Luis de la Corte: "Today the epicentre of jihad is in Africa"
In the latest instalment of "De Cara al Mundo" we have the presence in the studios of Onda Madrid of Luis de la Corte, professor at the Autonomous University of Madrid and writer, who presents his latest book "Historia de la jihad". On the other hand, the UAM professor analyses the evolution of jihadist terrorism in recent years and how they have been able to create propaganda through social networks. Finally, de la Corte gives us his impressions on the evolution of the conflict between Russia and the European Union.
His book, "Historia de la jihad", is an analysis of the reactivation of the different jihadist terrorists.
It is a history book that takes a very broad look at the origins of the problem of jihadism, which in turn is a problem of terrorism. " Historia de la jihad" not only talks about terrorism like the one we saw in Syria and Iraq, where there were insurgent forces with the capacity to dismember two countries in half in the heart of the Middle East, but the book also takes a historical look at the process that made all this possible. The bulk of the book focuses on the development of jihadism up to the 9/11 attacks in 2001.
Is Spain safe or are the budgets insufficient to cover the national security strategy?
Very interesting documents have been produced in recent years to try to deal with the development of the security system in Spain, but it is not very clear how this is then managed, and in the end paper is the only thing that holds everything. Nor is it clear what resources are available, and I am talking about economic, human and institutional resources, so to what extent do we have the necessary resources to fulfil a series of very broad lines of action that are presented in this strategy, as they have been presented in previous strategies and in sectoral strategies, against terrorism, organised crime, disinformation, etc.
What kind of terrorism is our society facing today?
Today on a global scale, although Al Qaeda has been very degraded for years, and although the Islamic State established a kaliphate and a proto-state in Syria and Iraq, but Al Qaeda and the Islamic State lost their territorial power, nevertheless, we have a situation in which there are more jihadist militants now than there were at the time in 2001. That fact is illuminating enough, and while there are a number of other destabilising problems in the world, this one has by no means disappeared.
To what extent do new technologies or social networks help terrorists to recruit young, violent or indoctrinated people?
Communication and information technologies and the development of social networks have indeed played an important role in recent years and in the evolution of the phenomenon. At the same time, what has happened is that the individuals who have been linked to this movement in recent years are individuals of their time, just as we use social networks for all kinds of information, communication, relationship and influence activities, so they have also used them, I don't think they have boosted terrorism, simply that they have changed the format of recruitment or indoctrination. One fact: more than 50% of the operations carried out by European intelligence services to dismantle jihadist structures in our countries have benefited from the presence of these individuals on social networks.
To what extent is the Islamic State / Daesh / ISIS a threat to Afghanistan today?
At the moment there is no possibility of them taking control of the country, but they do have the capacity to destabilise and do a lot of damage, complicating and generating tension that distracts the new government, the second Taliban emirate, from other tasks such as dealing with the humanitarian crisis in which the country is immersed and restructuring the institutions. The fear of many analysts in relation to Daesh and its presence in Afghanistan is that it could attract foreign volunteers to fight in its ranks as it did in Syria and Iraq and that disgruntled elements of the Taliban could defect and join the Islamic State, which would resize them and make the problem bigger.
The other focus that we have that is a very direct threat because it is our backyard is the Sahel. Should governments pay much more attention by providing means, resources and intervention to prevent terrorist groups from controlling the Sahel?
Well, if there is one thing that all international analysts who follow the dynamics of jihadist extremism around the world agree on, it is that today the epicentre of jihad is in Africa, and the Sahel is one of them and probably one of the most important. In recent years we have seen a spectacular increase in the level of terrorist activity promoted by these groups, the presence of two of the most important Al Qaeda affiliates on the one hand and Daesh on the other, and a spread from country to country beyond the Sahel itself in collaboration with West African groups. The European Union is making a major effort, France and Spain, among others, are making a great effort, but the expected results are not being achieved.
Moreover, there are divergences, France is withdrawing, there seems to be the presence of Wagner mercenaries, all of this intoxicates what should be a common strategy to prevent terrorists from being able to control the area.
Since the intervention in 2012 to stop jihadist mobilisation in Mali towards the capital, Bamako, what we have seen is that the situation has become increasingly complex. A high level of instability has been maintained in the country, there has been a coup d'état in Mali, there was a coup d'état a few days ago in Burkina Faso, which is not unrelated to the problem posed by jihadism, and the situation is really very complicated. Evidently not all the countries of the European Union give the same weight to the problem that this poses, especially now with the crisis that we have in Eastern Europe.
There are no major attacks like those that took place in Barcelona or Paris, but that should not make us think that the threat no longer exists.
One of the things I intended to show in the book by tracing the evolution of jihadism throughout history was to point out that it has been a Western error to understand the problem of jihadism only as a problem of terrorism and only as a problem of terrorism in the West. Jihadism is an enormously destabilising system, as we have seen in recent years, but it has been so in other times, in other regions and in other historical contexts. We always react after a major attack in a nearby country or in our own, and this leads us to an analysis of the phenomenon that underestimates its dimension as an insurgent factor, if these countries are destabilised, the Maghreb can also be destabilised, and as this happens we have a problem in the Mediterranean. If there is a problem in the Mediterranean and let's imagine that it is combined with an intensification or escalation in Eastern Europe, how do you manage these two problems at the same time... it's very bad.
How are jihadist groups nurtured, how are they able to eat young people's heads so that they become radicalised and do the atrocious barbarities that we have seen in Syria and in many parts of the world?
97% of terrorist attacks take place in Muslim countries, which is something I try to highlight in the book. The growth of jihadism has been linked and continues to be linked to two fundamental problems: fragile or failed states, most of the attacks you refer to have taken place in recent years in Muslim countries, but not in any type of Muslim country, since they have been in fragile Muslim countries, the more unstable they are, the more attacks because there is a greater level of impunity, there is more room for movement and there is a greater level of discontent in society. On the other hand, the other factor that is directly linked to that of fragile states is the outbreak of armed conflicts in which jihadist elements penetrate, as in the case of Syria. In Syria, when the revolution breaks out, there is repression by the regime that triggers a civil war and in principle the rebel side is not a jihadist side, but jihadism penetrates there and becomes the vanguard of rebel action against the state, as has happened in Afghanistan and other countries. These two elements - fragile states and armed conflicts in countries with a large proportion of Muslim populations - create the most dangerous situation that is most conducive to the proliferation of jihadist activity and the spread of the movement.
What do we in the West need to do to prevent a young European of Muslim origin from becoming radicalised and recruited by jihadists?
That is the key question. In recent years, much attention has been paid to the fundamental aspect that has most concerned both academics and practitioners: how this process of radicalisation occurs. The only thing we know is that it is something that does not occur in the same way in each person, each one has nuances, what is clear is that there is some factor in people's life trajectory that generates a situation of dissatisfaction and discontent where they come into contact with people who are in the orbit of this form of extremism, if they had come into contact with another form of extremism then perhaps they would have embraced it. Jihadism has taken into account the importance of manipulating propaganda, they are very effective at it and have managed to activate the illusion of having a collective life project, in defence of the Muslim community, with its own identity.
Then when they arrived in Syria or Iraq and saw what they had to do and how they had to live, the story changed radically.
This is one of the most interesting and difficult details to explain because it is true that some people, when they got there, realised that they had been deceived. But as it happens in the sects, many other people, when they arrive and find everything different from what they were presented with, are even more convinced. We still have women who married members of Daesh who are now detained in Syria and Iraq and they continue to say that they have never done anything wrong, that their husbands are innocent and they will never question the religion or the misinterpretation spread by these individuals.
It's been a few days since we talked about the Ukraine crisis, any new more or less clear ideas about the negotiations, and will there be military intervention?
My impression is that Putin had no real intention to intervene with the troops he has massed on the Ukrainian border, but to use this to put pressure on a possible negotiation with NATO rather than the EU. The situation has evolved to a point where Putin may have a credibility problem if he doesn't do something big with those troops. Russian strategists are probably recalculating the risks of what might be coming their way, but backtracking would also pose an image problem for Putin and his government. In international politics there are many pacts that are never acknowledged in public, we don't know what the United States and Russia have talked about, so surely what Putin expects is to be given what he is asking for, so you can agree that NATO will not be extended to Ukraine and say that you are just the opposite.