent back to Algeria. The regime immediately sentenced him to a trial, first to 12 or 15 years in prison, and then to death. That was a blow and I think it was the wrong thing for Spain to have done.