Libya: Does the elimination of Saif al-Islam Gaddafi seal the Franco-American deal?

1. Temporal analysis
2. IGH analytical reading
3. Regional and diplomatic issues
4. Economic and security implications
5. IGH Outlook / 3-5 year projection
6. Underlying Atlantic doctrine
7. Main sources

On February 3, 2026, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, son of former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, was killed in Zintan (western Libya) during a targeted operation carried out by a four-man armed commando unit. According to family and media sources (RFI, Reuters, Al Jazeera), the assailants neutralized surveillance systems before executing the 53-year-old Gaddafi heir, who had been wanted by the International Criminal Court since 2011 for crimes against humanity.

Temporal analysis

This elimination comes at a troubling strategic moment. On January 28, 2026, a secret meeting was held in Paris, organized jointly by France and the United States. The Libyan participants — Saddam Haftar (son of the marshal and deputy commander of the Libyan National Army) for the East, and Ibrahim Dbeibah (security advisor to Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibah) for the West — discussed institutional unification excluding the “old actors” and aimed at sharing oil, military, and financial power. This mediation was preceded on January 26 and 27 by a tour of the Maghreb by Massad Boulos, special advisor to President Trump, to Tunis and then Algiers, in order to align regional capitals with this stabilization process.

The assassination of Saif al-Islam, which took place six days after this Paris meeting, cannot be analyzed as a simple settling of scores by militias. The timing, the operational methodology, and the absence of any claim of responsibility suggest a political “cleansing” operation facilitating the Franco-American deal.

IGH analytical reading

Professional operational signature

The modus operandi reveals a technical capacity at the state or parastatal level: prior sabotage of surveillance cameras, coordinated assault by four operators, and exfiltration without a trace. This signature far exceeds the standards of traditional Libyan militias and suggests foreign intelligence-style planning.

Convergence of East-West interests

Despite their historical rivalries, the camps of Dbeibah (West, supported by Turkey and Qatar) and Haftar (East, supported by Russia, Egypt, and the Emirates) shared a common interest: eliminating a “third wheel” that could torpedo their power-sharing agreement. Saif al-Islam embodied this structural threat.

The Saif al-Islam obstacle: nostalgia and tribal legitimacy

Although officially supportive of UN reunification initiatives, Saif represented a major political danger to both sides. A growing number of Libyans—particularly within the Warfalla, Kadhafa, and Zintan tribes—associate the Muammar Gaddafi era with economic, security, and sovereign stability that has been lost since 2011. Saif crystallized this nostalgia without bearing the direct repressive legacy of his father. Analysts estimated his electoral potential at between 30 and 40% in the event of a transparent election.

In 2024, Saif broke with Haftar and rallied the militias of Zintan (historically loyal to the East), thus threatening the regional military balance. For Dbeibah, he embodied the anti-militia and anti-Islamist alternative, undermining the legitimacy of the Government of National Unity among the disappointed middle classes. While alive, Saif “monetized” his father's legacy without assuming responsibility for his crimes, making any bipartisan Dbeibah-Haftar deal vulnerable to popular Gaddafi-style protest.

Regional and diplomatic issues

Libya: simplification of the political landscape

Saif's elimination radically simplifies the Libyan political landscape by reducing the game to a Dbeibah-Haftar bipolarity. The Paris deal aimed precisely at this objective: the creation of a unified government controlling oil revenues (Africa's fourth largest producer), the armed forces, and the Central Bank, while excluding “cumbersome” figures such as Aguila Saleh (president of the Tobruk Parliament).

Without Saif, the Gaddafi tribes lose their figurehead and will have to negotiate their integration into the new system from a position of weakness.

Maghreb: mixed reactions

Algeria: Algiers, historically favorable to the Dbeibah camp and hostile to Haftar (perceived as pro-Western), faces a double risk. On the one hand, Libyan stabilization under French-American control could marginalize Algerian influence in Libya. On the other hand, any post-elimination tribal fragmentation (scenario of rejection of the “fait accompli”) risks destabilizing Algeria's eastern border (influx of refugees, arms trafficking, jihadist movements).

Morocco: Rabat has a window of opportunity to strengthen its role as a regional mediator, capitalizing on the monarchy's expertise in post-conflict transitions. Royal diplomacy could offer its good offices to facilitate the integration of Gaddafi tribes into the new Libyan political system, thus positioning Morocco as a guarantor of Maghreb stability with its Atlantic partners.

Tunisia: Tunis, a neutral mediator traditionally called upon for Libyan issues (Tunisia-Algeria-Egypt tripartite mechanism), sees its security vulnerability increase in the event of tribal destabilization. The porosity of the Libyan border exposes Tunisia to uncontrolled flows (weapons, migrants, jihadist cells).

Sahel: risk of militia redeployment

Precedents (2023-2024) show that Libyan militias redeployed to Mali and Niger during internal political restructuring. A post-Saif fragmentation scenario could fuel instability in the Sahel, particularly via the southern Libyan corridor controlled by non-aligned armed groups.

Economic and security implications

Securing European energy supplies

Libya remains a strategic supplier for the European Union (4th largest oil producer in Africa, with 80% of production controlled by Haftar). Post-Saif institutional unification aims to guarantee the stability of oil infrastructure and secure European foreign direct investment (FDI), particularly from Italy (ENI) and France (TotalEnergies). A unified government could also revive green hydrogen projects and Italian-Libyan gas interconnections.

Containment of migration flows

Libya is the main hub for irregular migration to Europe (estimated at 700,000 people/year). The Franco-American deal explicitly includes migration management as a quid pro quo for stabilization aid. A unified Libya under Dbeibah-Haftar control would facilitate bilateral agreements with the EU on border control and the refoulement of boats.

Neutralization of Russian-Chinese influence

The presence of the Wagner Group (renamed Africa Corps) and Chinese investments in Libyan infrastructure (Belt and Road Initiative) are a major concern for the Atlantic powers. The elimination of Saif—who had ties to Moscow and Cairo—is part of a Russian-Chinese containment strategy in the Mediterranean. A pro-Western government in Tripoli would reduce the influence of these non-Atlantic actors.

IGH Outlook / 3-5 year projection

Scenario 1: Forced stabilization

Probability: very likely

The Paris deal leads to the formation of a unified Dbeibah-Haftar government within 3 to 6 months. The Gaddafi tribes, deprived of leadership, accept their integration in exchange for compensation (administrative posts, local reconstruction budgets).

Foreign direct investment resumes, oil production stabilizes, and migration flows decrease thanks to EU-Libya agreements.

Scenario 2: Renewed fragmentation

Probability: fairly likely

Gaddafi tribes refuse to accept the “fait accompli” of Saif's elimination and launch a campaign of sabotage against oil infrastructure. Jihadist militias take advantage of the security vacuum to reestablish themselves. Turkey and Egypt intensify their direct military interventions. The Sahel experiences renewed instability due to the redeployment of Libyan militias.

Validation indicators – Scenario 1

Official announcement of a unified government by April 2026 • Resumption of oil production above 1.2 million barrels/day • Signing of EU-Libya migration agreements • Reduction in armed incidents in the oil crescent

Warning indicators – Scenario 2

Hostile statements by the Warfalla tribes within 15 days • Oil sabotage by March 2026 • Mobilization of Gaddafi loyalists on social media • Armed incidents in Zintan or the Oil Crescent

Underlying Atlantic doctrine

Beyond the scenarios, the elimination of Saif al-Islam reveals an Atlantic doctrine of “authoritarian stabilization” that prioritizes security over democratization. France and the United States, faced with the failures of previous interventions in Libya (2011), are now opting for a pragmatic approach: supporting a Dbeibah-Haftar duopoly capable of guaranteeing three strategic objectives (energy security, migration containment, Russian-Chinese marginalization), even if it means sacrificing electoral processes and political plurality. This logic could extend to other theaters in the Maghreb and Sahel regions.

Main sources

RFI, “Libya: Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, son of the former Libyan leader, is dead,” February 3, 2026;

Reuters, “Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, son of late Libyan leader, has been killed,” February 3, 2026;

Al Jazeera, “Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, son of former leader, killed in Libya,” February 3, 2026;

Africa Intelligence, “Dbeibeh and Haftar camps resume talks in Paris,” January 28, 2026;

Mondafrique, “Paris attempts mediation between Libyan enemy brothers,” January 29, 2026;

Agenzia Nova, “Libya: Contacts between Haftar and Dabaiba camps resume in Paris,” January 28, 2026.