The Millet convoy is not the first... war drones target humanitarian aid in Sudan

Truck from the World Food Programme humanitarian aid convoy attacked by drones in Sudan.
As thousands of residents of the town of Millet, in North Darfur state, waited anxiously for a new humanitarian aid convoy from the World Food Programme, a drone dropped its payload of bombs on them in an air strike that set the food on fire.
  1. Drone weaponry
  2. A growing internal conflict

This drone attack was reported by local sources and eyewitnesses in the town, located about 65 kilometers north of El Fasher. It is part of a series of bombings against Millet that also hit the main market, sparking panic among residents, according to the Darfur 24 website.

The Darfur Victims Support Organization also released a video that it said documented the bombing by a Sudanese army drone on the town of Millet in East Darfur state on August 17. A witness said the drone attacked the Gharb Al-Istad neighborhood, wounding two civilians.

Last June, five aid workers were killed and others wounded in an attack on a joint UNICEF and World Food Programme humanitarian convoy heading to El Fasher. At the time, several organizations accused the Sudanese army of being behind the attack.

Archive image of a WFP convoy in Sudan. WFP/SYLVAIN BARRAL

Faced with this escalation of drone strikes, analysts of the situation in Sudan are questioning the growing use of these weapons in the war that has been ravaging the country since mid-April 2023, and fear that they will end up in the hands of extremist groups involved in the fighting, especially Islamist brigades linked to the Muslim Brotherhood and other armed movements, as well as countries that allow drones to be exported to these factions.

Drone weaponry

The Sudanese army relies on several sources to arm itself with drones. According to a report in The Washington Post a few months ago, one of the main suppliers is Iran. Since late 2023, the Sudanese army has been using armed drones secretly supplied by foreign sources, especially Iran.

The same report mentioned seven flights between Iran and Sudan between December and July last year. Four of these are believed to have been military in nature because they returned to an Iranian air base in Tehran. The other three turned off their transponders upon landing in Iran, which, according to the report, is an indication that they were carrying military cargo.

These secret flights began in December 2023 using an aircraft that the United States had already identified as responsible for transporting weapons to Syrian fighters linked to Tehran. The last flight accurately recorded was on July 23, 2024. The Sudanese army denies these accusations.

Last June, US sanctions against the Sudanese government came into force after it was confirmed that the army had used chemical weapons the previous year in the civil war. The US State Department said in May, when announcing these sanctions, that Washington was demanding Khartoum stop using these weapons and comply with its obligations under international treaties banning their use.

In the same month, Human Rights Watch reported that the Sudanese army had dropped unguided bombs from the air on residential and commercial neighborhoods in Nyala, South Darfur, in early February. These indiscriminate attacks, considered war crimes, caused numerous civilian casualties.

In addition to Iranian drones, there are also Turkish ones. Last July, the Rapid Support Forces announced that they had shot down a Turkish “Akanji” drone used by the Sudanese army and its Islamist allies to bomb several areas, causing civilian casualties.

FAR spokesman Al-Fateh Qureshi said at the time that the drone had been shot down after carrying out repeated indiscriminate bombings against civilians in the areas of Zamzam, Al-Kuma, and Millet, targeting hospitals, schools, and camps for displaced persons.

The downing of the “Akanji” recalled international reports of foreign military support—from Turkey and Iran—to the Sudanese army and its Islamist allies. A report by the African Defense Forum, published in July, noted that since January, the Sudanese army had been using Turkish Bayraktar TB-2 drones to attack positions in Khartoum and in the state of Gezira.

Sudanese analyst Azzam Abdullah Ibrahim said that the army's acquisition of “Yiha” suicide drones in July is more related to support for Islamists than to the army itself, as these aircraft are more effective in targeted killings and attacks on civilian areas to destabilize the enemy.

The latest model comes from Pakistan. According to the Asia Defense Security platform, Islamabad signed a $1.5 billion defense contract with the Sudanese army. The agreement was finalized during a visit by a high-level Sudanese military delegation to Islamabad, signaling Pakistan's increased involvement in one of Africa's bloodiest conflicts.

The operation includes 10 K-8 Karakorum light attack training aircraft, capable of carrying rockets and air-to-ground weapons.

It also includes the delivery of 220 drones of four different types:

• Shahpar-2, manufactured in Pakistan, for precision strikes with laser-guided ammunition.

• Yiha-III, a light tactical reconnaissance drone.

• MR-10K, specialized in electronic reconnaissance and artillery location.

• Ababeel-5, which can be modified for suicide missions against infrastructure.

The report warns that a purchase of this magnitude raises questions about its financing, in a context where the country is suffering economic collapse after two years of civil war: the Sudanese pound has lost more than 90% of its value, and the government can barely pay salaries, let alone afford billions of dollars worth of weapons.

A growing internal conflict

The war in Sudan pits two blocs against each other:

• The army and its allies, including Islamist brigades linked to the Muslim Brotherhood and armed groups.

• The Rapid Support Forces.

But a rift has emerged within the first bloc. Analysts attribute this to General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan's announcement that he would place the auxiliary forces under army command, in accordance with the 2007 military law. In practice, this means legalizing and absorbing extremist militias into the army.

This move has raised concerns among Sudanese observers, as these militias are ethnically based and have complained of discrimination. They fight alongside the army under the umbrella of the “joint forces” in areas of Kordofan and Darfur, but their legal status differs from other armed groups that emerged during the war and did not participate in the Juba Peace Agreement.

The joint forces include fighters from the Justice and Equality Movement, led by current Finance Minister Jibril Ibrahim, and the Sudan Liberation Army, led by Darfur Governor Mini Arko Minawi. Both factions rejected Burhan's move, foreshadowing a clash between them and the army.