Scenarios for a peace agreement

This week, we must once again devote our space to what is happening in the Gaza Strip. A few days ago, we tried to explain what Israel is facing (without excusing or justifying certain actions or procedures) and the gravity of the situation that has led us to the current moment. 

However, a few days ago, a proposed peace plan was put on the table that is worth analysing in order to understand what scenarios it may lead to, as we must not forget that it is not only regional stability that is at stake. 

The proposed peace agreement between Israel and Hamas has been promoted by the White House, and can be interpreted as a ‘high-pressure diplomacy’ initiative that seeks to end the war quickly, responding both to the international outcry demanding an end to the humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip and to the intense internal political pressure on the issue in Israel and the United States, because we must not forget that internal pressure on this issue in both countries is extremely high. At the heart of the proposal, of course, is the release of Israeli hostages held in the Strip, which is not only a central element but also an initial and essential requirement. 

The US president has, in his usual style, taken centre stage, including a clear ultimatum to Hamas to accept the proposal. The plan's main focus, rather than building comprehensive peace, is on security and the disarmament of Hamas, but these two conditions are essential in order to continue moving in the right direction. Some have described it not as a peace plan, but as a ‘framework for future negotiations,’ which avoids addressing or only touches obliquely on fundamental issues such as territorial occupation or the right to Palestinian self-determination. However, given the current situation, this is probably the best way to approach the issue. The central objective is twofold: the immediate release of all hostages (living and deceased), and the disarmament and dismantling of Hamas as the ruling force in Gaza and as a military instrument. 

Throughout the process, Qatar's role has been consolidated as an essential channel of communication with Hamas, even obtaining an extended security guarantee from the United States after the Israeli attack on Qatari soil against leaders of the terrorist organisation. Israel's position, for its part, has been to project a commitment to the ‘immediate implementation’ of the first phase of the plan, seeking to manage the narrative of urgency. This is not trivial, because if there is one thing Israel needs, it is to regain ground in the battle for the narrative. The Israeli Prime Minister has insisted on the promise of the return of the hostages and the demilitarisation of Gaza, emphasising that the cessation of hostilities is contingent upon the fulfilment of essential military objectives. 

The plan is structured around 20 key points, with a post-conflict governance structure that introduces inherent risks of volatility. It establishes, for example, that the management of Gaza would fall to a technocratic body composed of Gazans, with the explicit exclusion of Hamas and other armed factions, and that it would be supervised by a transitional authority led by the US president himself. 

This dependence on US political leadership and the centralisation of oversight in a single political figure introduce a factor of great vulnerability to US political cycles. In practice, the model is a short-term exit strategy from the conflict that lays the groundwork for further progress in negotiations towards a more lasting and settled solution, but it cannot in any way be understood as a definitive peace agreement. 

In terms of more specific points, the plan stipulates a phased exchange of hostages and prisoners, beginning with a 60-day ceasefire. Israel commits to a gradual withdrawal from the Strip, while maintaining a ‘security perimeter’ until the terrorist threat is eradicated. Internal security would be handled by a multinational peacekeeping force, ideally composed of Arab or Muslim countries to reduce friction. 

Initially, both sides have decided to accept the basis of the document and sign the agreement; however, experience compels us to be cautious and consider all options, as the road ahead still appears long and tortuous. 

The viability of the agreement faces the fundamental incompatibility of the parties' demands, creating a ‘zero-sum dynamic’ that is almost impossible to overcome: 

1. Hamas' veto on political exclusion: although Hamas has formally accepted the plan, it has not done so without expressing its ‘amendments’ and conditions. The Islamist group has insisted on its right to participate in the political future of the territory and has called for a total and permanent cessation of Israeli aggression. Its initial response was notably ambiguous on the key points of disarmament and acceptance of an international force, suggesting that it is tactical acceptance to force an end to the siege rather than political surrender, making this point one of the great unknowns for the future. 

2. Israel's veto of a permanent ceasefire: Prime Minister Netanyahu has categorically rejected any idea of a partial truce and opposes a total cessation of hostilities without guarantees of Hamas' complete disarmament. For Israeli hardliners, the total dismantling of Hamas' military capabilities is the main justification for the war; accepting a permanent ceasefire without verifying disarmament would delegitimise that justification. 

3. The humanitarian crisis as leverage: the catastrophic humanitarian situation, with famine and deaths from malnutrition, is exerting extreme moral pressure on both sides, even though Israel appears to everyone to be primarily responsible. Allegations that aid is being politicised and blocked by Israel, on the one hand, or accusations that Hamas is taking control of it once it enters Gazan territory, on the other, show that if control of aid fails, negotiations will inevitably collapse, as the Gazan population will see no benefit from the agreement. 

The attached matrix illustrates in a more understandable way the incompatibility of the existential demands: 

Given this state of affairs, we can envisage three possible scenarios, bearing in mind the traditional volatility of the situation in the region and the fact that there are many external factors that may ultimately have an influence, the study and correlation of which would require much more extensive work. 

The first scenario is what we might call a ‘great achievement’. 

It would mean that the initiative has been fully and unreservedly accepted by both sides (although perhaps not exactly from the outset), that the red lines expressed by both Israel and Hamas have been overcome, and that the zero-sum dynamic shown in the table above has been ruled out. The ceasefire is permanent and verifiable. Pressure on Hamas, exerted mainly by Qatar and Egypt, forces the organisation to accept the exile of its leadership and the gradual and total disarmament of its units in exchange for the release of Palestinian prisoners, as reflected in the document. The situation achieved allows for the reconstruction of Gaza to begin and for administrative control to be transferred smoothly to the technocratic authority supervised by the United States. In other words, everything contained in the initial document is accepted and fulfilled without hesitation by both parties. 

For this framework to become a reality, a convergence of factors and unprecedented levels of pressure on both Israel and Hamas would be necessary. Pressure from the families of the hostages and the entire movement supporting them could act as a catalyst, coupled with internal political opposition in Israel and differences within Netanyahu's own government, forcing a ‘tactical concession’ regarding the category of prisoners released or the timetable for withdrawal, prioritising the return of the captives over the goal of the total and ‘in situ’ dismantling of Hamas' infrastructure. Some will argue against this position, claiming that the war will then have been for nothing. 

Another decisive factor in reaching this situation would come from regional and economic guarantees. The Arab Gulf states (UAE and Saudi Arabia) should offer such a robust economic and security ‘rescue package’ (including accelerated normalisation with Israel) that the de facto demilitarisation achieved through diplomacy would be more attractive to Israel than the cost of prolonged military occupation. Finally, managing Hamas' transition by negotiating a safe exit for its top leadership to a third country would be crucial to neutralising its ability to obstruct agreements in Gaza. 

This scenario leaves us with two major beneficiaries. On the one hand, the State of Israel, which achieves the long-awaited return of the hostages and makes significant progress in what we could consider the beginning of normalisation in the region. The population of Gaza is undoubtedly the other beneficiary, as the cessation of hostilities opens the door to the unhindered entry of essential humanitarian aid and lays the foundations for reconstruction. The United States, and particularly the plan's promoter, its president, would be in a position to sell the new situation as an unprecedented diplomatic victory, which places it directly in the group of beneficiaries. The big loser in this case would not be the Tehran regime, which would lose almost all of its influence in the Strip and, therefore, one of its main foreign policy tools. 

The greatest vulnerability of this scenario is what could be called the ‘Paradox of Coercive Peace.’ The imposition of a technocratic government without a popular mandate or elections, despite the lack of democratic culture in the area, will only guarantee stability as long as the international security force remains in place. If the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) does not undertake far-reaching reforms, the political vacuum created by the departure of Hamas, conveniently stirred up and manipulated by external actors interested in scuppering the initiative, could be filled by popular resentment, and we could easily witness the emergence of new violent actions that would ensure a new cycle of post-transitional instability in the medium term. 

The second scenario is what we have called ‘Geopolitical Limbo’. 

The first thing to bear in mind is that, despite being considered pessimistic, this is the scenario we consider most likely. In this case, we are talking about a partial implementation of the plan. The first phase, involving the exchange of hostages and the gradual withdrawal of IDF forces to more distant positions, would be carried out successfully, but the first real problem for the negotiations would arise in the transition to the second phase, as the two variables it contemplates, total disarmament and the permanent cessation of military actions, are the most unstable, and therefore the probability of failure at this starting point is very high. In this scenario, the conflict would not take on its current virulence, but would enter a state of low intensity, with occasional outbreaks of greater violence on both sides. Israel would logically maintain military control over a much larger security perimeter than expected and, despite the damage to its international image, would continue to manage the entry of aid in a restrictive manner. The political process would be paralysed, placing Gaza in a geopolitical limbo of chronic insecurity and structural humanitarian crisis, thus creating the ideal conditions for the emergence of new violent factions, as mentioned in the previous point. 

The stagnation described above is mainly fuelled by a dynamic of mutual deadlock. Hamas is very likely to use its proposed amendments to the plan to demand guarantees of a total cessation of IDF military actions and Israeli presence in the Strip, while Israel refuses to completely withdraw its forces and relinquish control of the security perimeter. What happens in the PNA is also a key factor. The PNA continues to lack the legitimacy necessary to assume civilian control in Gaza, which prevents international mediators from securing reconstruction funds and political transition. Therefore, although it may not seem so, its restructuring and the restoration of its credibility as a manager and guarantor of peace is the centre of gravity of this plan. 

The stalemate described above would be greatly facilitated by multilateral paralysis at the international level. The major global powers are divided (as usual), and the UN Security Council, as usual, remains blocked and useless due to cross-vetoes, making it unable to enforce compliance with the agreement or implement an effective peacekeeping force (assuming there are nations willing to be part of it, which is far from clear). Ultimately, this situation consolidates the law of the strongest in the region. 

The clear losers in this scenario are the inhabitants of Gaza, condemned to a situation of dependence on external aid that would continue to arrive with restrictions, turning the crisis from an urgent problem into a structurally accepted phenomenon: ‘Endemic Suffering’. The international community would end up, as so many times before, experiencing ‘crisis fatigue’, which weakens the political will for decisive intervention. This situation favours Israel's position of maintaining control over the security perimeter without facing severe international sanctions, but it would guarantee misery and resentment, factors that would undoubtedly end up leading to the resurgence of violence by new Palestinian groups. The second party to suffer in this scenario would be none other than the US president, as his initiative would be seen as a failure, although he could always blame the protagonists of the crisis. 

The third possible scenario is the least likely, but it should not be overlooked. In this case, we are talking about a return to total open confrontation. 

The cause could be a full expansion of the Israeli military offensive, as has been threatened in uncontrolled areas, or an intentional escalation by Hamas and its regional allies. The conflict would spread to the Lebanese front, and the situation would return to one of possible new direct missile confrontation between Israel and Iran. In this situation, the only viable solution would be imposition through total military defeat. 

The main catalyst that would not lead to this scenario would be the activation of the ‘Total Zero-Sum Doctrine,’ where extremist factions on both sides conclude that the diplomatic process is unviable. This collapse would be greatly influenced by Iran's intervention, which would use the lack of agreement to consolidate its narrative of resistance, increasing support for Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis, pushing the conflict to a regional level, which, in fact, was its intention in unleashing the attacks on 7 October. Faced with such a situation, the key mediators (Qatar and Egypt) would withdraw from the process, leaving the United States without effective channels to manage the crisis. 

The reason why this option can be considered the least likely lies precisely in Iran's situation and the real deterioration of the structures of Hamas and Hezbollah. Iran's military inferiority to Israel has become apparent, as evidenced by the inability of its air defence system to counter Israeli incursions. This does not mean that they are incapable of inflicting damage, but the consequences for them would always be much worse. 

Similarly, the resources needed to rebuild their proxy militias to the point where they once again pose the threat they did before 7 October are enormous and would take years. Again, it should be noted that this does not mean that they cannot continue to cause damage, but always on a much smaller scale. 

And finally, there is one key factor. All regional actors need this scenario not to materialise. The development of the region and, in some cases, even the survival of their regimes depend on it. Even if only for a short time, everyone has been able to see the future that the Abraham Accords opened up, and when there are real possibilities for prosperity, progress and improvement in all fields, no one wants war. Let us not forget the role of Qatar or what the Israeli attack on Doha meant. It may have been nothing more than a ‘consensual’ way of removing the last obstacles to the implementation of this plan. 

No one can know for sure what will happen from now on, but we can bet that it will not stray far from the first two scenarios outlined above. Or perhaps this is just wishful thinking.