The Argentine Army also fights against COVID-19

With more than a hundred days of permanent and simultaneous tasks, the Armed Forces as a whole are carrying out the General Manuel Belgrano Civil Protection operation that covers the entire national territory to mitigate the effects of the COVID-19 with global consequences. Within the framework of the subsidiary missions instituted in the National Defence doctrine in 2006, humanitarian aid actions continue to be developed without any time limit, which constitutes the main effort of the civil protection response deployed in the 21st century. 

In view of the implementation of the so-called staggered quarantine and the battery of announcements to reinforce the call for social responsibility, the military operation that began on March 19 continues consistently and is being carried out by Brigadier General Martín Deimundo Escobal - the operational commander of the mission ordered by President Alberto Fernández and the Minister of Defence, Agustín Rossi - who states that in the face of this pandemic, the premise "is not to relax"

The arrival of the COVID-19 has imposed that the operation called "General Manuel Belgrano" was carried out in record time and three days after taking office. How can a military civil protection operation of such magnitude be designed under these conditions?

I was the General Director of the Army's Plans, Programs and Budget until I was appointed to this role. I exposed to this management the budgetary situation I had been handling for two years and it was very problematic. At the end of February, the Minister of Defence summoned three Army officers, a Brigadier and an Admiral to be appointed to this operation. President Alberto Fernández had taken the decision to appoint the leadership of the Armed Forces. I was appointed by the minister and the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with whom we have been working for a long time. That implies the first fortress. I began to walk these floors when, from one day to the next, the first case of the pandemic appeared in Argentina. I knew that this operation would pass through this place, because we have the responsibility to command the operations in the national territory or outside it. We were going to a major operation. 

Can previous planning be considered an advantage in view of the events that had been observed worldwide and the development of military operations in other countries?

That is the second strength. Before receiving the order, we worked on a directive structure of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the campaign plan and on the operational command. That allowed us to have a meeting three days later with the president and the minister, where we received the order to put all the armed forces to work to help. In 48 hours we built a third fortress: the ministry with its political and military cabinet, issued the ministerial resolution and procedure that gave life to Operation General Manuel Belgrano. On March 10, it was put into effect, I activated it, I gave the order and I put fourteen joint commands in emergency zones.

Did the activation of the commands before the quarantine was declared mean that the emergency was pre-eminent? 

That was the fourth fortress.  To have activated before this became a problem in Argentina. Long before this was a newspaper cover. This allowed us to oil issues with the political and military cabinet. The military has a formation, where we command the force at all times. But when there is an operation where we have to give up forces, a certain resistance is generated that comes from many years ago, because we don't always work with a joint operational command.

The Minister of Defence, Agustín Rossi, has called this operation the most important military deployment since the Malvinas War in 1982 and stressed the importance of humanitarian aid operations in the face of health emergencies.

The activation of fourteen joint commands of emergency zones has the particularity that for the first time all the armed forces - after the Malvinas war - started working in a mission given by the president. The country was divided into jurisdictions that basically respond to the location of military units and provinces. A commander can be a joint commander of an emergency area in a province or the commander of several provinces.

After 38 years, do you consider the joint work of the three Armed Forces, coordinated with the same techniques and procedures within the framework of Operation Manuel Belgrano, to have materialized after the great lesson of Malvinas?

This operation highlights a series of factors that have to do with the military, which at the time in Malvinas did not occur. Here from the beginning it had a joint characteristic of the operation: the predisposition of each force chief to make the means available disinterestedly. That's why I was talking about the budget: when one has little and hasn't received something to improve for a long time, one tends to retain it in order to preserve the material and the people. At the time of the planning we did not yet know that the pandemic was what it is today. You have to go back to 13 March to understand how we gave the order for a military civil protection operation, which is based on humanitarian aid and community support.

These operations are considered subsidiary, and are implemented over the years throughout the national territory, but are not known or recognized. In this case, the impact has visibly been different.

These operations happen sporadically in different parts of the country, but they did not happen simultaneously. It happened in the world and it happens in Argentina. The Armed Forces have been doing this for many years and it marked a virtue: the materials of the forces are today 1 out of 10, but when you put the capacity of the man or woman who is working, that obsolescence of the material takes it to five. When one sees the military man or woman in the emergency command, helping to manage the governor or the mayor to set up a post. how to manage civilly or conduct the crisis, it brings it up to ten.

An amalgamation and interaction between civil society and the Armed Forces has been observed in the midst of this humanitarian aid operation. This fact is unusual, especially in some regions of the country, given the history of the media. Have they perceived this change and the acceptance of their actions? 

The first change, and this is a personal idea, is that the president calls the minister, the heads of the forces, and the operational commander. He talks to us and gives us a personal order. That had not happened for a long time and I think that attitude was different and extremely positive. The Armed Forces in general - until the pandemic began and in the societies of the interior - were seen as they are today before all the eyes of the whole country. The military units are totally amalgamated. I think that we and the political leadership, the governor, the mayor, in some cases the political cabinet, have discovered the value we have and we discovered the value of that governor, that mayor in a critical situation. Before society, some eyes may have been opened by someone who was not clear about what the armed forces were for, although this is not the reason for it, because as you indicated, it is a subsidiary mission.

The president is the commander of the armed forces. That summons and personal order, as you say, seems to have generated a psychological impact that has driven the action to comply with the decision of the executive.

Without a doubt. I'm going to speak from an almost idealistic point of view. That three generals, a brigadier and an admiral should be summoned at the beginning of this problem by the president and the minister and that they should be the first to mark what it meant at that time to attack this pandemic from different fronts, is unusual.  For me it was a different factor.

Subsidiary missions such as the one being carried out or the Peace Missions are part of the doctrine of the Argentine Armed Forces. Beyond the extraordinary work during the pandemic, what reflection have you had on the current performance?   

These missions have been carried out since the 90's, but within the political and directive regulations of the national defence. We act within the framework of civil protection operations. Many times one does an infinite number of professional tasks, but this was not questioned because no attention is paid to the Armed Forces or to defence policy, an issue that is often highlighted by the minister. Here there was a paradox in feeling useful in everyone's life through the level of efficiency of the fourteen commanders and even the last soldier in various tasks. Tasks that include supporting over a thousand planning issues. This issue is one of the most valued, because it shows the capacity acquired by officers over the years before a provincial governor, a municipal mayor and even before - as the president has said - before the national executive branch.

When we talk about the amalgamation of civil society and the armed forces or with the work that was done in conjunction with mayors and governors or the requests of the governors of Salta and Tucumán for military units to be reopened, do you think that the success of this operation has an impact on these requests?

I think so, and today it has become clear. There are provinces that, for different reasons, have been emptied of military units over time. If protection had been required, it was not available. The consequence of the good work has been the governor's request. There is no idea of strategic planning for a military unit, but there is a need from the point of view of civil protection in the face of a forthcoming episode.

The permanent participation and deployment of the Argentine military forces in UN Peacekeeping Operations and in extreme situations such as the earthquake in Haiti or previously in the former Yugoslavia with the BEA - where they faced very critical situations - generated a wide experience and the so-called lessons learned. Did this knowledge facilitate this civil protection operation, which is clearly not a black swan, but is something new for the involvement of the armed forces in many countries of the world? 

I took it as such when the planning of this operation was started. There is no doubt that the Military Peace Operations contributed to the conscious and unconscious of the military to plan or to act. We are in the fourth month and for a Peace Operation - which is 6 months - it is the worst month. Everyone is beginning to relax and think that it is over. There is a blackboard where I wrote seven sentences that end up having an impact on the way the forces and commanders are used. I knew that the operation would last a long time. I had an exercise in motion that was Europe and Asia and then the United States and they were the best window for me to see what the repercussions would be in Argentina. And obviously the issue of the long duration of the operation was a precept. What remains as a message is not to relax.

Do you think that there is a part of the population that is relaxing and is not aware of the magnitude of the situation in terms of health and human security?

As a subtitle to "not relaxing", I would add "we can fail". This I say to my commanders. When you measure whether people understand or don't understand, I think the important thing is that our task has to be empathetic, keeping in mind that this is a civil protection operation. Empathy is not looking for followers, but helping through concrete tasks to mitigate the pandemic. I believe that today people are at the limit in terms of tiredness, boredom or understanding. But when they see a military uniform, the striking thing is that they feel respect and appreciation. In these three and a half months - which seems like four years in terms of the intensity of the work - people's understanding has been achieved. As a person, when it comes to tiredness, everything is understandable because it happens to me too. We have not had a single incident against the Armed Forces. On the contrary. We have gone to the most complex and unimaginable places from the point of view of planning and attack - not military - but to make the pandemic disappear through various tasks. Including feeding. Examples such as Villa Azul, Barrio San Jorge or Barrio San Marcos in Corrientes. So I could give you a series of names and locations in which empathy between the armed forces and society was marked. What I do say is that we have been understood from day one until today.

President Alberto Fernández expressed his intention in the Legislative Assembly to bring these new forces closer to society, since these members of the armed forces did not participate in the military dictatorship. In a way he was ending a stage. Now these events are developing with the results of a new relationship with civil society. Do you think it can be beneficial to acquire new equipment and technology in view of the need to modernize, since we are behind at the global and regional level? Has the emergency caused by COVID-19 changed the social view towards these Armed Forces? Is the population receptive to the capacity of territorial presence and the capabilities of the Armed Forces in humanitarian crises?

Naturally, the fact that they are visible simultaneously brings consequences and conclusions. I'm going to be 58 years old and I'm still thinking as a second lieutenant. And I remember that the trucks that I had as a second lieutenant in the 20th Regiment, and of which I later became chief, had the same vehicles and at some point they are going to change them. And that's the way I have to think about it. Now I have a more positive attitude with the question, that the Minister of Defense marks the obsolescence of the material and says that we are doing this with means that are 50 years old. If we had better means, better tasks we could have done. I trust what the minister says more than my personal wish, because he committed himself and says it publicly. Beyond that, the minister was the creator of FONDEF before coming here, knowing that he was going to face the wall that defence policy sometimes has, where there are always previous or more important needs. But I think that here it was combined that a part of the Defense has a direct relation to the population, to the health of the population, to the well-being of the population, so something that did not happen before is being combined. In Argentina we know what was experienced many years ago and I think this marks, as the president or the minister or yourself said, another stage. General Paleo was received in 1983 and the sword was given to him by President Alfonsín. I graduated the following year. This view of the Armed Forces as an integral part of society and of the solution of a problem as a state actor in what it has to do, I think is a success factor.

In 10 years, seven strains of coronavirus were discovered. The health emergency can be repeated or the viruses can mutate. Is this experience valid for future action?

I am a military man, not a statesman, but if one looks today at the communications infrastructure in the world in general, one sees its vulnerability and how it can be attacked. Or living through a pandemic like this or the issue of cyber defence. So I could go on listing a series of factors that can end up in the use of the armed forces and one can conclude that they can be in various ways, as is happening in Argentina. It's very good to analyze in the during and after, what has been the use of the different armed forces in all countries of the world. Unimaginable things have happened like looting on 5th Avenue in New York. When one says what the probable use of the armed forces will be, it is difficult to imagine. However, in Argentina, along with the pandemic - which is an exceptional event - another exceptional event occurred: the use of the armed forces almost unnaturally, because these commandos who go out to operate do so without weapons. For the military to go out without weapons is to feel that something is missing. However, this detail, which seems minor, was one of the success factors of this operation. That is to say that these beloved forces, unlike others - and I do not make any value judgments in Latin America or in other countries of the world - were used decisively to support the population.

Is the Ministry of Defense going to reinforce the so-called "dry borders" with Brazil where the health situation is the worst in the continent, taking into account that the passage with Bolivia has already been closed?

At the same time as Operation Manuel Belgrano, we continue to develop an operation that has been implemented for years, called Operation Integration North. This operation is being developed in Jujuy, Salta, Formosa and in Misiones is not activated. And both are mixed because the governor of the province of Salta asks the president for army troops so that people who are sick do not pass through the border. In reality, the border must be preserved by the Gendarmerie that fulfills its task. They are two different operations but they combine in the effects. The minister received an initial request from the governor of the province of Misiones, where there are a number of crossings other than the border, both in Bernardo de Irigoyen and other areas. We started the planning. The Ministry of Security also received the same request from the governor. We made a first coordination, because we work at the request of the national, provincial or municipal Executive Branch. If it is of this type it is coordinated by the Minister of Security. A series of videoconferences have been developed between the Ministry of Defence and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their counterparts in Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay, which are the bordering countries. From the military point of view, there was what is called military diplomacy. Some issues have been released, such as in Salta in Los Toldo with a civilian population. Through a management, it was possible to unblock the border militarily and to be able to pass with a military convoy and then with a civilian one.

Taking into account the characteristics of a civil protection operation, but one that is simultaneous and planned over a long period of time, can an analogy be made between a post-pandemic and a post-conflict situation? 

When I try to summarize, I think it is a civil protection operation and a large logistical support operation. But in my head and as we conceive the operation, we are in operations and I am talking about the highest military level. I didn't take this as support for the community, but this is a military operation with all the consequences. The term is shocking, but we are at war in the best sense. Our war today is to make visible what everyone calls the invisible enemy. We make it visible in very concrete tasks that are executed in assistance at the highest or lowest level. This is one of the greatest strengths. This situation was forced, because the pandemic accelerated the processes of adaptation and knowledge with other people.

The head of Spain's Defence Staff, Air General Miguel Ángel Villarroya, said that it was the only country whose armed forces have acted as a bloc in the face of COVID-19. What lessons could we draw from this? Could one of them refer to what in Spain is known as the UME (Unidad Militar de Emergencias), obviously adapted to our reality?

I went to war school in Spain and I know the Chief of Defence Staff. He is an excellent person. The Spanish people and the Spanish military are very noble. We copied from them the model of the EMU. During the previous administration of Minister Rossi, they began to develop through units of the Army and the Engineers' Army, because it is the one that is most associated with means to support the community. It started to grow in an incipient way, but we lacked time. The scarcity of material meant that it was not used for emergencies, but for training. Eight emergency response units were planned. This is one of the lessons learned and it is also a requirement. The pandemic exists and it would be a very serious shortcoming for the political and military leadership to see that if we had had the means, we could have done much more.

Do you plan to deepen the study of issues related to germ warfare, which is a threat that is several decades old, or bioterrorism, observing that we are currently living a stage of biological revolution? 

It would be necessary to prepare for it. Preparation requires planning, training and obtaining the means to be able to attack this type of war. I would not define it today as germ warfare, but we obviously have a clear notion of what might be required in the future and know the strengths and weaknesses.

What health protocol did they apply for forces deployed abroad in peacekeeping operations or have they adapted and complied with the guidelines of each country? How are the returns and relays going to be carried out? 

Under this command, in addition to Operation Manuel Belgrano, there are also Peace Operations or those related to the Antarctic Campaign. What used to be procedural as a relay, now implies a new engineering. We depend on Argentina with the closure of the airports, on the United Nations which determines when the relays are made, on what the Cypriot president says, or on what Israel or Lebanon says. There are many actors. We have to send a relay to Cyprus free of COVID-19 and ready to operate. A relay has to take place without spreading the disease. We are going to take the Argentine forces out, on August 18, in a charter of Aerolineas Argentinas with the airports closed - directly from Buenos Aires to Larnaca. It's a very complex planning. We receive the forces that also have to quarantine and all this with the COVID-19 going through us.

Did the personnel in Antarctica have any cases of COVID-19? What protocols were implemented to avoid moving the virus to a strategic area?

With respect to Antarctica, we made seven flights with Hercules planes to take cargo and crew to Marambio base. We had to do this ahead of time and also with a series of special measures to prevent the virus from being transferred to Antarctica. Now we are developing the Antarctic Campaign 20-21 which is marked by what is happening in the world. We continue with the sovereign presence, the support to the scientific activity and the major responsibility: not to put the virus in the Antarctic.

To what do you attribute the low percentage of infections within the Armed Forces personnel despite the fact that they are deployed throughout the national territory and have direct contact with COVID-19? In other parts of the world there are military personnel who have died or have a higher rate of infection, and in Argentina there are about a hundred at the moment.

Take care of the one who takes care of you. March 7 meant a military order that is how the task should be carried out when they leave the barracks. This has procedures, orders and controls. This "care for the caretaker" means that with some 55,000 people carrying out tasks and operating in different parts of the country, there are six sick people who have already recovered, 50 who are infected and 60 who are suspected of having something to do with the people who left the barracks and returned. You have to be obsessive about these controls and this is the right thing to do.

The behaviour of the virus is changing day by day, as are the infections and how they are transmitted. How are the protocols being adapted periodically and what are your expectations of this "long term" operation?

There is permanent reorientation and the order is not to relax, because this is a long-term operation that no one knows when it will end. That's one of the certainties, not an uncertainty. This is long term and we're going to end well. The situation is so dynamic that what happens today is not valid for tomorrow or the day after. In the world and in Argentina. I want to be in the permanent alert of "not relaxing". And as a reflection: the armed forces were made visible and also the need for a defence policy which - as the minister says publicly - is the greatest lesson.