What is the logic behind the new international conflicts?

"The pre-established global order during the 20th century was designed to deal with various inter-state tensions or civil wars. War between nation states and civil wars had a certain logic. The violence of the 21st century, however, does not fit the mold of the 20th century. Although conflicts have not disappeared, the success in reducing inter-state wars has meant that other forms of violence have either fallen far short of the classification of 'war' or 'peace', or of 'political' or 'criminal' violence," warned the World Bank ten years after the September 11 attacks shook the foundations of the global system we had known until then. 

In recent years, the idea that the violence of the 21st century is different from that of the wars of the 20th century has been repeatedly debated in both academia and politics. The analyst Mary Kaldor reflects in her article 'In defence of new wars' on the fact that new international conflicts take place in areas where authoritarian states are weak, partly as a consequence of having opened up to the world. 

"In these contexts, the dissociation between state and non-state, public and private, external and internal, economic and political, and even war and peace, is crumbling," she said in 2013.  This dichotomy and the absence of institutions capable of finding a certain stability has meant that, just six years later, insurgencies have found a place to roam freely in countries such as Chile, Colombia and even some areas of Venezuela. 
 

Mary Kaldor was a pioneer in analyzing what years later we would know as hybrid war, a term that, however, does not convince the author. In this research, Kaldor assures us that old and new wars differ in a series of elements such as their players, objectives, methods and forms of financing. As far as the players are concerned, Kaldor explains that while the conflicts of the 20th century were fought by the regular armed forces of the different states, the new wars are fought by different combinations of networks of state and non-state players (paramilitaries, warlords, paramilitaries, etc.).

Another major difference has to do with the objectives pursued by these conflicts. "The old wars were fought for geopolitical interests or for ideology such as democracy or socialism. In the 21st century, however, new wars are being fought in the name of ethnic, religious or tribal identity," says Kaldor. According to the author, identity politics has a different logic from geopolitics or ideology. In terms of methods, in the conflicts of the 20th century, territories were conquered through military offensives. In the hybrid conflicts that have developed in recent decades, territories are captured through population control or political means. "Violence is largely directed against civilians as a way of controlling territory, rather than against enemy forces," the author laments.

Finally, the "old wars" were financed by the states themselves, while today many of the conflicts are financed through illegal methods such as looting, kidnapping or smuggling. "While the old war economies were typically centralising, autarkic and people-mobilising, the new wars are part of a globalised open and decentralised economy where participation is low and income depends on continued violence," he warns.

However, the main difference is that while the conflicts of the 20th century were aimed at building a new model of state, the new wars seek to dissolve it, without having a defined project for when the conflict ends, as we have seen in Sudan.  The increase in destructiveness caused by the development of military technology, the emergence of new forms of communication such as social networks and globalisation have transformed states and changed the role they play in relation to organised crime. 

However, many of the authors who analyse this phenomenon agree that the new conflicts are a mixture of war (organised violence with political ends), crime (organised violence with other ends) and human rights violations (violence against civilians). Despite this distinction between old and new wars, much contemporary violence could be considered insurgency. The Mara Salvatrucha, for example, emerged in the 1980s in California with the aim of caring for Salvadoran migrants and has since spread throughout much of Central America. The economic, social and political instability suffered by countries such as Honduras and Guatemala has meant that the objectives of this criminal gang have been transformed over time. 
 

The Army's Counterinsurgency Doctrinal Publication (PD3-301) defines insurgency as "the organised violent movement that undertakes a prolonged struggle with the aim of changing the established political order", as Javier Jordán states in his article 'Theory of Insurgency: Concept, Ends and Means'. Thus, the war on drugs in Mexico or Colombia could be considered a political and authoritarian response to an insurgency developed during the last three decades of the 20th century. 

Jordan considers that the objective of the current insurgencies is 'to take control of the state in order to implement a different political system', something that differs from the objective of the new wars previously analysed. On the other hand, the insurgencies that have been developing during the last few years pursue "national independence or the creation of a new state independent of the previous one, or local or tribal political autonomy, generating or maintaining a situation that escapes state political control". 

After creating his own theory of the insurgency, Jordan assures that for it to appear there must be a series of conditions, such as generating a "relevant political entity that opposes the political authority that is being challenged".  Last October, during the protests in Chile, known as 'Chilean Red October', hundreds of people took to the streets in different regions of the country, especially in cities like Gran Valparaíso, Gran Concepción or Arica, to protest against the increase in fares on Santiago's public transport system. The social and political entity that developed in Chile during those days was able to raise a political cause and attract a large number of committed supporters, two of the other characteristics defined by Jordan in his theory. Likewise, insurgent groups have to be able to "prevail over rival groups, have outside support and even have a refuge," according to the author.  A simple action such as the rate increase in Chile caused several pockets of protest, looting and violent unrest to appear throughout the country. Faced with this situation, President Sebastián Piñera had no choice but to decree a state of emergency and a curfew in several regions of the country. 
 

Whether or not an insurgency is prolonged in time depends, in part, on the "capacity of the state at the time and the level of democratisation of the political system where it intends to develop," according to Jordan. In Chile, Sebastián Piñera's government has announced a series of measures, known as the 'New Social Agenda', and has set in motion a security agenda to prevent a recurrence of peaks of violence like the one last October. 

However, the response of states cannot always put an end to an insurgency. One example is the National Liberation Army (ELN) in Colombia. The five pillars of insurgent activity, according to Jordán, are "armed struggle, propaganda, social assistance, social and political activism and foreign relations".

The ELN, like the Mara Salvatrucha, has been transforming its social and political objectives over time. This revolutionary leftist insurgent guerrilla organization perfectly fulfills the five pillars of which Jordan speaks in his theory. Although during the last few years its actions continue to be violent, the ELN has begun to take advantage of other types of weapons such as information. For example, this week a pamphlet has been circulating on social networks in which the ELN warns that a curfew will be decreed in the country because of the coronavirus pandemic, according to Radio Caracol. However, authorities have explained that this pamphlet is false and seeks to spread fear in society. 
 

Whatever the case, it is clear that the current global system is a legacy of the era of globalization. How this will affect the development of states and the possible appearance of insurgency is something that we will have to analyze during the next decades, starting by defining what can be considered conflict and what cannot. The response to this type of violence will depend mainly on States and their ability to mediate. As long as conflicts such as those in Syria or Libya continue to exist, we will have to continue seeking peaceful alternatives to these confrontations and reflecting on the logic behind them.