Saudi Arabia's approach to the crisis in Yemen

Along a long stretch of the border between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and southern Yemen, Riyadh has begun to deploy local forces backed by heavy military equipment in an attempt to impose a new reality on the ground following the changes driven by the Southern Transitional Council in recent months.

These moves come at a particularly delicate time in the region, with the conflict in Yemen shifting from a centralized war to overlapping spheres of influence, and allies and adversaries realigning themselves according to calculations more complex than the simple logic of “unity” or “legitimacy.”

Military sources indicate that a state of division has begun to emerge within the local formations sent to the lines of contact, as southern fighters from the Saudi-backed “Nation's Shield” forces refuse to participate in any confrontation that Riyadh wishes to wage against other southern forces, considering that such a scenario only benefits actors who have historically taken advantage of the chaos.

This situation places Saudi officials in an extremely sensitive position, as their ability to command forces that lack political or social motivation to fight becomes limited, opening the door to resorting to other military formations, perceived in the south as an extension of the Muslim Brotherhood in Marib.

In this context, the Saudi approach to the south seems to rely on tools that are already worn out politically and in terms of security. Recycling forces that have lost their local legitimacy and dragging the south into a new internal conflict does not generate stability, but rather reopens security vacuums that experience has shown to be the most conducive environment for the return of Al Qaeda and, at the same time, for the strengthening of Houthi activity.

Any large-scale Saudi military movement in the south cannot be separated from its maritime repercussions. The potential chaos along the coasts of the Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait would not be confined to Yemeni geography, but would directly affect international shipping routes and the interests of Western powers. In scenarios such as these, Al Qaeda or the Houthis do not need so much a military victory as an unstable environment that allows them to move and carry out qualitative attacks that bring them back to the forefront of the security scene.

From a strategic perspective, opposing any path to autonomy or independence for the south does not so much weaken the Transitional Council as it gives the region's adversaries a golden opportunity. The south, in its current reality, has become one of the few barriers preventing the Houthis from expanding southward, and in recent years it has constituted a genuine line of defense against extremist organizations.

Undermining this reality through pressure policies or internal confrontations means, in practice, dismantling what remains of the security achievements made since the beginning of the military intervention.

The most dangerous aspect of this approach is that it ignores the most profound transformation in the definition of the Yemeni conflict: the south is no longer simply a theater of open warfare in the north, but has become a political and security process in its own right, with its own calculations and differentiated regional relationships. Treating it as a secondary issue or a temporary obstacle to be overcome does not lead to controlling the situation, but to overwhelming it.

Ultimately, any policy that opposes southern independence without offering a realistic and viable alternative does not lead to protecting Saudi national security as intended, but creates the ideal conditions for the return of the most dangerous actors. While Riyadh is committed to imposing a balance through force, the Houthis and Al Qaeda are committed to time and chaos, and history often shows that the latter is the most profitable bet in contexts of unresolved conflict.