Al-Sisi in the face of a perfect storm

The conflict in Libya, a dispute with Ethiopia that threatens control of the Nile's water, and an economic crisis precipitated by COVID-19 have put Egypt's President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in the face of a "perfect storm" for him and his government. 

When last month Marshal Khalifa Haftar consummated the failure of his attempt to take Tripoli and the forces of the man that Cairo has backed in the Libyan conflict were repelled by those of the UN-supported National Accord Government (GNA), the worst case scenario was present in Egypt. 

Mercenary militias paid by Turkey advancing along the Libyan coast towards its border is an impossible image for the Egyptian military to accept, and Al-Sisi did not hesitate to respond in a categorical manner then assuring that a "direct intervention" by Egypt in Libya would have "international legitimacy". Last week he reiterated that the Libyan cities of Sirte and Al-Jufra (centre) are two strategic enclaves that represent a red line for his country. 

While this was going on, unsuccessful negotiations between Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt aimed at reaching an agreement on the Great Dam of the Ethiopian Renaissance (GERD) regime failed last week leaving the dispute under a worrying question mark. Ethiopia is preparing to fill the dam on the Blue Nile, the main tributary of the river from which the Egyptians get 90% of their fresh water, without agreement with the other countries on how to manage the river in the event of drought or an arbitration mechanism to resolve any disputes that may arise. 

The controversy began in 2011 with the start of the construction of the dam and during this time the three countries found ways of communicating and even an agreement in 2015 committing not to act unilaterally or harm the others. However, in recent months and as the completion of the dam approached, attempts at agreement mediated by the United States and the World Bank have failed and direct discussions have only led to more frustration among the parties. 

The third problem has come with COVID-19 and its impact on the local economy. Two points below expectations, Egypt closed its 2019-2020 fiscal year (July to June) with 4% growth. With the tourism sector closed and the economy paralysed, Egypt has received 8 billion dollars in two loans from the International Monetary Fund in the last two months, raising its external debt to 112 billion dollars according to the latest report provided by the Central Bank in May, double the debt it had in June 2016. "What we are seeing is the convergence of three crises," Riccardo Fabiani, director of the International Crisis Group for North Africa, told Efe, stressing that this is a "very complex" scenario for Al-Sisi. 

If each of these problems is in itself a challenge, the coincidence of the three creates an added difficulty in their resolution. "Multiple challenges make action on any international front more complicated by limited resources and increased demand for those resources," he tells Efe Timothy Kaldas of the Tahrir Institute for the Middle East. 

In the case of Libya, the scenario is even one of possible military intervention, something that would make a conflict in which foreign powers, mercenaries and all kinds of armed, criminal and Islamist groups are already interfering even more complicated. Experts do not believe that Egypt seeks to become "deeply involved" in the conflict, but "that said, there is always a risk of escalation," Kaldas says. In the case of Ethiopia, Egypt has also raised the tone and recalled that the Nile is a "national security" issue, in which Kaldas sees "a use of language" to warn of the seriousness of the issue. Egypt has tried everything it can, according to Kaldas, who underlines that Cairo "logically considers it untenable" that Ethiopia intends to "maintain more or less unilateral control of the water that flows over the country". 

For Fabiani the most complicated scenario is the internal economic one. "The ability and capacity to manage the economy is already badly hit by accusations that the military runs too many businesses," he explains. "Obviously with the COVID-19 crisis and the drop in tourists, unemployment figures are going to grow, reinforcing the perception that this regime is incapable of managing the economy," the analyst adds.

In a country with great opacity in the management of the Government and absolute darkness in the military leadership, it is difficult to know the degree of wear and tear that this situation and its possible outcomes may have for the Al-Sisi Executive.  

Another element will be the reaction of the authorities in a scenario of instability, given the precedents of repression of activists and critics in the face of the continuous silence of the international press. 

But Kaldas sees in the economic one an element not so easy to handle in that sense. In his opinion, "undoubtedly repression will be part of the equation, but it will not be the only thing. "At the end of the day you can censor websites, censor political content, arrest activists, political figures, activists (?) but what you can't censor is the price of onions and tomatoes," he said.