The defence industry is key to protecting threatened democracies

The defence industry is vital in these turbulent times with the war in Ukraine and the threat posed by Russia and China to democracy.  

In this regard, Eugenia Hernández, senior advisor in the Security and Defence Office of the Llorente y Cuenca consultancy firm, professor of International Relations at the Francisco de Vitoria University and director of UNIT, the Intelligence Analysis Unit of the School of Economic Intelligence and International Relations of the Autonomous University of Madrid, spoke into the microphones of Onda Madrid's 'De cara al mundo' programme to address the current world situation in relation to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the latest NATO Summit in Vilnius, Lithuania.  

What assessment can we make of the results of this NATO Summit in Vilnius?  

This summit is a war summit, in which the main thing was to maintain the allies' unwavering support for Ukraine. But it is true that no military decisions were taken at this summit. What was done, however, was to sign the decision by a country that is very important from the point of view of its strategic situation. Evidently, this vote, which has allowed Sweden to join the Alliance, has been very well used, moreover, by Turkey, which is emerging as a strategic actor and international negotiator that has gained a great deal from this summit.  

It is true that this summit did not want to propose an international coalition approach, but military aid to Ukraine is being provided by the different countries, with obvious defence contributions. It is a different summit from the Madrid summit, because the Madrid summit had a sense of urgency, of generating a new strategic concept that would explain in some way what NATO was and remind those who seemed to have forgotten. Who the enemy was, in this case Russia, and who the systemic enemy is, in this case China, which is considered a risk to our democratic and open societies because of its technological development.  

At this summit, in reality, what is coming back in some way is to rethink these territorial defences and to see the need to adapt these approaches. It is true that the force structure of almost 300,000 soldiers with maximum training and an increase in the deployment that we already have in the Baltic countries has been completed, and part of the reviews carried out in Madrid have been developed. But beyond that, Ukraine has obviously not had an accession timetable. Because what NATO is really considering is to see how this Russia, which has undergone an internal evolution since 1991, fits into our security structure. That is somewhat the key. 

We also have to think about a Russia that has to fit into the international arena and, above all, into the most pressing issues with its government's control of nuclear weapons.

No doubt about it. There was a phase after Yeltsin, even the first part of Putin's government, the first term, in which NATO somehow experienced a kind of honeymoon with Russia, a sense that Russia shared some of the values environment with Europe. And Russia has had a particular development of what it is and what it wants to be as a nation with a nuclear power, but it is true that we have also seen during this war that everything we thought Russia had from the point of view of military power, then in combat it has not been so. We see that neither Russia wins nor Ukraine loses, and it is in this tense situation that we find ourselves.  

The defence industry is becoming much more important now because of events. Is there a need for consensus, more coordination among Alliance countries?  

Consensus and coordination are different issues. In reality, the Alliance is a political alliance based on the military defence of its members. The defence industry is the Latin phrase "civis pacem para bellum". If you don't want to have war, have deterrence, prepare for peace.  

Therefore, it must be understood that the defence industry is not an industry of war, it is an industry to defend oneself. Defending oneself involves much more than the defence industry. It is a concept to understand that the world we live in has changed, that we are in a strategic competition in which law is giving way to liberal powers, to power and the imposition of force. Therefore, our democracies, as we understand them, are under threat. Therefore, the defence industry in the end is a key pillar in what would be the culture of security and defence. It is important to talk about geopolitics, international relations in public debate and defence, but also about the armed forces. Our armed forces need to be reinforced by society, to ask for their living conditions, their salaries. They are civil servants who can go to other things in fact, they even put their lives at stake, even to give the last and most precious effort.  

Therefore, it is important to understand that in this debate on defence we have to think that the defence industry makes us safer. This is not about guns or butter, but about guns as security and butter because without defence there is nothing else we can defend. Our lives and our security are at stake, as unfortunately they are now in Ukraine. Therefore, there is something to be said here, and that is that the citizens must be aware of the necessary increase in these budgets, which are going to provide us with security, which are going to allow us to recover essential military capabilities. In the case of Spain, with the budgetary degradation that has been suffered in the Armed Forces, but also in industry, I am thinking of the retirement, for example, of the Mistral submarine and now the enormous milestone and the joy that Spain can have the S-81 through something as impressive as the process that the construction company has carried out. 

But to think of Spain as a coastal country that is losing capabilities, such as anti-submarine air capabilities, seems somewhat surprising. It seems somewhat surprising, but this must be addressed, we must address the issue of not losing capabilities, such as as "carried fixed wing", and understand that this is one of the final responses of this summit, that in addition to the domains that we understand as part of war, land, sea and air, there are two more consolidated, emerging domains, such as cyber and extraterrestrial space, space, and we must focus on this multi-domain effect, on this new spectrum in which we have to defend ourselves. That's why I think it's very relevant to understand this support to the defence industry, to see the dual uses. 

GPS is dual use. The technology that we civilians then benefit from... 

Absolutely. So, sometimes you have to put in context and somehow in relation to NATO, this is one of the important pillars of the Alliance, being part of it, as partners and allies we see that we are increasing our joint capabilities, precisely through startup processes, technological innovation processes, that can perform dual-use processes. Uses, as you rightly said, in the civilian environment, in the military environment. And for this, moreover, there is a programme (DIANA) that specifically focuses on the need for collaboration between academia, the military, the public and the private sector, in order to achieve technological pre-eminence, so that we can develop this type of project. Spain also needs to see itself as a strategic player, and the strategic player is a medium-sized power, and to support the efforts that are being made by the State itself and the political parties, which understand that Spain needs to be strong as a nation and that it must also rely on a defence industry, which is now developing an industrial strategy that is going to be extremely relevant. 

One last point. The holding of the summit in Lithuania and then the summit in Finland by Biden with the Nordic countries is a clear message to Putin, but those of us from the south are calling for what NATO began to do in Madrid, which is to look to the south because the situation in Ukraine is very, very serious, without a doubt, but the Russians are also acting in the Sahel and this poses a threat that we should try to deal with as soon as possible, so that NATO does not distract its southern flank.  

Absolutely. There is an approach that emerged after the Madrid Summit, and that is to see NATO as a global NATO, that is, a group of allied partners, of consolidated democracies, operating in a global environment in which we are a very small part, in which illiberal emergencies are becoming stronger and stronger. So what NATO has had today with the war in Ukraine is a war close to our borders. Therefore, NATO is looking eastwards with a war that is practically 19th century to 21st century, in other words, we are seeing artillery, as you have rightly said, infantry, truly an almost trench war, a north in which the aggressor, in this case Russia, is once again on the border, but which also surrounds one of the elements that will be the most geopolitically relevant in the next 20 years. These polar ice caps are being eroded and there will possibly be navigation in this area of the world. We are therefore going to have an open franc in China and Russia, who are the ones who are keen for this route to open up.  

Therefore, from a geopolitical point of view, it is understandable that the Biden Administration has strengthened its position in Finland. But Spain has to think about its place in the world and see that it is very important to think about how to fight, as is being done right now in these reflections on "cold weather operations", how countries that have information, how to fight in icy environments, are important, but what happens with a south. I don't know if I like the concept of global south, but how Spain should be concerned and occupied by its geographical position. Our global risks and threats are, as part of this Alliance, but we are great partners and allies, we have particular occupations and concerns. Our southern flank is a Morocco where we are seeing potential destabilisation and a change in the status quo, for example, with respect to the issue of Western Sahara. We see the enormous tensions between Morocco and Algeria, therefore, our look to the south has to be much deeper, much more evident, and draw attention to this NATO in which Spain has always been a magnificent partner, a magnificent ally, but we also call for a review that these risks and threats are emerging in a very hybrid way in the south. 

One of the responses or inclusions in the final declaration of this summit was precisely to draw attention to these new domains, the domain of the hybrid. Spain in recent months has suffered a violation of its borders through a hybrid movement, such as the border crossing of thousands of teenagers. We have Wagner paramilitary groups, as you have pointed out, in different parts of the Sahel. Wagner, which is a mercenary armed group, but what we are seeing is not just Wagner, it is Wagner as the head of entry and China using these paramilitary resources.  

It is such a terrifying scenario in which the nation-state, which had regular armies, which had rules to be able to wage war, to be able to exercise violence, suddenly finds it difficult to respond to hybrid threats, which are much more complex, but also groups not only like Wagner, but there are more emerging mercenary groups that exercise violence in a brutal way in very close environments.