Scenarios for Venezuela and consequences for Spain
No one can fail to notice that bilateral relations between the United States and Venezuela are at their most tense and uncertain in decades.
Probably the main feature of the relationship at the moment is Washington's profound strategic oscillation. The situation has shifted dramatically from an effort to change the regime, through the recognition of Juan Guaidó (2019), to a stage of pragmatic and conditional diplomacy mediated by the Barbados Agreement (2023). However, the current trajectory, which we can place between the end of 2024 and the present, is marked by what we once called ‘selective coercion,’ increasing pressure on all fronts with the aim of bringing down the current Venezuelan regime.
United States strategy
US policy, particularly under the current administration, has been guided by a strategy of persistent duality. On the one hand, a channel for tactical dialogue on issues of mutual interest has been kept open. Examples of this pragmatism include the agreement for the return of Venezuelan migrants from the United States and the recent prisoner exchange negotiated between the two governments. On the other hand, the rhetoric and deployment of military assets, including the USS Gerald R. Ford aircraft carrier in the Caribbean, as well as the authorisation to carry out clandestine operations on Venezuelan territory, indicate a clear willingness for active confrontation. In this context, key figures have oscillated between suggesting imminent attacks against Venezuela and seeking direct dialogue with President Nicolás Maduro.
The US relationship with Venezuela is defined by the complex interaction of four main axes of friction that go beyond mere political debate:
- The regime of energy and economic sanctions.
- The escalation in the security and drug trafficking framework.
- The geopolitical counterweight exerted by non-Western blocs (mainly BRICS).
- The migratory pressure that has a direct impact on US domestic politics.
Many may be surprised by the following fact, but economic relations follow their own paths, not always consistent with political relations, and in the case of Venezuela and the US, oil remains Washington's main economic lever. However, the direct importance of Venezuelan crude oil for US consumption is limited. In 2025, the annual average of Venezuelan crude oil exports to the US (corresponding to Chevron's production) reached approximately 195,000 barrels per day, which is equivalent to only 1% of total US consumption. The real significance of this oil lies in its ability to influence global prices and in the leverage it gives the US over PDVSA and the Venezuelan elites. This fact requires us to deal with the issue in somewhat more detail so that the reader can get a more accurate picture.
The brief diplomatic and energy opening that began in 2023 was thwarted by the failure to comply with the Barbados Agreements. These agreements, signed in October 2023, established an electoral roadmap, but the government of Nicolás Maduro and its representatives did not fully comply with the commitments, especially with regard to the disqualification of opposition leaders and the release of political prisoners.
As a direct response to the failure to comply, the United States decided not to renew General Licence 44 (GL 44) of the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) in April 2024. This licence meant a temporary easing of restrictions on the Venezuelan oil and gas sector.
The revocation of GL 44 had immediate consequences for the energy sector, forcing transnational companies to cease or drastically limit their new operations. For example, French oil company Maurel & Prom confirmed the revocation of its specific licence in March 2025, although it was granted a temporary licence until 27 May to complete pending operations. The decision to revoke GL 44, despite the risk of an increase in oil prices, is an objective fact that many analysts have overlooked, but which confirms that the US administration is willing to assume limited geopolitical costs in exchange for maintaining the credibility of its coercive mechanisms. This indicates that sanctions are being used as a strict and conditional tool, and not simply as a source of energy supply.
Additionally, the deterioration of the internal situation and the increase in human rights violations have caused Norway, a historical mediator in the various dialogue processes, to recalibrate its position and abandon its neutrality, openly condemning the Venezuelan government, which adds significant diplomatic pressure.
The non-renewal of GL 44 also blocks PDVSA's ability to receive new investments and key foreign financing, undermining the country's efforts to ‘circumvent sanctions’ through strategies such as import substitution. However, US coercion is not absolute, but targeted.
The most notable and critical exception is Licence No. 31, which allows the US oil company Chevron to operate in the country. This licence has been extended and allows limited activities, including payments to third parties, local tax payments and salary payments. It represents the main channel for crude oil exports to the United States, with the aforementioned average of 195,000 barrels per day.
The strategic value of Chevron's presence far exceeds the volume of oil it supplies. Its primary function is to act as a containment mechanism: it maintains a minimum operational infrastructure under Western supervision and prevents production from falling completely into the hands of non-Western strategic actors with a recognised interest in the country, such as Russian, Chinese or Iranian companies. In this way, the US retains a tool that it can use as leverage to reverse the situation in the future if global political or energy conditions require it.
The sector's extreme dependence on OFAC decisions is evident in the projections of economist Rafael Quiroz Serrano, who estimates that if the ‘maximum pressure’ strategy returns with the suspension of Chevron's Licence No. 31, Venezuelan oil production could fall back to levels of 700,000 barrels per day (bpd) in 2025. Meanwhile, the internal economic crisis continues, marked by the hyperdevaluation of the bolivar, where the difference between the official rate and the parallel dollar can exceed 20%, rapidly diluting the purchasing power of wages.
But we are currently witnessing a strategic evolution in the primary objective of US policy. While the official rhetoric focuses on restoring democracy in the Caribbean country, the most forceful actions in 2025 have centred on security. The designation of the Cartel of the Suns, a drug trafficking group led by Venezuelan political figures, as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO) is the clearest manifestation of this change. By framing the conflict through the lens of narco-terrorism, Washington transforms the political dispute into a transnational security conflict, thereby enabling the legal justification necessary for direct action without having to declare a conventional war against a sovereign state.
The following table can help us understand the true current situation, taking into account all the factors mentioned:
The current situation does not allow for optimism. And although we must always consider all possible scenarios, being pragmatic and objective, we must recognise that the deployment of US forces is the clearest indicator that this time we may be witnessing the beginning of the end of the Venezuelan regime. The question is how this will happen. And not because we are going to witness a large-scale military intervention, but simply because no one would take on the cost of such an action only to come away empty-handed.
Security strategy
The US administration has clearly opted to implement its security strategy, making full use of the legal framework for counter-terrorism and drug trafficking to attempt to dismantle the Venezuelan leadership. Washington has decided to prioritise direct action and maximum coercion over economic stability or political negotiation, assuming the cost of global energy instability and the exacerbation of migration.
In our view, a large-scale military operation, an invasion such as those we witnessed in Panama or Grenada, is a completely unlikely scenario. Firstly, because the forces with the capacity to operate on the ground that are part of the current deployment, i.e. the units with the capacity to carry out amphibious operations, number less than 2,000 troops, which is completely insufficient. It should also be borne in mind that for an operation of this magnitude against a country such as Venezuela, it would be essential to have the support of a neighbouring country from which to either launch a ground attack or deploy all the necessary logistical support for the landing forces (which would have to be far superior to those currently available). Finally, it should be remembered that an amphibious assault operation is one of the most complex military actions and one with the highest risk of casualties. Therefore, applying only practical and military logic, we can rule out that option.
So, what are the possible scenarios? We can focus on two.
In the first, attacks on drug-smuggling vessels will be complemented by actions within Venezuelan territory carried out by an armed insurgent group trained by US assets under the authorisation of 'clandestine operations'. These attacks will target elements of the logistical and productive network of drug trafficking organisations (Cartel de los Soles and Tren de Aragua), which provide economic support to the regime's elites. The intention would be to force a crisis situation within the circle of power or to provoke a reaction from elements of the armed forces opposed to the regime who would see an opportunity to overthrow Nicolás Maduro. In short, to force an end to the dictatorship, but from within.
The second possible scenario, which could well be a consequence of the ineffectiveness of the actions described in the first, would include open military operations by US forces deployed off the Venezuelan coast, but always targeting facilities, infrastructure and even leading members of the aforementioned drug trafficking organisations. Military action against Venezuelan armed forces units, bases or weapons depots is unlikely, firstly because these forces do not pose a real threat to US troops, and secondly because the main thrust of both scenarios is to minimise or completely avoid casualties among personnel not belonging to criminal organisations. In this conflict, the narrative will play a fundamental role, both for the Venezuelan population itself and for international public opinion, and even more so given the legal doubts about the actions already being carried out. Although the objective is to overthrow a despot, it is essential to win the information battle, and avoidable casualties will not help in this regard.
In both cases, if the regime were to fall, what we can consider likely is either an operation to capture the Venezuelan leader and transfer him to US territory to be tried for his links to drug trafficking (as happened in the case of Noriega). Or, if the right circumstances arise, that this operation would take place with internal support in order to bring an end to the Chavista era in Venezuela.
Notwithstanding the above, we must point out several points of interest. Drugs, mainly cocaine, produced in South America will seek new, safer routes or, failing that, will reinforce the use of existing ones. This could result in an increase in the flow of drugs to Europe, which puts Spain in a very dangerous situation as it is the main point of entry into Europe.
Another consequence to bear in mind is the ties between Venezuela, Russia and Iran. Ending the Chavista regime will eliminate a very important asset used by these countries, especially in their campaigns to influence the United States and Europe, again through Spain. It is to be expected that the disappearance of Maduro's government will lead to a redirection of these campaigns, which will require us to be very vigilant.
Finally, although the excuse is the war on drugs, let us not forget that the real problem in this area for the US is fentanyl, which enters its territory via the border with Mexico. That is the real war on drugs; that is the real battlefield. And we are already seeing movements, in the form of agreements between the US and Mexican governments, to make progress in this field. But again, any progress or success will force the cartels to seek new routes and markets. And unfortunately, our country currently, not only because of its geography and language, but also because of its established networks and legal restrictions when it comes to using force against crime, is becoming the natural alternative. We need only remember that several members of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel were recently arrested in Spain. These organisations are probably anticipating what is to come and are already preparing the ground.
Be that as it may, Maduro's likely downfall will be great news, but we must be alert to the possible consequences.