Chad's indispensable military leadership

The militarization of African politics is not new. It is not uncommon to see political leaders in their pompous, medal-filled military suits, in the style of Muammar al-Qadhafi. Africa is a continent where regimes - and leaders - of this kind still survive. The case of Chad, and its President Idriss Déby, is one of them. This Chadian soldier has been in front of the country since he took it by force in 1990. 

Déby graduated at the Officers' School in N'Djamena, the Chadian capital, and completed his professional training as a pilot in France. Chad was then a country in the throes of an intermittent civil war since the mid-1960s. This instability, in which the factions and alliances were not very consistent, was taken advantage of precisely by the aforementioned Gaddafi, to invade a northern part of Chad rich in certain mineral resources. The invasion was carried out with the connivance of some Chadian rebel groups that could benefit from the Libyan presence. The first two major Libyan interventions took place at the end of the 1970s, in 1978 and 1979, and allowed one of the rebel leaders, Goukouni Weddeye, to reach the power in September 1979. The creation of the Government of National Transitional Unity (GUNT) established by Weddeye was rejected by another rebel leader, Hissène Habré, in addition to France and the United States, which supported the latter. Hissène Habré succeeded in ousting Goukouni Weddeye from power in 1982, with the help of military personnel such as Idriss Déby, who became commander-in-chief of the Northern Armed Forces (FAN). These were the troops Habré led during the Chadian civil war, and they were to be converted into regular forces (FANT) under the new presidency of the Republic of Chad held by the one who was supported by Idriss Déby. 

Déby remained linked to Habré throughout the 1980s, when there were two other Libyan interventions, until in 1987 Gaddafi's troops were finally defeated in the so-called 'Toyota War'. Idriss Déby, who became President Habré's military advisor, gradually distanced himself from him until in 1989 he was accused of trying to carry out a plot to overthrow him, which forced him to flee to Libya and Sudan, along with other military and political leaders. 

The experience Idriss Déby had gained during more than a decade of violence in Chad, in addition to the leadership he had gained in the military, allowed him to found his own faction, the Movement for Patriotic Salvation (MPS). The military campaign he launched against Habré pushed him to power in December 1990. It can be said that Déby has managed to lead the country ever since, both militarily and politically. At least in the sense of staying in power for three decades. He has won the presidential elections of 1996, 2001, 2006, 2011 and 2016, not without the shadow of manipulation, a constant accusation from the opposition. Déby's permanence at the head of Chad for so long may give a false projection of stability. The country has enjoyed only short periods of calm between successive riots and uprisings. The president himself has had to deal with several coups d'état, sometimes depending on the French forces present in the country to keep him in power. 

A 2016 study by the EU Institute for Security Studies (ISSUE), which analyzed the armed forces of the African continent, indicates up to seven periods of internal violence under the presidency of Idriss Déby. Apart from internal conflicts, the Chadian armed forces have been present in other external conflicts, such as those that took place in the Democratic Republic of the Congo between 1998 and 2003 and in the Central African Republic between 2004 and 2007 and between 2012 and 2013. Nor should we forget the confrontation that Chadian troops have been engaged in for years against Boko Haram and ISWAP in the Lake Chad basin, something that is not reflected in the document but whose increasing virulence must be highlighted.

The continuous confrontations in which the Chadian army has been immersed, generally satisfactorily resolved, provide these armed forces with a background that gives them a greater capacity to deal with threats such as those presented by jihadism in the region. Their capacity to deal with terrorism is greater than that of other regional armies in the surrounding area such as the Malian or Burkinabé armies, whose experience is more limited and whose training is still incipient. If we add to this the leadership provided by Idriss Déby, with a war curriculum and a very broad knowledge of methods and geography, the chances of success of the Chadian army in the military fight against terrorism are greatly increased. On the other hand, political, economic and social victory would obviously remain pending, which should go hand in hand with other solutions, not exclusively military, to be adopted in the region to avoid the rapid expansion of the jihadist phenomenon. 

All this military experience of the Chadian Armed Forces and the military leadership of its president has been evident in the actions that have taken place recently. After the worst jihadist attack suffered by the army, in which almost a hundred soldiers died, the so-called Operation Bohoma Cholera was carried out, in which Chadian troops would have inflicted a resounding defeat on Boko Haram. It was an operation, directly led by the President himself, which targeted the area of Lake Chad, where there is a confluence of national boundaries very favorable to the movements of terrorist groups, through water and very porous borders, which makes it a sanctuary. The attack, which, according to official sources, caused around a thousand victims, also resulted in the destruction of 50 motorized boats used by the Jihadists for their cross-border movements. Chad is thus demonstrating that its military and response capacities are far superior to those of other countries in the Sahel, despite the fact that they also have vulnerabilities. 

Following the operation, and in a presidential statement, later qualified by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chad announced a decrease in its activity outside its borders, to focus on the internal fight against terrorism. Despite the clarification of the ministry that indicated that Chadian participation in the regional operations being carried out in the Sahel wouldn't be affected - Mixed Multinational Force, Joint Force of the G-5 Sahel, MINUSMA - there is concern about the possible withdrawal of its armed forces in other operations against Boko Haram and ISWAP beyond Chadian territory, as the major part of the activity of these groups is outside its borders and the intention would be to act only in the national territory. The military experience of Chad and its president are key to making military progress against terrorist groups. Any step backwards will be perceived by these groups as a situation of fragility in the political, military and diplomatic environment of the region, which, added to the imminent health crisis, could mean a strengthening of their positions and an increase in their activity, putting at risk the stability of the country considered to be the most stable in the Sahel region.