The insurgency in Syria: year 2024, Daesh (part 1)

1. Introduction
2. Daesh, current insurgency level
   • Parameter 1 - Ability of Daesh to establish a permanent foothold in certain areas of Syrian territory. 4 or high capability
   • Parameter 2 - Current capacity of Daesh to expand territorially - 3 or medium capacity
   • Parameter 3 - Daesh's ability to carry out consistent and large-scale terrorist actions. Use of heavy artillery, rockets and light missiles. 4 or high capability
   • Parameter 4 - Civilian population support. 2 or low capacity
   • Parameter 5 - Recruitment power. 3 or average capacity
   • Parameter 6 - Ability to violently oust a country's regime or government or to create a parallel structure in a major capital (Daesh created one in 2014 in Raqqa). 1 or very low capacity
3. Final result and conclusions
4. Bibliography

The Daesh terrorist organisation, after splitting from al-Qaeda in 2013, had as its most immediate objective in its global jihad, the conquest of Iraq and Syria without achieving it, but it did manage to capture a large part of the territory of the two countries, establishing its capitals in Mosul and Raqqa respectively, practicing since 2014, a violent governance in the occupied territories.

With the terrorist organisation militarily defeated in March 2019, it returned to a terrain it knew well, insurgency. This article will describe and analyse the level of insurgency achieved during 2024 by the terrorist organisation in Syria, which has not ceased to pursue its objectives with varying degrees of intensity despite the limitation of its forces due to the losses suffered during and after the false caliphate.

Introduction

Once Daesh was defeated in Syria and Iraq, it returned to the realm of insurgency and has since caused thousands of deaths. The intensity or level of the insurgency, as of 2019, has been varying. In Syria, based on the parameters we will see below, in terms of the terrorist organisation, the level of insurgency has gone from low to medium as of today, while in Iraq the level has evolved from medium to low. 

At this point, the counterinsurgency has had a preferential place, and the counterinsurgency has been obliged to put aside its different actors' differences, being united and coordinated, since otherwise security gaps are created that Daesh takes advantage of to expand and intensify its actions.

Thus, in Iraq great progress has been made despite the differences between the Kurdish Peshmerga militias and the Iraqi army in the Kirkuk area (1). In Syria, on the other hand, the numerous arrests for counter-insurgency work have not been able to stop the terrorist organisation's actions and the increase in their number. This may be due to the huge differences between the different counterinsurgency actors, which have even led to military confrontation.  

 Territorial stability also plays an essential role in the fight against Daesh. While the Iraqi government has control over most of its territory, Bashar al-Assad's regime had problems exercising authority in the northwest of the country, mainly against organisations such as Hayat Tarhir al Sam (HTS) and the Syrian National Army (SNA), which controlled parts of Idlib and Aleppo (2) and which finally defeated the regime's army in December.

The number of deaths caused by Daesh in 2024 was more than 760 among civilians, military and allied militias (3), in nearly 500 actions, surpassing the figures for 2023, which were 693 people killed and 336 actions. The main area or focus for yet another year continues to be the province of Homs with 324 deaths, exceeding the 245 killed in 2023. It is followed by Deir Ezzor with 176 deaths, with a slightly lower figure than in 2023, with 187 deaths (4).

In Iraq, the actions carried out by the terrorist organisation in 2024 would be reduced to 64 (5), which would represent a decrease in relation to 2023, in which the terrorist organisation carried out 134 actions in Iraq, reflecting a clear difference with Syria, which counts them in the hundreds.

Daesh, current insurgency level

To determine the level of insurgency, six basic parameters are evaluated without going into further parameters and subdivisions in order to make the explanation easier, all of them with a score from 0 to 5, with 0 reflecting a non-existent capability, 1 very low, 2 low, 3 medium, 4 high and 5 very high.

Adding the six parameters together would give us the level of Daesh insurgency, at a threshold set between 0 and 30 points:

• 0 to 6 points. Insurgency of very low or non-existent intensity.

• 07 to 12 points. Insurgency of low intensity.

• 13 to 18 points. Medium intensity insurgency

• 19 to 24 points. High intensity insurgency

• 25 to 30 points. Very high intensity insurgency 

Parameter 1 - Ability of Daesh to establish a permanent foothold in certain areas of Syrian territory. 4 or high capability

The terrorist organisation has achieved a permanent presence in the north-east of the country, mainly in rural and desert areas which, by their nature, make it easier for members of the terrorist organisation to hide. The province of Deir Ezzor has been one of the places where the counter-insurgency (6) has carried out numerous operations against the terrorist organisation, which, during this year, has achieved a notorious presence not only in this province, but also in Homs, especially in the area surrounding the desert of Palmyra, where it has committed continuous ambushes against civilians and members of the counter-insurgency, mainly from the Syrian Army and allied militias, with 568 dead of the more than 760 people killed during the year 2024, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. 

Hama, Raqqa and lately Hasakah, have also been provinces where Daesh has committed attacks, albeit on a smaller scale, demonstrating the terrorist organisation's ability to remain hidden and to be based in specific areas of the territory.  

The permanent presence of the organisation is also reflected in Hasakah, where the Al-Hol camp is located, which is home to some 50,000 people, mostly family members of Daesh members, who have managed to establish a ‘mini-caliphate’, with a permanent presence in the terrorist group's environment, both inside and outside the camp. The Al-Sina prison, also in Hasakah, is another permanent focus (7) to be taken into account, because it holds more than 3,500 Daesh prisoners, whose organisation has tried on several occasions to free them, the most serious attempt being the one carried out in January 2022, where they partially achieved their objective, with the Kurdish Security Forces paying a high price for it with around 80 dead, managing to regain control of the prison and the surrounding area after days of fighting (8).

Parameter 2 - Current capacity of Daesh to expand territorially - 3 or medium capacity

This parameter is conditioned in an important way by parameter 1, because if they manage to settle in a place, their capacity for territorial expansion may increase. From the area around the province of Deir Ezzor being the epicentre of their presence, they have managed to expand to Homs, carrying out numerous actions in that province. They have also done so in neighbouring Hama and Raqqa, to a lesser extent. 

Parameter 3 - Daesh's ability to carry out consistent and large-scale terrorist actions. Use of heavy artillery, rockets and light missiles. 4 or high capability

The terrorist organisation has had moments during 2024 when it has perpetrated continuous ambushes, some large and sophisticated, against counter-insurgency forces, using missiles and light rockets. The following is a summary of the most serious cases by month. 

January

 In Homs, 14 Syrian soldiers (9) were killed while travelling by bus in the desert area of the province.  

February

Groups of civilians collecting truffles around Palmyra (Homs) were attacked with automatic weapons, killing five of them (10).  

March

Again in Homs, an Iranian militia vehicle, Liwa Al-Quds, loaded with weapons and ammunition, was ambushed at a fake roadblock by Daesh terrorists wearing Syrian Army uniforms (11).  

April

During this month in Homs, 22 pro-Iranian Quds Force militiamen were killed in an ambush after being attacked with missiles (12). Also this month, Daesh carried out one of the most important attacks, as it managed to reach the road connecting Raqqa with Deir Ezzor, entering inhabited villages and killing four Syrian soldiers (13), as well as confiscating military and civilian vehicles and looting several food shops.  

May

Earlier this month, terrorists killed 13 Syrian fighters from the National Defence Forces, or NDF, allied to the Bashar regime, in Homs after storming three military positions in the desert (14). Later in the month, two regime soldiers and six members of the Iranian militia, Liwa Al-Quds, were killed in a rocket and machine gun ambush in the desert area of Homs on their way back from a tracking operation (15). Still in May, a car bomb exploded in Deir Ezzor near a checkpoint of the Syrian Democratic Forces assault units, killing three of its members (16).  

June

In Homs, an attack on a Syrian Army checkpoint killed five military personnel (17). This month, 16 members of the regime forces were killed by Daesh members as they entered a minefield in the Homs desert (18). Also in June, the terrorist organisation carried out another action to be taken into account, similar to the one that took place on 27 March in Homs, when it intercepted a Syrian army convoy carrying weapons and seized it, leading to a confrontation that caused the soldiers to flee (19). So numerous were the ambushes in Homs and so many were the casualties of the Syrian army and its allied militias that the terrorist organisation could have a core of informants in the area who could be communicating accurate information to it. 

The most disturbing attack of the month was carried out in Abukamal (Deir Ezzor), in which several Daesh members, armed with silencer-equipped pistols and posing as Iranian security forces, managed to enter a military post of the so-called Syrian Hezbollah (20), killing four of its members, including a Lebanese leader. This daring infiltration operation indicates that it was certainly prepared in advance and was not the product of improvisation. In any case, and despite the fact that this event took place in Syria, it suggests an issue to be taken into account by our security forces, namely the ability of Daesh members to infiltrate in the uniforms of the local security forces into their facilities. 

July

At the beginning of this month, two shepherds and six members of the National Defence Forces, collaborators of Bashar's army (21), were killed in the desert area of Raqqa. Also in Raqqa in the middle of the month, according to the OSDH, three Bashar's army soldiers were killed in a mine explosion. 

August

During the month, four members of the Syrian Army were killed in a surprise heavy weapons attack by Daesh cells on their military headquarters in the eastern area of al-Shoula in the Deir Ezzor desert (22). 

September

In Hasakah province, Daesh killed three members of the Kurdish internal security, the Asayish (23), who were on patrol in the Al-Hol area. Also in Hasakah is the Al-Sina prison, which houses thousands of prisoners of the terrorist organisation. Hundreds of Daesh members stormed the prison in January 2022 in an attempt to free thousands of jihadists, but the operation was thwarted by the SDF (24). 

October

Continuing with the constant activity of Daesh in Syria this month, the terrorist organisation committed one of its bloodiest attacks in a village in Homs, targeting a broken-down Syrian army bus in which twelve soldiers were killed (25). Still this month in Homs, the terrorist organisation had time to kill three members of the Iranian IRGC (26), ending the month with a bloody attack in the Raqqa area, where nine people were killed, eight of them members of Bashar's army (27). 

November

Throughout November 2024, a tanker was machine-gunned in Hasakah, killing the driver and a member of a militia allied to the Syrian Army who was providing protection. Daesh has carried out continuous attacks this year on trucks carrying oil, mainly from Kurdish militia-controlled areas north of the Euphrates River (28). In Homs, also in the middle of the month, there was a bloody attack on pro-Iranian militias, killing seven of their members (29). At the end of November, there was a daring attack on checkpoints of the 4th Armoured Division of the Syrian Army under the command of Maher Al-Assad, Bashar's brother, who still controlled southern Deir Ezzor, killing three regime soldiers and even seizing the checkpoints with weapons and ammunition (30). 

December

This month, the terrorist organisation carried out one of its worst massacres against soldiers of Bashar's former army, who were fleeing the defeat suffered against HTS in the desert area of Homs, reportedly killing 54 soldiers (31). At around the same time, they carried out an ambush in Deir Ezzor, killing six oil workers (32). During 2024, Daesh continuously spread terror among oil transporters and businessmen.

Parameter 4 - Civilian population support. 2 or low capacity

When Daesh penetrated a Syrian city in 2014, a large part of the inhabitants fled, others stayed because they had nowhere to go and others welcomed them because they sympathised with the terrorist organisation, but just as they welcomed them, they also moved away, as the organisation showed its true totalitarian and cruel face, murdering thousands of people.  

Although today the terrorist organisation survives far from the support it had years ago, the remnants, although low, are sufficient to make the organisation a very resilient terrorist entity. The areas where Daesh may have the most support are eastern Deir Ezzor, near the last stronghold of Baghouz. According to North Pres Agency sources, there is a security gap in this area that Daesh is exploiting to pressure its inhabitants with its presence, while the sources warn of the support it may have there due to ideology or fear (33). 

Parameter 5 - Recruitment power. 3 or average capacity

This parameter is linked to parameter 4; thus, the greater the sympathy for the organisation, even if it is only a few thousand, the greater the power of recruitment.  

But the distinction is also clear: sympathy with the ideas of a terrorist organisation is not the same as reaching a commitment with it in order to join it, although the line is sometimes very thin. The Daesh's capacity for regeneration after the arrests and casualties it suffers from the counterinsurgency must be taken into account, as the year 2024, despite the numerous operations against it, has been the most lethal since its defeat in Baghouz.

All indications are that the organisation has sufficient remnants in the area to regenerate. Daesh, in its strategy, offers an outlet for the inhabitants (especially the younger ones) in the areas under its influence, many of whom move for family and economic reasons, having had members who were part of the terrorist organisation and are now also suffering economic hardship. There are also revenge motives against Bashar's army, Iranian militias and the Syrian Democratic Forces (34). After the defeat, they lost much of their recruitment power, but their presence remains.

Parameter 6 - Ability to violently oust a country's regime or government or to create a parallel structure in a major capital (Daesh created one in 2014 in Raqqa). 1 or very low capacity

The terrorist organisation currently does not have the capacity to establish a parallel structure to the state in any of the country's major capitals (Raqqa 2014). This being said, the work of the counterinsurgency is essential in order to prevent the organisation from reaching a large number of militants that would defeat the military units of Syria and Iraq, which are continuously harassed by Daesh, but so far without the capacity to take over important provinces as in 2014 or as Hayat Tarhir al-Sam or more specifically the al-Nusra Front did in Idlib. 

Final result and conclusions

When the six parameters are rated and the scores for all of them are added together, the insurgency of the Daesh terrorist organisation in Syria would be MEDIUM or 16 (13 to 18 points. Medium Intensity Insurgency).  

They are based in very specific areas of northeastern Syria and their ability to spread towards the centre is beginning to cause concern. Their ability to carry out significant attacks increased during 2024, even reaching a certain level of sophistication by using Syrian Army or allied militia uniforms and silenced pistols at army checkpoints. Rockets and light missiles have been used in some actions, with no record of artillery being used so far, although vigilance is required given the amount of weapons and tanks abandoned by Bashar's army after its defeat in December.  

On the other hand, actions intensified outside the province of Deir Ezzor, specifically and in this order, Homs, Hama, Raqqa and Hasakah, which is a worrying development. Ambushes and more specifically ambushes against Bashar's army have been practically constant, and the terrorist organisation has been in permanent check, due to the constant casualties it has inflicted on them, mainly in the province of Homs. 

The sympathy that Daesh can arouse among the Sunni population in the area where it is based is low, but despite this, recruitment among this population may increase depending on the economic or other motives that the inhabitants of these areas may have. 

What is certain is that the regenerative capacity of its cells, once dismantled in counterinsurgency operations, does not seem to suffer and, within weeks, after a major operation against the organisation, serious attacks are once again carried out. On the other hand, the capacity to establish a governance structure in Syria, as it was once in Raqqa, is very low, as it was against Bashar Al-Assad, and once he was overthrown, it is also very low against the new reality that governs interim in Damascus, although the terrorist organisation's capacity to expand into areas that were far from its traditional epicentre in Deir Ezzor is worrying.  

Terrorists have raided weapons and ammunition convoys, seized villages and checkpoints in counter-insurgency uniforms, and practised fake Syrian Army checkpoints, mirroring what they were beginning to do during 2013. They have continued to practice economic extortion under death threats against investors and traders in the northeast, especially in Deir Ezzor. Daesh demanded ‘zakat’, a sacred word in Islam, but the organisation has completely distorted it, as this donation should be directed towards the most disadvantaged classes, going into Daesh's coffers to finance itself (35).

Daesh leaders at the end of November, in the wake of the HTS and ENS operation and according to sources in the area from The Euphrates Post, held a high-level meeting in Homs to study the line to follow in the face of the new reality (36), with the terrorist organisation claiming to have suspended ‘military operations’ for the duration of the anti-Bashar operation, although immediately afterwards they carried out a massacre of Syrian soldiers fleeing through the desert of Homs and of oil workers in Deir Ezzor.

The doubts that arise in the fight against the terrorist organisation are logical in the face of such an uncertain future as that represented by the interim government of Al-Jolani, mainly because of its past, which has led even the military chief of the SDF, Mazloum Abdi (37), to warn of the risk that in the future Daesh may once again have a greater military capacity than it does today and, if it notices security breaches, attempt to storm the prisons where its fellow terrorists are being held and free the families in the Al-Hol camp. 

As this article draws to a close, the digital Euphrates Post published a report on how Daesh could have begun to rearm its cells with weapons from the military arsenal abandoned by the defeated army of Bashar Al-Assad, which would undoubtedly further complicate the current situation in Syria (38). 

Bibliography

1-AP NEWS.  Disputa entre soldados iraquíes y fuerzas kurdas peshmerga deja 3 muertos. 23 de octubre del 2024. Original en inglés. https://apnews.com/world-news/general-news-80110dcc2c1bbebdd2cb27aa85f00f62  

2- HISPAN TV. Conozca las bandas terroristas que luchan contra Siria en Idlib. 19 de febrero del 2020. https://www.hispantv.com/noticias/siria/449435/idlib-alepo-terroristas  

3- OSDH. El resurgimiento del ISIS en 2024 | El ISIS mata a más de 750 civiles y combatientes en casi 500 operaciones en el desierto sirio y en áreas controladas por las SDF y pierde a 117 combatientes y comandantes en contraoperaciones. 29 de diciembre del 2024. Original en inglés. https://www.syriahr.com/en/352568/  

4- OSDH. El resurgimiento del ISIS en 2023 | El ISIS mata a casi 700 civiles y combatientes en 336 operaciones en áreas controladas por el régimen sirio y las SDF y pierde 82 combatientes y comandantes en operaciones de contraataque. Original en inglés. 29 de diciembre del 2023. https://www.syriahr.com/en/321468/  

5- ALA Joel. Blogspot Musings on Iraq. Dec Sees Insurgent Violence In Iraq But No Actual Attacks By The Islamic State  January 06, 2025. http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/   

6- SDF PRESS CENTER. Operación conjunta contra el ISIS | Desmantelada una célula terrorista del ISIS en la zona rural del norte de Deir Ezzor. 14 de noviembre del 2024. Original en inglés. https://sdf-press.com/en/2024/11/joint-anti-isis-operation-an-isis-terrorist-cell-dismantled-in-deir-ezzor-northern-countryside/ 

7- MOTA J. I. Digital El País. Cuando los vecinos son presos yihadistas: la vida marcada por el miedo y el abandono en el norte de Siria. 10 enero del 2023. https://elpais.com/planeta-futuro/2023-01-10/cuando-los-vecinos-son-presos-yihadistas-la-vida-marcada-por-el-miedo-y-el-abandono-en-el-norte-de-siria.html  

8- OSDH. Las SDF asumen el control total de la prisión de Hasaka. 31 de enero del 2022. Original en inglés. https://www.syriahr.com/en/237302/?doing_wp_cron=1736030783.8756170272827148437500  

9- ARAB NEWS. Fuente: AFP El grupo Daesh mata a 14 soldados sirios, según el Observatorio. 12 de enero del 2024. Original en inglés. https://www-arabnews-com.translate.goog/node/2438786/middle-east?_x_tr_sl=en&_x_tr_tl=es&_x_tr_hl=es&_x_tr_pto=sc&_x_tr_hist=true  

10- KHOJA Abdulsalam. North Press Agency. Hombres armados desconocidos matan a cinco cazadores de trufas en Homs, Siria. 24 de febrero de 2024. Original en inglés. https://npasyria.com/en/111492/  

11- ABDURRAHMAN Omar. Diario North Press Agency. 27 de marzo del 2024. ISIS mata a tres militantes de Liwa al-Quds en Homs, Siria. Original en inglés. https://npasyria.com/en/112623/  

12- DIGITAL ENAB BALADI. Liwa al-Quds llora la muerte de 22 miembros tras el ataque a un autobús militar en la zona rural de Homs. 19 del abril del 2024. Original en inglés. https://english-enabbaladi-net.translate.goog/archives/2024/04/liwa-al-quds-mourns-22-members-following-attack-on-military-bus-in-homs-countryside/?_x_tr_sl=en&_x_tr_tl=es&_x_tr_hl=es&_x_tr_pto=sc  

13- ABDURRAHMAN Omar. Diario North Press Agency. ISIS mata a cuatro soldados del ejército sirio en Raqqa. ISIS lanza un feroz ataque contra las fuerzas gubernamentales en Deir ez-Zor. 6 de abril DEL 2024.  https://npasyria.com/en/112923/  

14- AL-HAYES Saeed. Diario North Press Agency. ISIS mata a 13 militantes afiliados al gobierno en el desierto sirio. 3 de mayo del 2024. Original en inglés. https://npasyria.com/en/113655/  

15- ABDURRAHMAN Omar. Diario North Press Agency. Mueren 2 soldados del gobierno y 6 militantes apoyados por Irán en el desierto sirio. 20 de mayo del 2024. Original en inglés.  https://npasyria.com/en/114101/ 

16- YOUSSEF Stella. Diario North Press Agency. Mueren 3 combatientes de las SDF en un atentado suicida con coche bomba del ISIS en Deir ez-Zor. 11 de mayo del 2024. Original en inglés. https://npasyria.com/en/113844/  

17- A.K. Diario ANHA. Fuente: OSDH. Cinco muertos por ISIS en el campo de Homs. 8 de junio del 2024. 08 de junio del 2024. Original en inglés. https://www.hawarnews.com/en/5-killed-by-isis-in-homs-countryside  

18- Observatorio Sirio de los Derechos Humanos. 16 miembros de las fuerzas del régimen, incluido un alto oficial, fueron asesinados por miembros del ISIS en el desierto de Homs. 12 de junio del 2024. Original en inglés. https://www.syriahr.com/en/336087/?doing_wp_cron=1733557764.6964778900146484375000  

19- ABDURRAHMAN Omar. Diario North Press Agency.  ISIS confisca cargamento de armas en el desierto sirio. 24 de junio de 2024. Original en inglés.  https://npasyria.com/en/114896/  

20- THE EUPHRATES POST. Una célula del ISIS se infiltra en las filas de una milicia iraní en Albukamal y mata a varios de ellos. 15 de junio del 2024. Original en árabe.  https://euphratespost.net/%d8%ae%d9%84%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d9%84%d8%aa%d9%86%d8%b8%d9%8a%d9%85-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%af%d9%88%d9%84%d8%a9-%d8%aa%d8%ae%d8%aa%d8%b1%d9%82-%d8%b5%d9%81%d9%88%d9%81-%d9%85%d9%8a%d9%84%d9%8a%d8%b4%d9%8a%d8%a7/  

21- ARAB NEWS. AFP Fuente: OSDH. 4 de julio del 2024. Militantes de Daesh matan a ocho personas en el desierto de Siria. Original en inglés. https://www.arabnews.com/node/2543486/medio-oriente   

22- OSDH. Nuevo ataque | Cuatro miembros del 5.º Cuerpo, respaldado por Rusia, mueren en el desierto de Deir Ezzor. 18 de agosto del 2024. 18 de agosto del 2024. Original en inglés. https://www.syriahr.com/en/341790/  

23- DIGITAL RUDAW. ISIS mata a tres miembros de las fuerzas de seguridad kurdas en Rojava. 27 de septiembre del 2024. Original en inglés.  https://manage.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/270920241  

24- OSDH. Liberados 32 rehenes | Evacúan más rehenes de la prisión de Ghuwayran, algunos de ellos aparecen en un vídeo difundido por ISIS. 26 de enero del 2022. Original en inglés. https://www.syriahr.com/en/236367/  

25- DIGITAL WILAT. Fuente: North Press. Un ataque armado contra un autobús deja 12 soldados muertos. 23 de octubre de 2024. Original en inglés.  https://welattv-com.translate.goog/tr/node/6527?_x_tr_sl=en&_x_tr_tl=es&_x_tr_hl=es&_x_tr_pto=sc  

26- DIGITAL NORTH PRESS AGENCY. Ataque del ISIS mata a tres militantes apoyados por Irán en el desierto sirio. 8 de octubre del 2024. Original en inglés. https://npasyria.com/en/117400/  

27- OSDH. Ataque del ISIS en Al-Raqqah | El número de muertos aumenta a nueve, incluido un civil. 31 de octubre del 2024. Original en inglés. https://www.syriahr.com/en/348124/  

28- MUHAMMAD Taysir. Digital North Press Agency. Células durmientes del ISIS matan a conductor de camión cisterna en Hasakah, Siria 14 de noviembre del 2024. Original en inglés. https://npasyria.com/en/118417/# 

29- ABDURRAHMAN Omar. Diario North Press Agency. Ataques del ISIS matan a 7 militantes apoyados por Irán en el desierto sirio. 19 de noviembre del 2024. Original en inglés. https://npasyria.com/en/118482/  

30- ABDURRAHMAN Omar. Diario North Press Agency. Hombres armados del ISIS atacan puestos gubernamentales en el desierto sirio. 25 de noviembre del 2024. Original en inglés. https://npasyria.com/en/118619/  

31- SOHR. Homs | IS*IS exec*utes over 50 members of regime forces in Al-Sukhna área. 10 de diciembre del 2024. Original en inglés. https://www.syriahr.com/en/351124/  

32- SOHR. New attack | IS*IS cells ki*ll six employees in Al-Taim Oil Field in Deir Ezzor. 10 de diciembre del 2024. Original en inglés. https://www.syriahr.com/en/351123/  

33- MUSTAFA Maher. Diario North Press Agency. Tres ciudades de Deir ez-Zor caen bajo el control del ISIS. 22 de mayo del 2023. Original en inglés. https://npasyria.com/en/98351/  

34- THE EUPHRATES POST. “ISIS” entre pérdidas militares y reclutamiento continuo. 21 DE AGOSTO DEL 2021. Original en árabe.  https://euphratespost.net/%d8%aa%d9%86%d8%b8%d9%8a%d9%85-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%af%d9%88%d9%84%d8%a9-%d8%a8%d9%8a%d9%86-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%ae%d8%b3%d8%a7%d8%a6%d8%b1-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b9%d8%b3%d9%83%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d9%88%d8%a7/  

35- ABDURRAHMAN Omar. Diario North Press Agency. Las regalías y la extorsión del ISIS plagan las vidas de los residentes de Deir ez-Zor. 5 de agosto del 2024. Original en inglés. https://npasyria.com/en/115807/  

36- THE EUPHRATES POST. Furat Post. Exclusiva - Líderes del ISIS se reúnen en el desierto tras el avance de la oposición: ¿Qué planean? 4 de diciembre del 2024. Original en árabe.  https://euphratespost.net/%d8%ae%d8%a7%d8%b5-%d9%82%d8%a7%d8%af%d8%a9-%d8%aa%d9%86%d8%b8%d9%8a%d9%85-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%af%d9%88%d9%84%d8%a9-%d9%8a%d8%ac%d8%aa%d9%85%d8%b9%d9%88%d9%86-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d8%a7%d9%84/  

37- MUHAMMAD Malin. Digital Nort Press Agency, comandante de las SDF advierte sobre planes de ISIS y pide apoyo de EE. UU. en Kobane. 19 de diciembre del 2024. Original en inglés. https://npasyria.com/en/119962/  

38- EUPHRATES POST. Furat Post. Desde debajo de las cenizas” ... ¿Cómo aprovechó ISIS la caída de Assad para reconstruir su poder en Siria? 2 de enero del 2025. Original en árabe. https://euphratespost.net/%d9%85%d9%86-%d8%aa%d8%ad%d8%aa-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b1%d9%85%d8%a7%d8%af-%d9%83%d9%8a%d9%81-%d8%a7%d8%b3%d8%aa%d8%ba%d9%84-%d8%aa%d9%86%d8%b8%d9%8a%d9%85-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%af%d9%88/ 

Luis Montero Molina, colaborador de S.E.I y OCATRY 

Politólogo, Máster en Terrorismo Yihadista.