Iran-Israel: a situation analysis

In view of the evolution of the situation in the Middle East and the possible repercussions that its evolution may have at regional and even global level, it would be interesting to analyze in depth what has happened in order to try to expose the scenarios we may face and their consequences.

For this purpose, and for those who have been lost along the way or have not been following the events from the beginning, we will begin with a brief list of events that will put us in situation:

Background

• On October 07, 2023, the Palestinian terrorist organization Hamas acting as a proxy for Iran carried out an attack on Israeli territory resulting in thousands of civilian deaths and over two hundred kidnapped.
• In response to the attack, Israel launched a military operation in the Gaza Strip with the aim of eliminating or minimizing the terrorist organization's operational capacity.
• In April 2024 a senior leader of Iran's Qud force was killed during an Israeli air force strike that hit Iran's consulate in Damascus.
• On April 13 Iran, in retaliation, launched a drone and missile strike against Israel. It was Tehran's first direct action on Hebrew territory. The attack was carried out with just over 300 drones and missiles with very limited effectiveness.
• On April 19, Israel responded to Iran's attack with an operation on the Isfahan complex, where Iran's nuclear program facilities and a missile assembly plant are located.
• On September 17, more than 2,000 members of Hezbollah, a pro-Iranian militia operating in Lebanon, were seriously injured or killed by the explosion of their paging devices.
• On September 18, the explosion of walkie-talkies and other electronic devices continued to cause casualties among Hezbollah ranks.
• On September 27, following a campaign of air strikes on Lebanese territory that eliminated a large part of Hezbollah's arms depots and a large part of the organization's leadership, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah died following an attack on the bunker of the organization's leadership in Beirut.
• On October 1, Iran, in response to the death of the leader of the pro-Iranian Lebanese militia, fired 180 ballistic missiles at Israel. The attack caused only two deaths, a Palestinian in the West Bank and a Jordanian citizen.

The succession of events described above has led to the current situation, the most significant and proximate events of which are as follows:

Current situation

• On the night of October 1st Israel began limited ground incursions into Lebanese territory to clear the area of Hezbollah elements.
• The Israeli government has announced that it will respond to Iran's attack.
• Iran in turn has threatened all-out war if Israel attacks its territory.
• Troops belonging to UNIFIL remain in their bases for security.
• Israel's ground operations in Lebanon have already caused the first casualties among the IDF.

The analysis of the above two points allows us to make the following assessment:

•  For the time being, Israel is acting as planned. After 07OCT23, Tel Aviv made it clear that a similar action would never be repeated. Implicit in that message was not only the occupation of Gaza to attack Hamas but an operation to take Hezbollah out of the equation.  The only way to act preemptively was to eliminate those two threats along its borders.   It is at a time when the Gaza operation is slowing down in intensity and requires less operational and logistical effort that the final phase of the operation against Hezbollah has been launched. The explosions caused by the beepers and walkies were aimed not only at attacking the command and control structure of the pro-Iranian militia, eliminating a large number of mid- and high-level command cadres, but also at obtaining information. In the panic, the terrorists were forced to relax security measures, use unsecured means of transmission and make mistakes. As a result, Israel was able to map the organization in much greater detail, draw its organizational chart with greater precision and obtain more locations. With the data obtained, they were able to hit several high-value targets, eliminating the entire top leadership of the organization, including its leader.                                        In parallel, the main missile and rocket caches have been destroyed, thus degrading the main threat to the population of northern Israel.                                                                                                   Israel has created the conditions so that, through limited ground operations, the same degree of degradation that has been achieved with Hamas can be achieved with minimal casualty cost. The main objective is to destroy as much of Hezbollah's infrastructure as possible and render southern Lebanon unsafe, which will force the organization to retreat northward.                                             The epicenter of Israel's operations has shifted to southern Lebanon. However, it should be noted that, despite the October 1st attack, Iran's attitude towards the offensive against Hezbollah can be defined as lukewarm.
•  According to available information, Iran informed via the US shortly before the missile launch, similar to what it did in April. This is a clear indicator that once again threats of all-out war are rhetorical. A confrontation between Israel and Iran would take place solely and exclusively by means of air strikes (something impossible for Iran) or exchange of salvos.
• In such a confrontation, a priori, Israel has the advantage. However, the cost would not be minor for Tel Aviv. The Iron Dome defense system does not distinguish between real missiles and decoys, and the cost of each missile launched against Iranian projectiles is about $50,000. Their replenishment is not quick, and several saturation attacks against high-value targets would end up being effective, potentially causing numerous casualties in addition to the enormous economic cost.
• Iran has the capacity to launch several attacks like the last one, and even larger ones. Therefore, its capacity to cause serious damage is high. However, it should be noted the low precision shown by its missiles, which increases the probability of missing the target and causing civilian casualties.
• To the above must be added gray zone operations, indiscriminate attacks at the hands of isolated individuals or small groups, cyber attacks, etc.

Such an escalation could lead to a permanent state of panic in Israel's major cities and a deterioration of the situation.

The cornerstone of the threat to Israel is the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Iran has always acted through its proxy militias to avoid direct retaliation by the IDF. However, the current situation has led it to seek a forceful response from Israel.

The isolation brought about by the signing of the Abraham Accords and the loss of its main vectors of pressure only leave it with the option of provoking Israel with an action that would justify a regional war with a global impact.

In view of the above, it is very necessary to review the possible scenarios that could result from all that has happened, taking into account the fact that no Muslim country has raised its voice in the face of the attacks on Hamas and Hezbollah.

Scenarios

1- Limited Israeli response

As was the case in April, and taking into account that Iran made its intentions known before the attack on October 1, Israel's response may be limited to military targets which are not of high value, but which make its capabilities clear. These are likely to belong to the IRGC structure, which, through the Quds force, controls the militias, which would be consistent with operations against Hamas and Hezbollah and would avoid escalation.

Risks

In this scenario, the focus of tension would continue in Lebanon. It would not affect maritime traffic or the activities of third countries in the region, beyond those operating in the areas of confrontation.

2 - Israel's forceful response

In this scenario, Israel's targets would likely be Iran's DA systems, missile assembly and/or manufacturing facilities, and the IRGC command and control structure. The objective would be to reduce the threat of further missile attacks to a minimum and degrade the force that holds the regime together and protects it. Such a successful action could open the door to movements seeking change within Iran. The IRGC's primary mission is to protect the regime from potential enemies within. Discontent in Iran is very high. If that repressive force loses its power, the chances of an internal movement would increase, and that in turn would reduce the threat to Israel, both from Iran itself and from its militias losing their support.

Risks

In this case, Iran would try to provoke a regional conflict, and would use all its available arsenal to attack Israeli territory as many times as it could.

Muslim countries would come under more pressure to position themselves. Iran would raise the flag of jihad against Israel and its supporters (mainly the West), and attacks on Israeli and European soil would multiply.

The risk of companies associated with Israel or operating there being targeted is very high.

The Gulf of Aden would become a priority target for Iran and the Houties militias. Denying shipping would cause a huge global economic problem. Sinking a ship in that area is likely to be a prime target. If that happens, no shipping line will risk using that route until it is completely safe, something very difficult and time consuming to achieve. The impact on the economy and businesses that depend on products coming from that route would be very high, as the Suez Canal would be de facto closed.

3 - Response to economic capacity

The possibility of an attack on Iran's oil infrastructure, specifically its refineries, has been leaked.

Such an act would sink the Iranian economy, but would in turn set off a chain effect that would wreak havoc on the world economy.

In this case, the target could be the Kharg terminal. Through that point 90% of Iran's oil exports leave. In a single blow with a quick and precise attack and with few casualties, the damage caused to Tehran would be almost irrecoverable. However, in addition to the environmental disaster that would affect more countries in the area, a response along these lines would cause the price of oil to rise above $120 a barrel in a context where Russian oil is not circulating. The consequences for the world economy would be unpredictable, which is why it is an unlikely scenario, as it would not meet with the approval of the US.

Iran's response would be similar to that described in response 2, with the addition of the Strait of Hormuz as a priority target. If its oil export capacity is limited or destroyed, it is likely to try to close the Strait of Hormuz so that the rest of the countries in the area, and therefore the rest of the world economy, will suffer the consequences. It should be noted that 20% of the world's oil passes through this route, and 35% of that transported by sea.

4 - Response to the nuclear infrastructure

The last scenario is an attack on the infrastructure of the Iranian nuclear program.

In this case it would be entering uncharted territory. Iranian nuclear facilities are already operational, unlike those attacked in the past in Iran itself and in Syria.

An attack on these facilities would provoke a nuclear accident with unforeseeable consequences in the region. Iran's reaction would be the same as in the previous response option. However, the risk of a breach of the Abraham agreements would be very high and Iran would most likely obtain external support that it does not have now.

Once the scenarios have been exposed we can draw the following conclusions.

The order of probability of Israel's response options would be:

Most Likely: Response Option 1.

Less likely: Response options 3 and 4.

The order of dangerousness of the response options:

Most Dangerous: Response Option 4 and 3.

Least Dangerous: Answer Option 1

The greatest risk in Lebanon today is the outbreak of civil war. The country is home to various religions and ethnicities that have traditionally clashed. A large part of the population is tired of Hezbollah's actions and pressures, and they are not happy about its demise. In some Christian localities they have expelled Hezbollah militants and in others they have refused to support them. If the situation deteriorates, Hezbollah may retaliate and then escalate into civil confrontation, as already happened in the 1980s, and this is certainly an aspect that needs to be followed up in detail.

It is clear that we are in one of the most delicate situations of the last decades. Once again, what happens in the region that is considered the cradle of civilization will once again mark the future of all.