Armenia and Azerbaijan: epidemic danger on the Nagorno-Karabakh border
In recent years, the border has been characterised by a continuous violation of the ceasefire, and despite Russia's intervention to seek to pacify the area, the positions between the two countries remain far apart.
The region commonly referred to as "Nagorno-Karabakh" or "Nagorno-Karabakh" is a region of the South Caucasus. The region is currently known as the Republic of Artsakh, acting as a breakaway state supported by Armenia, but internationally considered as part of Azerbaijan. In this sense, it can be seen as having a dual duality, belonging de facto to Azerbaijan, and de facto to the Republic of Artsakh.
To understand how it is possible that there have been clashes for decades, one has to go back to the beginning of the 20th century, when the government designated this land as an autonomous region of Soviet Azerbaijan, with the former violence remaining under control through the formation of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast within the borders of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic1. In 1988, however, an uprising took place in Nagorno-Karabakh.
However, in 1988, an uprising took place in the region, demanding unification with Armenia2. This led to a war that lasted over 6 years and in which approximately 30,000 people lost their lives. However, despite the 1994 ceasefire, Armenia and Azerbaijan have never stopped fighting each other.
Each of the opposing actors uses its own arguments to "convince" the others that it is in the right. On the one hand, Armenia invokes the 1991 referendum in which the Nagorno-Karabakh region decided to secede from Azerbaijan3. It is very important to note that about 95% of the inhabitants of this region are ethnic Armenians. On the other hand, Azerbaijan has recourse to UN resolutions which state that this territory is part of the territory of Azerbaijan4.
In this regard, the UN Security Council has so far adopted four resolutions, none of which has been implemented5:
- Resolution 822. Adopted after the occupation of the town of Karavachar. The resolution calls for the withdrawal of Armenian forces so that the occupation does not endanger the stability and security of the region.
- Resolution 853. Adopted after the occupation of the town of Agdam. The resolution calls for a ceasefire on both sides and the disengagement of Armenian forces from the area.
- Resolution 874, adopted following the occupation of the towns of Fuzuli, Cebrail and Qubadli. The resolution calls for a ceasefire and peace negotiations between the two sides.
- Resolution 884. Adopted following the occupation of the town of Zengilan. The resolution demands that Armenia immediately leave all occupied territories.6
It can be seen that while Armenia appeals to the sense of belonging and ethnicity, Azerbaijan relies on international recognition. No government recognises the Nagorno-Karabakh region as Armenian.
Since the beginning of the conflict, efforts have been made to find a solution, with the creation in 1994 of the Minsk Group by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. This group, co-chaired by the United States, France and Russia, succeeded in getting the two regions to agree to a ceasefire, which they subsequently violated7.
In the mid-2020s, and in the midst of a global pandemic caused by COVID-19, clashes between the forces of the two actors continue, with each accusing the other of being the culprit. In this regard, Armenia has been the most affected, as it has seen how Azerbaijan's use of a wide variety of unmanned aerial systems has played a key role in the conflict, compounded by the lack of knowledge and integration of this technology within the Armenian ranks8. A look at the military capabilities of Azerbaijan and Armenia in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic shows that the Armenian military has been able to use a wide variety of unmanned aerial systems.
A look at the military capabilities of Armenia and Azerbaijan shows that the former is far behind in terms of resources and capabilities, ranking 96th in the world's firepower rankings, while Azerbaijan is 52nd, 44th ahead of the Armenians9. In this sense, it is a question of the Armenians' ability to maintain their own military capabilities. In this sense, it is an asymmetric war in which Azerbaijan has everything to gain.
This situation of permanent confrontation only ended on 9 January with the ceasefire agreed between the two forces, aided by Russian mediation,10 with the aim of halting the escalation of violence in 2020, which saw some 5,700 demonstrations and political violence and more than 6,000 incidents of fighting.11 The fact that it took the ceasefire to bring about the end of the war was a major factor in the success of the war.
The fact that it took Russian intervention to help 'pacify' the region is particularly interesting, because behind this seemingly selfless assistance there must be something else.
Russia was not in a very comfortable position, because in order to give effect to the agreements with Armenia, it had to provide support for its defence; however, it was not in a position to deal with these forces. This made them look weak, as they were unable to end the conflict, and so they decided to intervene to achieve peace, knowing that Armenia's military capacity was insufficient.
With this agreement, Russia is the only power that can play the role of mediator, leaving aside Turkey which, although it cannot deploy military personnel to keep the peace, as the Kremlin will do, has announced that it will send observers. Russia thus managed to salvage relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan, although the Armenians were not too happy with the resolution.
In Armenia, the agreement was perceived by the vast majority of the population as a capitulation, who consider their president a traitor. The agreement, which allows for Russian military deployment to monitor the peace, has a maximum duration of five years, after which Armenia and Azerbaijan can request its withdrawal, subject to a five-month notice before the final deadline. As things stand, it seems difficult to reach a lasting agreement that would guarantee the stability of the region.
Furthermore, the signing of the document allows Azerbaijan to control the Nagorno-Karabakh region. In addition, it is stated that Yerevan should cede seven areas adjacent to Karabakh. At the same time, Yerevan is also to cede the Kalbajar and Lauchin areas, although the Lauchin corridor remains under Russian control12.
In view of all these concessions, in which Armenia is only granted the possibility of continuing to control small central areas of Nagorno-Karabakh, it is necessary to understand its motives for accepting this agreement.
All indications are that Armenia was "forced" to sign an agreement knowing that it is clearly detrimental to its interests. However, the army's manifest inability to pursue the contested actions has led to this situation. It is estimated that the Armenian army has lost more than 5,000 soldiers, or 10% of the total armed forces. The Armenian Prime Minister acknowledged that the military had pressed him to accept the agreement, as human and material resources had been exhausted.
Although the agreement has been implemented, it does not appear that the final settlement is even close to being reached. While Azerbaijan continues to claim the territory as its own, Armenia insists on the independence of the Republic of Artsakh. In addition, important issues such as border demarcation, refugee return and measures for a lasting peace remain unresolved. This lack of agreement, together with the continuing state of tension, continues to cause clashes, which are compounded by the difficulty of completing the process of demining the area, which could take over 20 years.
Spain, for its part, seems to be clearly on Azerbaijan's side, as was demonstrated in 2019 when Spain exported defence equipment worth €63.6 million to Azerbaijan. This meant ignoring the embargo imposed by the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which called on member countries not to sell arms to countries in conflict in the Nagorno-Karabakh region. The Spanish government defended itself by claiming that the embargo was voluntary.13 The Armenian ambassador to the United States, who was in the process of signing the agreement, said: "I am not sure that I am going to be able to do that. The Armenian ambassador to Spain has called for a halt to Spanish arms sales to Azerbaijan and Turkey.
Similarly, Spain is clearly interested in trade relations with Azerbaijan, including precious metals, fossil fuels, renewable energy and investments.14 Despite these commercial links, Spain has not been able to establish a strong relationship with Azerbaijan.
Despite these commercial links, Spain has repeatedly urged a ceasefire in the region, although it has refused to recognise the Armenian genocide on up to three occasions, most recently in 2018.
The sense of disillusionment and anger that the peace agreement has provoked in Armenia, the wear and tear it has caused both Russia and Azerbaijan, as well as Turkey's need to show itself as a viable alternative to Russian control, suggest that a solution to the conflict is far from being reached. The future of the region will need to be kept under close scrutiny as it may become clearer in the coming months.
Finally, the crisis triggered by COVID-19 has greatly complicated the already tense relations between the two actors, making a possible solution even more difficult and challenging. However, everything seems to indicate that the only viable alternative is Armenia's de-occupation of the conflict zone, in accordance with the various UN resolutions, and its inability to confront Azerbaijan.
Jairo Sánchez Gómez, criminologist and analyst of international terrorism and contributor to Sec2Crime's Terrorism and Armed Conflict Space
Bibliographical references :
1 - C. McLaughlin, E. “Deep-seated animosity paves way for Armenia, Azerbaijan violence”, CNN, 3 de abril de 2016. Disponible en: https://edition.cnn.com/2016/04/03/asia/armenia-azerbaiajan-nagorno-karabakh-explainer/index.html
2 - M. Simmons, A. y Gauthier-Villars, D. “Armenia-Azerbaijan War: What is Happening in Nagorno-Karabakh?”. The Wall Street Journal, 11 de enero de 2021. Disponible en: https://www.wsj.com/articles/armenia-azerbaijan-conflict-11601325097
3 - Ibíd.
4 - Schreck, C. y Jhonson, L. “Explainer: The Nagorno-Karabaj Conflict”. Eurasianet.org, 6 de agosto de 2014. Disponible en: http+s://eurasianet.org/explainer-the-nagorno-karabakh-conflict
5 - Rehimov, R. “Las cuatro resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad de ONU sobre la ocupación de Armenia al Alto Karabaj”, Agencia Anadolu, 29 de septiembre de 2020. Disponible en: https://www.aa.com.tr/es/mundo/las-cuatro-resoluciones-del-consejo-de-seguridad-de-onu-sobre-ocupación-de-armenia-al-alto-karabaj-/1990003
6 - Ibíd.
7 - Nagorno-Karabaj Conflic. Council on Foreign Relations. Disponible en: https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/nagorno-karabakh-conflict
8 - Marín Delgado, J.A.” Guerra de drones en el Cáucaso Sur: lecciones aprendidas de Nagorno-Karabaj”. Documento de Opinión IEEE 21/2021. Disponible en: http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs_opinion/2021/DIEEEO21_2021_JOSMAR_DronesCau caso.pdf
9 - Ibid.
10 - Ghaplanyan, V. “Armenia and Azerbaijan: High risk of cross-border violence in Nagorno-Karabaj despite ceasefire, ACLED, Febrero 2021. Disponible en: https://acleddata.com/2021/02/02/ten-conflicts-to-worry-about-in-2021/
11 - Ibíd.
12 - “Nagorno-Karabak, porqué los armenios se sienten traicionados por su presidente”, nuevo periódico, 11 de noviembre de 2020. Disponible en: https://nuevoperiodico.com/nagorno-karabaj-porque-los-armenios-se-sienten-traicionados-por-su-presidente/
13 - “España vendió equipamiento militar a Azerbaiyán el año pasado pese al embargo de la OSCE”, El independiente, 15 de noviembre de 2020. Disponible en: https://www.elindependiente.com/espana/2020/11/15/espana-vendio-equipamiento-militar-a-azerbaiyan-el-ano-pasado-pese-al-embargo-de-la-osce/
14 - MATIAS, C. “Karabaj es Azerbaiyán y España arriesga negocios millonarios en la zona”, ABC, 30 de septiembre de 2020. Disponible en: https://www.abc.es/internacional/abci-karabaj-azerbaiyan-y-espana-arriesga-negocios-millonarios-zona-202009291647_noticia.html