Israel and the future of Hezbollah

We can place the beginning of the Middle East's leading role in global geopolitics in the years following World War II. 

Although this statement is not entirely true and could even be considered pretentious, as we forget all too easily that this area is precisely the cradle of civilisation and the origin of the greatest empires that history has ever known. 

But returning to the current context, it must be recognised that what happens or has happened in this region of the planet has conditioned relations between countries, the world economy and, to a certain extent, the future of the world, as it has been a key factor in shaping the balance of power and influence and the stage on which various powers have settled their differences. 

And, likewise, no one doubts that two relatively recent events, one a direct consequence of the other, have been a turning point that will reshape relations throughout the region and the world, with implications of all kinds. We are referring, of course, to the ‘Abraham Accords’ and the terrible events of 7 October 2023. 

The latter event will undoubtedly shape everything that happens in the region for probably decades to come, though certainly not in the way that those who planned and executed it at the time expected. 

As has been discussed on other occasions, Hamas's action against Israel was primarily intended to derail all the progress that had been made in relations between Tel Aviv and the Arab countries in the region, as this progress meant further isolation for Iran and the gradual loss of its two main tools for external action: the influence of its ‘proxy’ militias and the constant manipulation of the Palestinian cause for its own interests. It should not be forgotten that Iran's ‘concern’ for the Palestinians has always been self-interested insofar as it has served as a rallying point for the Muslim world around its objectives and as an element of destabilisation of the State of Israel. 

It would therefore not be unreasonable to think that the objectives also included destabilising the Israeli government by provoking an even more serious institutional crisis than the one it was already suffering. This would undoubtedly also have served Iran's interests, especially at a time when Prime Minister Netanyahu's situation was quite delicate and both political and social problems were pushing Israel into an unprecedented situation. 

When it is said that the goals of 7 October have not been achieved, we refer mainly to their effect on the Abraham Accords. These have been maintained and none of the signatory countries have withdrawn, despite the inevitable expressions of condemnation of Israeli retaliatory actions, but no further action has been taken. It also seems to have had the opposite effect on Israeli domestic politics. In a way, it has temporarily strengthened the position of the prime minister and his government and allowed them to take certain domestic decisions that would have been unthinkable on 6 October. What is more, and most importantly, even with the hostage problem, and the internal response to the reaction against Hamas, the overall result has been an ironclad unity around the government and in pursuit of the country's defence. 

Of course, this support or this position will not be immutable over time, and little by little, in specific situations, we see how it can wane, but its core remains unchanged. And it is precisely this that is allowing the Tel Aviv government to continue with its actions in the Gaza Strip. That and the certainty that Iran, as such, is not and will not be a direct actor in the conflict. This became clear after Tehran's attack on Israel, in both form and substance, and was further defined by the Israeli response. What was important about that event was not the military actions themselves, but the messages they conveyed. And those messages confirmed that neither country intends to engage in regional escalation, and that Israel's capabilities go far beyond what Iran can counter. So, at least for the moment, this exchange of blows has served to make Israel feel that its hands are free to continue with its plan.

And it seems that for now the Iranian militias are determined to provide Israel with the necessary motives to go ahead. For we must not deceive ourselves. The Israeli government, or rather the state of Israel, has no problem with the external repercussions of its actions. Protests, condemnations, untimely recognition of the Palestinian state, resolutions and so on will not cause it to deviate one millimetre from its objectives. 

Since the birth of the Hebrew state, its history has been punctuated by numerous episodes of violence, threats, wars and even real danger to the survival of the country itself. 

And if there is one thing that all Israeli governments since that time have had in common, it is that they would do whatever was necessary to ensure the country's survival over and above its external image. This is something that they soon learned is recovering, and that actions that today are scandalous are forgotten in a few weeks or months. In their particular cost-benefit balance it is clear that it pays off. 

That is why the latest attack on Israeli soil from southern Lebanon, which has so far killed twelve young people, may be the last excuse, or one of the last, that will lead Israel to take the final step in what could be considered the second phase of its response to 7 October. 

If anything was clear after the Hamas attack, it is that Israel will not allow such a thing to happen ever again. Israel's borders need to be secure, and the Israeli people cannot live in fear of another incursion by militias of any kind leading to a bloodbath like the one in October. Of course, there are still many unknowns about what happened and much to be said about intelligence and security failures, but those internal accounts will have to be settled when it is all over. 

Israel's security will undoubtedly depend on the disappearance or neutralisation of those militias with the capacity to carry out major actions. Among these we can identify three main ones: Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis. The latter have limited capacity and are a problem to be dealt with later. The real problem, however, is Hamas and Hizbollah. The operation in the Gaza Strip has significantly reduced their capabilities, although there is still work to be done, and in parallel, targeted attacks on Lebanon are slowly eroding Hizbollah. But we should not be misled. Sooner or later, and we can almost be sure it will be sooner rather than later, what has been experienced in the Gaza Strip will be repeated south of the Litani River, without surely reaching the same level of destruction, but probably with greater severity and at greater cost to Israel, but it is bound to happen. For Tel Aviv, the fact that an operational, well-armed, well-equipped, well-financed and well-trained militia is operating freely just one metre from its border (and anyone who has passed through the area has seen and knows this) is no longer an acceptable option, and it will avoid it by assuming the necessary military, human and reputational cost. 

Iran, for the moment, seems to have lowered the pressure and adopted a lower profile, probably due to the recently concluded electoral process and certain internal movements that denote tensions at the top of the regime. And we can venture to say that there are probably those in certain circles in Tehran who do not take kindly to the fact that the ‘Guardians of the Revolution’, and more specifically the Quds Force, are losing ascendancy and power by losing part of their assets. This is undoubtedly a very interesting topic for future discussion. 

It remains to be seen how other actors who have come to the fore in recent days and who in the past have had moments of great tension with Israel, such as Turkey, will react. However, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's statements, as is almost always the case, must be seen in a domestic context. Despite what it may seem, the domestic situation in the country is becoming increasingly complicated, especially on the economic front, and the Turkish government needs to seek attention for its population outside its borders. All of this is coupled with Ankara's keen interest in establishing itself as a regional power in the eastern Mediterranean and very interesting implications of a possible new conflict in Lebanon, such as the exploitation of the gas fields in the area, another key axis of Turkish foreign policy. 

As we can see, once again the turn of events in this corner of the globe will have an influence that goes beyond the regional level and will determine a scenario that we probably cannot even imagine today.