The insurgency in Syria: year 2024, Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (part 2)

1. Introduction 
2. Insurgency in the year 2024: Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham 
3. End of the insurgency and interim government 
4. Conclusions 
5. BIBLIOGRAPHY 

On 27 November an insurgent operation began against the army of the Bashar Al-Assad regime, whose main actors were the organisations Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham and the Syrian National Army, hereinafter referred to as HTS and SNA. 

The operation was named ‘Deterrence of Aggression’ (1). The insurgents swiftly conquered Aleppo, Hama and Homs, concluding the operation on 8 December in Damascus with the defeat of the regime's army. Thus, Bashar Al-Assad's regime ended in Syria and a new interim government began, led by the former's greatest enemy, Ahmed Al-Sharaa, better known in recent years as Mohamed Al-Jolani, the top leader of the now defunct HTS. 

Introduction 

HTS, since 2017, and previously its predecessor the Al-Nusra Front, a former franchise of the terrorist organisation al-Qaeda, managed to establish itself in a large part of the province of Idlib, and in areas of Latakia, Aleppo and Hama (2), resisting the attacks of Bashar Al-Assad's army, using artillery, snipers, guided missiles and suicide drones (3), with both sides carrying out high-intensity and constant attacks (4). The jihadist organisation and its leader had as their main objective to overthrow the regime of Bashar Al-Assad.  

To do this they had to defeat his army, which came close to collapse in 2015, having been attacked from various fronts by opposition factions of the now Syrian National Army, by the Al-Nusra Front, a satellite of al-Qaeda and above all by Daesh, which at its height from Raqqa, capital of its false caliphate, continued to occupy Syrian cities in the face of the impotence of Bashar's regime, which, given the serious problems it was going through, relied on the help of Russia and Iran (5). Bashar's army recovered and managed to reconquer much of the lost territory, indirectly counting the mainly Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces as an ally in the northeast, who did the same in Syrian Kurdistan, thus leading to the defeat of Daesh in March 2019 in Baghuz (Deir Ezzor).  

The territorial ‘statu quo’ led to a third of Syrian territory, mainly the northeast, in areas of Raqqa, Deir Ezzor, Hasakah and Aleppo, being administered by Kurdish autonomy (6), while northwestern Syria was still controlled, in part, by the insurgency. The Syrian National Army and its Turkish Army allies controlled part of Aleppo province, mainly Afrin, while the capital and its surroundings were controlled by the army of Bashar's regime, as can be seen on the map of the information centre of the Kurdish autonomous authority (7), which shows all the actors in the area, including HTS, which controlled a large part of Idlib, Hama and the interior of Latakia.  

Meanwhile, Bashar's army waged continuous fighting against HTS for years to dislodge them from the areas where they were located, especially during the 2019-20 offensive, but despite some losses, more than half of the province remained in the hands of Al-Sharaa's organisation. After years of continuous fighting and attacks, HTS and SNA organised an insurgent operation that began on 27 November and ended on 8 December 2024 with victory over the regime's army.  

From then on, the insurgency ended and an interim government was formed, mainly by HTS, raising many questions in the international community, especially whether they could establish free elections and an integrated government, with respect for the rights and freedoms of minorities.  

Insurgency in the year 2024: Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham 

The first part of the article published in January analysed the insurgency of Daesh during the year 2024. After analysing the parameters for evaluating the level of insurgency, it was concluded that Daesh's activity in Syria had to be placed at a medium level. 

With HTS, the same operation could be carried out with the six parameters that were used for Daesh, and it would most certainly place us at a very high level of insurgency, the maximum, having achieved its main objective, to overthrow Bashar Al-Assad. But, before we get to the overthrow in December, there will be a brief summary of how the year began at the HTS insurgent level until they achieved their objective. 

January  

The year began with an exchange of mutual bombings between HTS and Bashar's army in Idlib, killing a woman and two children (8). 

February 

Bombings broke out between HTS and Bashar's army in Idlib, killing several people (9). 

March  

During this month there were several bombings by dozens of kamikaze drones between Bashar's forces and HTS in Hama and Idlib (10). 

June 

Several HTS attacks kill six Syrian soldiers in the inland area of Latakia. (11) 

August 

11 Syrian soldiers were killed when a quantity of explosives located in a tunnel under their positions in southern Idlib detonated (12). 

September 

Twelve soldiers were killed in the interior of Latakia by various suicide attacks carried out by HTS special forces (13). 

October  

Two HTS jihadists were killed when several villages in Idlib were bombed by forces of the Bashar regime (14). 

This brief summary of the ambushes carried out by the insurgent group is just a small sample of the warfare that took place. The paradox of this matter is that HTS has not been an insurgency since 8 December, and not only that, HTS has not existed since 29 January when all the armed factions were dissolved, the day on which Al-Sharaa was also appointed interim president of Syria (15).  

Now the only insurgent movement is Daesh, with the main unknown being whether it will attack the former HTS militias. So far it is only attacking Kurdish militias, but let's remember that Daesh is unfortunately in an unbeatable position, as its freedom of movement has increased, with the new army settling in and the counterinsurgency fight falling to the SDF and the Asayish (16), so that outside the area of the Kurdish Autonomous Authority there could be a security breach, as the militias of the interim government are in a situation of territorial deployment that can be problematic due to the amount of resources they have to mobilise. Idlib and part of Latakia and Hama, where they could deploy 10,000 men, are not the same as the rest of the country.  

Security has become the issue to be resolved by the interim government given the change of image they want to carry out. 

The work of its leader Ahmed Al-Sharaa has been fundamental in this change of image. Since 2017 he has been exercising governance in Idlib in the hands of the so-called Salvation Government, the political arm of HTS (17), turning a large part of the province into a kind of testing ground, where a group of elected officials or technocrats, supervised by the leader, directed the governance and municipal services of the city.  

But the HTS leader has also been implacable with opponents of his administration, whether civilians or important members of the organisation such as Abu Maria Al-Qahtani, killed by an explosive device where he resided in Idlib, in April 2024, accusing HTS of the attack on Daesh, although an important dissident of the HTS organisation, Saleh Al-Hamwi (18), accused the leader of the organisation of being behind the death of Abu Maria. 

All this added to the tension that existed in a sector of the population of Idlib, with numerous demonstrations in the streets in 2024 criticising Al-Sharaa's management. Many of the demonstrators were relatives of prisoners held in HTS jails (19), making it probably the year in which Ahmed Al-Sharaa faced the most protests (20).  

End of the insurgency and interim government 

With the entry of the HTS militias into Damascus on 8 December and the flight of Bashar Al-Assad to Russia, Ahmed Al-Sharaa ended the insurgency, gradually forming an interim government made up of the leader's trusted men, who acted as de facto president of the Syrian Republic until being appointed interim president at the end of January. All of them will lead this transition, in which doubts have not been cleared up about what system of government there will be in Syria in the future and what the official name of the country will be. 

Al-Sharaa, for the time being, has left his military uniform and changed into a suit and tie to receive foreign delegations, and the diplomatic agenda of the interim government is intense, both in Syria and abroad, mainly seeking confidence and investment, making the country's capital its headquarters, relegating to second place Idlib, the city where the whole operation to oust Bashar's regime was organised and which has now been emptied of leaders of the now dissolved HTS (21). 

As for the inner circle of people surrounding Al-Sharaa, they all come from HTS. Acting Prime Minister Mohamed Al-Bassir, born in 1983 in Idlib, graduated in electrical engineering from the University of Aleppo in 2007, obtaining another degree in Sharia and Law in 2021 from the University of Idlib, and also studying advanced English, being appointed in 2021 as Director of Islamic Education in the Salvation Government of Idlib, as mentioned above, the political arm of HTS. At the beginning of 2024, he was appointed Prime Minister of Idlib. In December, following the victory over Bashar's army, Al-Sharaa appointed him acting prime minister (22).  

Another member of the interim president's inner circle is Asaad Al-Shaibani, born in Hasakah in 1987. For years he has been the jihadist organisation's top political official in the Salvation Government in Idlib. He has a degree in English and also in Political Science and Foreign Relations (23), and was chosen by Al-Sharaa to head the interim Ministry of Foreign Affairs, one of the most important ministries in this period of transition. One of Al-Shaibani's most important interventions was at the World Economic Forum, where he answered questions from former British Prime Minister Tony Blair (24). Among other issues, Al-Shaibani said that the Syrian economy will be open to foreign investment and that the country poses no threat to the world.  

Another man close to Al-Sharaa is said to be the controversial interim Minister of Justice Shadi Al-Waisi, a former member of the Al-Nusra Front organisation, which was once in the orbit of the terrorist organisation al-Qaeda until its dissolution in January 2017. Al-Waisi, an expert in sharia law, has been part of the Salvation Government of Idlib since 2022. But Al-Waisi has been embroiled in a serious controversy as a result of images from 2015 in the town of Maarat Misri (Idlib), in which a woman (25) who is in the town's clock square, surrounded by members of the Al-Nusra Front, is tried in the street by a group of them, including Al-Waisi, who served as a judge in Idlib, to apply Islamic law. In the recording, one can see how one of the members who is with Al-Waisi and next to a wall where ‘Al-Nusra Front’ can be seen written in Arabic, accuses the woman of adultery, asking to see her children. Then, one of the group leaders forced her to her knees and she was shot dead, an event recorded by several of those present. 

The defence minister is Murhaf Abu Qasra or Abu Hassan. His career with HTS was in its military branch in Idlib. After the loss of ground in the province in the Syrian Army's 2019-20 offensive, Abu Hassan deployed Al-Shaheen drones in 2020 (26) to slow down Bashar's troops in their offensive. In December 2023, Abu Hassan was involved in accusations of espionage against the HTS leadership and was released weeks later (27).  

To conclude, in Al-Sharaa's circle of trust is his brother, the interim Minister of Health, Maher Al-Sharaa, who already served as an advisor to the Minister of Health in the Salvation Government of Idlib. Maher could be seen very close to his brother during the speech he gave in December at the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus. This choice has caused controversy in some sectors, in case the Al-Sharaa government falls into the same defects as that of Bashar Al-Assad (28). 

And the fact is that Al-Sharaa, on his trip to Saudi Arabia at the beginning of February, was also accompanied by his other brother, Hazem Al-Sharaa (29). The interim president was received by Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman. Ahmed Al-Sharaa also travelled to Mecca, accompanied by his wife Latifa Al-Sharaa to perform the Umrah, which consists of an act of worship at the sacred house of Allah or Kaaba (30). 

The Syrian National Army and two of its most prominent leaders who have accompanied Al-Sharaa in his operation deserve a special mention. One is the Syrian Turkmen from Aleppo, Sayf Balud, a prominent opponent of Bashar since the beginning of the Syrian civil war. In 2016 he was part of the Hamza Brigades, later the Hamza Division of the Syrian National Army. Sayf Balud was particularly known for his military attacks on the Kurdish militias (31). The other FSA leader is Abu Amsha, a 38-year-old resident of Hama. According to reports, he went from being a farm driver to leading one of the factions of the Syrian National Army, specifically the Suleiman Shah Division (32). Amsha advocated for understanding with HTS, which was sometimes viewed with suspicion by some factions of the Syrian National Army (33).  

The fact is that the good relations between the HTS leaders and some SNA divisions were well known, to the point that, in October 2022, a serious confrontation took place between SNA divisions, with the Hamza Division and the Suleiman Division of Sayf Balud and Abu Amsha respectively, on one side, against the third legion (34), one of the factions of the SNA, with the former managing to take control of the city of Afrin, with the support of the then Al-Jolani and HTS. 

Conclusions 

Syria, at the moment, is in a complete state of uncertainty regarding its future. As for free elections, Al-Sharaa, when he was the de facto president, qualified the international desire for elections because, according to him, the first thing is the drafting of a new Constitution in three years, giving a period of four years for free elections to be held (35), the issue of the census being very important.  

Already acting president, Ahmed Al-Sharaa gave an interview to Syrian TV in which he asked for time and made it clear that ‘the period for reaching presidential elections requires between 4 and 5 years’ (36). He spoke of his interim government's economic intentions to promote a free market economy and create an investment environment. He also said that they were working on the creation of a national army in the face of the dissolution of Bashar's army. When one hears the leader of the interim government talk about the constitution and the years it will take to materialise, parallels emerge with the Taliban regime, which is still in the process of drafting it since entering Kabul in August 2021 (37). 

One key point that has not been discussed so far is what the official name of Syria will be, which could give an idea of the intentions for the country. Al-Sharaa has also not publicly commented on the role that Islamic law will play or the balance between religion and the state. 

The steps taken by the interim government are closely watched in terms of international recognition, foreign investment due to the catastrophic economic situation and the easing of sanctions. Al-Sharaa said in early December that minorities had the right to live freely and condemned the use of female slaves by Daesh (38).  

In the successive visits that the interim president has received in Damascus from international leaders and envoys, all took place normally, although in one of them there was some controversy at the reception. This refers to the visit made by the German Foreign Minister and EU representative, Annalena Baerbock, in the company of her French counterpart Jean-Noel Barrot, where there were handshakes only for the French minister, keeping her distance Al-Sharaa with the German minister, whom she greeted by placing her hand on her chest (39). After the meeting, the minister said that her country wants to help in this transition without Bashar, but that it will not finance new Islamist structures, as dialogue between all ethnic groups and women's rights are fundamental, she said (40). 

Another very important issue is security. The normalisation of the new reality means that the future Syrian state must be secure. The truth is that there have been murders in the street in some areas where there is a power vacuum. On 24 January, in a village in rural Homs, 15 Alawite residents were murdered by uniformed men who burst into the village, and among the dead were former members of Bashar's army (41). On the other hand, Daesh took advantage of the security vacuum to expand, among other areas, to the western part of Deir Ezzor. In fact, there, they come out of the depths of the desert and approach the positions of the Al-Sharaa militias (42), probably at night, to flash lights or signals at them and thus warn them that they are still there. 

The pacification of Syria after 14 years of civil war will be the most important and difficult challenge the country has faced, it was before and it is now; if the transition stage in this new reality fails, hopes for a new Constitution and free elections will be dashed. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

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Luis Montero Molina, contributor to S.E.I and OCATRY  

Political scientist, Master's in Jihadist Terrorism.