India in Africa: projection and imperative
This document is a copy of the original that has been published by the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies at the following link.
India's ties with Africa are historical and can be seen in its diaspora to the continent, its business presence and its growing cultural influence in many African countries. Since current Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi came to power in 2014, the Afro-Indian relationship has intensified, with India seeking to both maintain its influence while drawing on African resources and trade, and to curb fierce competition from China. Security has therefore become a key issue in the relationship and India, an already more than emerging global power, presents itself as a reliable partner for African countries and especially for those located along the eastern Indian seaboard, an area with vital maritime routes for the country. Another consequence of this centuries-old relationship is the Modi government's policy of presenting India as a representative of Africa's interests in international fora and a clear example of the 'Indian imperative', defined as the push for a multilateral third way for global governance, original and idiosyncratic to India.
Introduction
In the midst of the conflict that broke out in Sudan on 15 April, the different countries with resident nationals in the African country announced repatriation operations in view of the danger they faced. Then came some dramatic news reports, including that of an Indian citizen, Albert Augustine, dying in Khartoum after being hit by a stray bullet. Days later and given the inaction, the victim’s family demanded that the government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in office since 2014, repatriate the Indian community and Albert's remains. Meanwhile, groups of Indian nationals gathered to wait in Port Sudan with no news of any kind, and India beginning to appear in some media as a nation that may not have the capacity to successfully carry out such an operation1.
It then emerged that there were in fact more than 3,500 Indian nationals in Sudan, including the Hakki Pikki, a nomadic tribe from the southern state of Karnataka, whose security became a priority for Prime Minister Modi2. On 24 April, it was announced that an operation known as Kaveri would be launched to evacuate its nationals from Sudan and give them protection. Days later, images went viral of long queues of Indian citizens waiting to board either Indian Air Force planes or the INS Sumedha, a warship sent for the purpose3.
India's involvement in the Sudan crisis served to highlight the relationship between the African continent and the Asian country, which can no longer be described as an emerging or regional power, but rather as a global power that is struggling to define its strategy in today's multipolar world, and is seeking strategic autonomy from dependence on a third country or bloc. In the fields of economics, finance, culture, food security, health and the military, among others, the relationship between Africa and India goes back a long way, and has now become a strategic priority for the Modi government. Africa is both an opportunity for India and a site of confrontation with other competing powers, especially China.
The Indian diaspora in Africa has a strong presence in countries like Kenya, South Africa and Mozambique. This is reflected, for example, in growing Indian cultural influence on the continent through music, the film industry and literature, with many Indian authors reflecting in their narratives about Africa on the adaptation of Indian communities in African societies, and the interdependence among them4. Maintaining a high status for this Indian diaspora in Africa is an objective for the current Modi government, as it is also the image of India's relevance in the world.
Behind a decades-long presence symbolised by India's multi-generational citizenship and making the country a security ally in Africa, there is another motive: the economy and its ability to influence the continent. India's need for resources, especially in the energy sector given the current changing global context, makes it want to position itself as a major investor in the African continent, using tools ranging from the promotion of a certain cultural affinity to aid to the diaspora and the visualisation of India as a reliable partner in trade, technology and security, not to forget India's more recent bid to be the voice of Africa in international forums5.
The Indian presence in Africa
The presence of the Indian subcontinent in Africa is centuries old, dating back to antiquity, especially with regard to the Indian coastal region of Africa, where communities of Indian origin have settled over the centuries, weaving intense commercial and cultural relationships between the two areas. However, what we are interested in is the new dimension of how this Indian presence in Africa has evolved in recent years, discernible in the economic and security spheres, and developing beyond the countries of the Indian littoral to other parts of the continent6. The Indian diaspora in Africa is estimated at three million people, 40,000 of which are in the eastern coastal countries, with South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt, Kenya and Togo as its main markets7.
Judging by the Indo-Pacific concept for Indian foreign policy and defence, Africa is a key region. The 2015 Maritime Security Strategy defines as a priority area for Indian security the maritime space stretching from Southeast Asia to the eastern coasts of Africa, including the Indian Ocean island nations of Madagascar, Seychelles, Comoros and Mauritius, and also the countries falling within this ocean-bound geographical framework such as Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique and South Africa. Indeed, we will see that India's security projection in this East African sub-region is growing8.
India's current interest is geo-economic because Cape Horn, the Horn of Africa coastline and the Strait of Hormuz are areas of transit for supplies of oil, minerals and other commodities that enable the country to sustain domestic needs and cater for the import and export of a growing industry in the technology sector and in the manufacture and marketing of pharmaceuticals, among others. A total of 50% of the world's containers and 70% of the world's oil products, among other things, transit through the Indian Ocean9.
Another economic aspect linking India to Africa is trade as a key internal link for the continent. African countries are increasingly seeing India as a strategic partner for their own development, making the Asian country one of Africa's main trading partners. For India, the issue implies competition with China, the aim being to lessen the importance the Chinese giant has acquired on the continent over the last decades and in areas such as finance, trade and infrastructure. Moreover, this Indo-Chinese competition in Africa brings to the region the interplay of alliances and suspicions of two opposing powers with shared borders and a history of conflict10.
India's presence in the region is also noticeable in the construction of infrastructure. In 2006, the country launched an aid initiative in Africa, building the Pan-African e-Network across 47 African countries, the continent's largest interconnected network, which includes schools and hospitals, and even Indian centres, connected via satellite and fibre optics11. And not to be forgotten is the ambitious Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC), a project that began in 2017 to develop the continent through investment, in line with the converging interests of India and Japan in Africa12.
The India-Africa trade and infrastructure investment relationship was strengthened in 2008 with the India-Africa Forum Summit (IAFS), a high-level meeting to follow up on India-Africa relations, to be held once every three years. The first meeting took place in New Delhi in April 2008, attended by heads of state from fourteen African countries. At the second meeting, which took place in Ethiopia in 2011, the then Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced a $700 million development aid programme for African nations and soft credit lines, which were ratified at IAFS summits in subsequent years. In 2015, 51 African countries met in New Delhi, under the presidency of Prime Minister Narendra Modi13.
India's interest in Africa, especially in investment in projects and infrastructure, has grown exponentially under the current Modi government, continuing the narrative that India is a strong partner for building capacity in African countries, either jointly in projects such as the Pan-African e-Network or through bilateral state-to-state agreements. 2018 was a key year in this regard, with Modi deciding to create 18 new diplomatic legations across the continent and personally touring a number of the countries. And most notably, in a March speech to the Ugandan Parliament, the prime minister outlined what would become known as the "Kampala Principles", a set of ten guidelines certifying India's commitment to Africa to promote African economic growth, fight terrorism and mitigate the effects of climate change14.
The vision for African countries, especially those on the Indian seaboard, of India's proximity as a friendly state intensified during the worst moments of the COVID-19 pandemic. Beyond investment and trade, India was notably very present as a provider of humanitarian aid. In December 2021, the ship INS Kesari arrived in Mozambique, unloading five hundred tonnes of food for the disease- and drought-stricken country. Indian island countries such as the Maldives, Seychelles, Mauritius and Madagascar were already being provided with food, medical and pharmaceutical aid, starting the previous year15.
Indeed, the presence of Indian-origin communities in several East African countries has acted as a driver for Indian initiatives in the health sector, reflecting the private interest the country has in pushing itself into the African market. In this regard, there have been investments and in some cases transfers of medical technology from India, although African states are finding themselves dependent on the companies that export and produce medicines, build hospitals, improve hospital management and infrastructure and digitalise medical care but do not involve local populations, which could degenerate into a real lack of efficiency if these companies decide to leave certain countries or change their conditions16.
India security provider
In 2015 during a visit to Mauritius, Modi referred to an initiative called Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR). Sagar literally means "ocean" in various Indian dialects and refers primarily to the Indian Ocean17. The prime minister's speech was made on a Mauritian Coast Guard corvette, the first Indian-made warship sold to another country. In 2018, on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue meeting to address security issues in Asia, Modi equated SAGAR to a regional cooperation project in the Indo-Pacific that included Africa, stating as one of his priorities the maritime security of respecting the very specific Indian rules and international law for navigation and fishing18.
In recent times, the Indian Ocean has earned a regretful reputation for piracy against ships plying their routes and fishing vessels operating in its waters, a problem that India cannot ignore. The assaults and hijackings of ships on the eastern African coast undergo periodic resurgences, which is why the priority focus of the Indian Maritime Security Strategy is on security in the Indian Ocean from the Cape of Good Hope to the coastlines of African countries, island states and generally the entire southwest ocean, paying special attention to the bottlenecks leading to India through these sea lanes19.
While the Indian Navy has been involved in joint anti-piracy initiatives from the Arabian Sea to the Horn of Africa since 200820, there is also another major security issue of concern to Africa: the threat in the Indian Ocean sub-region posed by China and its strategy of establishing a network of commercial, maritime and military facilities in the Horn of Africa. The issue is that the security of Indian foreign trade and supplies also depends on control of this coastline so, as with piracy, maritime deterrence of China in Africa is of paramount importance to Indian interests21.
India is also present in UN peacekeeping missions on the continent. Involved in various missions since 1960, six thousand ‘blue helmets’ are currently deployed in some conflict zones, for example in Sudan, primarily to fight terrorism and provide food and health aid to the local populations where they are based. There are also annual education and training projects for the armed forces of various African countries at Indian institutions, as well as annual joint exercises under the Africa-India Field Training Exercise (AFINDEX), the first edition of which was held in 2019 with India and 17 African states, this number rising to 23 in March 202322.
Regarding security in Africa, the Modi government also envisages India becoming an exporter of arms and equipment to the continent, something that today seems distant and limited to small transactions. Coast guard patrol boats, Dhruv helicopters, small transport aircraft, vehicles, ammunition and communications equipment are sold from India to some African countries, albeit in small quantities as opposed to major contracts. In this regard, the Indian government has outlined the goal of becoming a net exporter by 2025, thereby alleviating the current deficit balance, given that India is one of the world's leading arms importers. Several countries have been identified as being susceptible to agreements for this purpose, such as Egypt, Nigeria and Kenya23.
A voice for Africa in the international community?
Prime Minister Modi visited the US in June this year. It was an event that the US Administration itself described as historic, not least because of India's interest in siding with US interests vis-à-vis China and the goodwill between the two countries, but also because it was a gesture of Modi's interest in the Indian diaspora in the US and in presenting himself as a mediator between the Western and China-Russia blocs, as well as a voice of the Global South24. Some media criticised the Biden Administration for not seeming to care about news of democratic backsliding and India's refusal to condemn and sanction Russia, all in the name of achieving a longed-for cooperation that had recently seemed to be cooling, as evidenced, for example, by the different approaches to foreign policy taken by India and the US in shared fora, perhaps most notably in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD)25.
In organisations and summits with Western leaders, Modi also seems to want to play the role of an India as the representative of African countries, although neither is this new. The country has traditionally exerted considerable political and ideological influence in Africa as a role model for decolonisation and Non-Aligned leadership. Nonetheless, India has been reluctant to provide military assistance to African national liberation movements and even criticised how minorities of Indian origin were persecuted in some of them in cases of Indophobia, the most obvious being Idi Amin's repression in Uganda26.
Almost coinciding with his visit to the US, Modi formally asked the leaders of the G20 countries to accept the African Union as a permanent member of the organisation, demonstrating the prime minister's commitment to strengthening Africa's representation and partnership in shaping global affairs27. There has been speculation that, unlike in the past when the Indian National Congress was in power, Prime Minister Modi represents Hindu nationalism, there being no shortage of serious clashes with the Muslim population, and that there could be friction with some African countries with Islamic majorities, although this has not happened so far. India's leadership aspiration has African support in international fora, including advocating for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, an express request of IAFS 2015 as a way to make Africa feel that its interests are represented by India, like in the BRICS and the G2028.
In the UN Security Council debate in May 2021 on "Peace and Security in Africa: Addressing the root cause of conflict while promoting post-pandemic recovery", the Indian Foreign Minister spoke up as the continent's voice calling to be better represented, echoing the African Union's demands made official in the Ezulwini Consensus and the Sirte Declaration, linking the request to prioritising multilateralism in the UN, and holding it as tangible proof of deep ties with the African continent29.
Nowadays, it appears that India and Africa's engagement in international affairs is solid and based on economic growth and addressing common challenges. In this cooperation, India wants to be recognised not as an equal but as a power that echoes the interests of the African Global South, both in traditional international fora and in alternative multilateral institutions that are gaining relevance in today's liquid, bloc-fronting geopolitical situation.
In short, India wants to play China's role on the continent but with different tools30 , which is where Africa and the "Indian imperative" come in.
Conclusions: the "Indian imperative" and Africa
In Indian policy circles, the "Indian imperative" is referred to as a form of foreign policy that is unique to India, and is original, detached and independent from third actors and blocs. To this effect, India would be a suitable nation for global leadership because of its Western democratic credentials based on a free market system, while at the same time representing the Global South and its aspirations. India is a pivotal country in terms of geography and demography, the heir to a millennia-long history that shapes it with a unique cultural character that is well suited to achieving global governance that advocates dialogue, peaceful conflict resolution and, ultimately, greater international equity31.
Of course, this imperative presupposes first and foremost the country's own interest. India is now Africa's third largest trading partner, one of its main threats in the continent being the influence of China, with which it can compete in two ways. First, by incentivising collaboration through increased aid and investment in exchange for support for its global interests; and second, by leveraging the Indian diaspora in Africa, a tool of influence that China, the US and the EU cannot count on. In the case of China, this is because it has had little presence on the continent for centuries, and in the cases of the Americans and Europeans precisely because their centuries-long presence and policies during decolonisation work against the historical and political narrative for many African societies, while India stands as a constant ally and point of reference.
Security aspects are very important in India's relationship with the African continent because it involves projecting an image of reliability that convinces the different countries and the international community that India plays a relevant role in this area in Africa, as evidenced by the mediatic military operation Kaveri to repatriate Indian nationals from Sudan. Security vis-à-vis Africa is also influenced by the position of China, which in turn triggers growing interest in implementing military infrastructures in the eastern region, precisely the area of greatest interest to India because of its coastline, as exemplified by the Chinese naval base in Djibouti. One response to its existence is the possibility of Indo- Russian joint use of a naval base in Sudan, thereby multiplying its strategic importance for the Indian Ocean region and a palpable example of India's multilateralism, not caring about the misgivings that a collaboration of this kind with Russia would raise in the West32.
India is also concerned about other Chinese initiatives, such as the country’s plan to set up private security companies to operate in some African countries, especially the most unstable ones, similar to the Wagners' presence in Russia but with the possible threat of blocking India's access to African resources, endangering Indian minorities in some countries, and hindering New Delhi's implementation of cultural, infrastructure, health and technology projects33.
There is a conviction that the deep historical, commercial and cultural ties between India and Africa will enable the social and business ecosystems to continue to develop significantly beyond threats, accelerating Indian trade and business investment in the continent via initiatives such as the IAFS summits and meetings as part of the upcoming India-Africa Entrepreneurship Forum (IAEF) to take place in July 2023 in Mauritius. It is hoped that this Afro-Indian business summit will boost Indian private interest in Africa based on the growth of the economies of some countries and the financing of African companies with Indian capital34.
In conclusion, India offers Africa an alternative economic, security and international relevance in the tradition of non-alignment, multilateralism and rejection of bloc politics. From the 'Indian imperative' approach, Africa can be seen as the most visible and successful geopolitical option for implementing an Indian-owned model of common benefit, balance and counterbalance in today's polarised global situation. On a visit to Rwanda by then Vice President Mohammad Hamid Ansari in 2017, he spoke of the imperatives of this Afro-Indian cooperation, grounded undoubtedly in shared history and cultural ties, but also in capacity building as economic partners and from a shared perspective on security matters35.
Javier Fernández Aparicio*
IEEE Analyst
@jafeap
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