Sahel: all against all?

If we take a look at the 2010 decade, we can see that one of the most turbulent geopolitical regions has been the Sahel. A number of jihadist terrorist organisations have found fertile ground there for their activities. Weak state structures, porous borders, inter-ethnic conflicts, rampant poverty, lack of systemic opportunities for young people... All these factors have been the fuel allowing some groups to operate, most of them combining the ideological postulates of jihadism with more localist discourses.

This was the case in the Tuareg rebellion of 2012, which was struggling to establish a Shari'a-based society and to achieve independence for the desert region of Azawad at the same time. In fact, the organization leading that conflict called itself The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad.  

Likewise, other more recently established organizations have been making political or ethnic causes their flags while promulgating a jihadist doctrine. This is the case, for example, of the Macina Liberation Front (MLF) in southern Mali and Ansaroul Islam, which used to operate around the border with Burkina Faso. Both organizations linked their message to that of the Peul ethnic group, which is often marginalized in West African countries. 

In recent years, the number of groups practising this kind of hybrid terrorism in the country has been increasing.  The International Observatory on Terrorism Studies (OIET) places the Sahel as the region where jihadist activity has increased the most. Although it is true that there is a complicated dance of acronyms, with numerous organizations overlapping and acting in common territories, there are two large conglomerates of terrorist groups of jihadist aetiology. And they have begun to fight each other.

These groups are: Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) and Daesh in the Greater Sahara (ISGS). JNIM is closer to the orbit of the global Al-Qaeda network; after all, it emerged in 2017 as a combination of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb with the FLM, Al-Murabitun and Ansar Dine. 

Its leader is precisely the leader of the latter organization: Iyad ag-Ghaly, a veteran of the Tuareg wars. He has been largely responsible for the unstable situation in the Sahel in recent years. However, his organization does not lack a certain degree of pragmatism. 

At the end of March, Ag-Ghaly himself acknowledged that JNIM was willing to start a negotiation process with the Malian government, provided that the foreign troops - mainly French troops from Operation Barkhana - deployed in the country left the territory.

Then the sudden change of mind of the terrorist leader was seen, from Bamako, with a certain hope, but also with marked scepticism. Hope because this is an unusual step in the most recent history of Mali, which had not managed to attract jihadists to its domain since the so-called Algiers agreement (2015), negotiated with the MNLA Tuaregs. In five years, it was the most relevant step for the Executive in the framework of its so-called inclusive national dialogue. 

Scepticism, for its part, could not be ignored either. After all, Ag-Ghaly was proposing, at least from the outset, a rather maximalist position: Either them - the international soldiers - or us. The premise on which the JNIM was planning to attend the meetings was unrealistic. Just a few days later, the terrorist group resumed its campaign of attacks against the country's armed forces. 

However, the big news over the past month is that the JNIM and ISGS, the Daesh branch based in the region, have significantly increased their clashes. The two organizations have had an ambivalent relationship in the past: whenever it was convenient for both sides, they have cooperated to achieve their respective goals.  

However, it cannot be forgotten that both JNIM and ISGS operate basically in the same geographical area. The border region between Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger is currently a hotbed for terrorist activity, and there have been occasional clashes between the two factions. In recent weeks, this trend has increased, as acknowledged in an authenticated video by Adnan al-Sahrawi, the top leader of ISGS. 

The reason could be related precisely to the JNIM's attempt to join the talks proposed by Mali's President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta. According to independent journalist Housseyne Ag Issa, a Sahelian conflict expert, he had access to an audio recording in which one of the ISGS leaders, Abd al-Hakim al-Sahrawi, stated that his organisation legitimises the fight against “those who negotiate with tyrants”.

It can thus be seen that, although both groups start from similar ideological postulates, they also have some differences. Ag-Ghaly's acknowledges that JNIM's insurgency has proved to be extremely costly in terms of lives and is open to dialogue, although it is true that it has not ceased its terrorist activity.

This double game is not even contemplated in Daesh's ranks. Recent accusations made against Al-Qaida like-minded groups underline that the ISGS take the Takfirist doctrine to extremes. Propounded by the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb in the 1970s, this line of thought justifies violence not only against non-believers, but also against those Muslims who participate in the public life of states not fully governed by the Sharia.

There is also the possibility, however, that the fighting has a much more prosaic component and that the step taken by Ag-Ghaly is the pretext for Daesh trying to reduce the influence of JNIM in his operation area. 

For the moment, the fighting has spread throughout the western Sahel area, both in Mali and Burkina Faso. In fact, it is in the latter country that the latest fighting is taking place. Over the past few years, the forests of Soum province in the far north have provided a safe haven for terrorist groups. Now, they are the scene of a crossfire that is leaving dozens of dead and prisoners on both sides. 

It was in that enclave that, at the end of last week, a clash between the two groups left more than 60 Jihadists dead on both sides. The clash took place between the towns of Arbinda and Nassoumbou, according to the French-language Nord-Sud Journal. For the time being, this area is the most severely hit by Daesh's attacks. The JNIM contingents located there were commanded by Abou Mansour and the ISGS contingents by Abdoul Hakoum. 

While the terrorist groups continue to fight each other, the local population remains virtually at their mercy. Governments, already absent, are now facing the coronavirus pandemic, which has hit Burkina Faso hard and which, if spread throughout the region, would be truly destructive.