The Shamkhani factor in post-Supreme-Leader Iran
Iran is moving quickly to suggest that it is reconsidering its relations with the Gulf states. In doing so, it is rightly focusing on the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Its relationship with Bahrain awaits breaking decisions beyond those currently within reach of Iranian officials, while ties with Kuwait ebb and flow within predictable boundaries. Relations with Qatar and Oman are approaching the level where decisions are coordinated with Tehran. It still remains to be seen how the relationship with Saudi Arabia will evolve.
The situation has changed as a result of efforts undertaken by the UAE national security team, in coordination with an Iranian partner who, for a while, seemed to be a reliable figure. The Emirati team was led bythe National Security Adviser, Sheikh Tahnoun bin Zayed Al Nahyan who moved in sync with Iranian National Security Adviser Ali Shamkhani to achieve tangible progress. The results were so remarkable that others built on them leading to a deal being struck between Saudi Arabia and Iran, in Beijing.
But then something happened. At the apex of the accomplishments, Ali Shamkhani disappeared. This type of official, as described by Dr. Abdul Khaleq Abdullah, a professor of political science in the UAE, in a very pertinent interview on the Amwaj Media website, plays a pivotal role. It is too early to tell to what extent Shamkhani's replacement will affect the pattern of Iran's relationship with Arab Gulf states. But if there is one country that particularly understands the impact of roles played by individuals in making and directing policies, especially in vital areas such as those of national security, it is definitely Iran.
Changes in personnel have played a crucial role in Iran’s contemporary history. Ali Shamkhani is one such personality who made a difference. A former commander during the Iraqi-Iranian war, Shamkhani is an ethnic Arab from Al Ahwaz (Khuzestan), who eventually reached the rank of minister of the Revolutionary Guards and then minister of defence. During a decade (2013-2023) he held the position of national security adviser, which is one of the most important positions in the stabilised Iranian state (post-revolutionary Khomeinism, so to speak). In Iran’s hierarchy, it is a very high position. Perhaps the closest to the Supreme Leader. During his first years of office, it became quickly clear that Shamkhani had removed his general's uniform to become a top-level national security man. One cannot exaggerate anything of course since we are dealing with Iran. But establishing a school of thought in Iran is not an easy task. Many expected, especially with the progress of the Iranian nuclear talks, to see a pragmatic school emerge from within the Iranian ruling establishment. And again, without undue exaggeration, Ali Shamkhani wanted to leave his mark on Iranian national security in the same pragmatic manner in which Henry Kissinger left his imprint on American national security.
We later came to understand that there are no Kissinger or Shamkhani schools of thought in Iran. As Dr Abdulkhaleq Abdullah pointed out, the region has to start all over again after Shamkhani's dismissal.
His removal was not an arbitrary decision. Iran is aware of the centrality of political figures. The presence and exit of such individuals can reverse situations, obstruct decisions and change priorities. There are many examples of that in recent Iranian history.
When former US President Donald Trump realised the pivotal role played by Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani in controlling the Middle East, he took the decision to eliminate him. Soleimani was at the height of his pomp when his personal dream and Iran's historical dream of total control of Iraq were almost fulfilled. Under his watch, the Tehran-Mediterranean road was completed. Post-ISIS Iraq is a connecting station towards Syria and Lebanon. The Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), which were controlled by Qassem Soleimani, were a smart strike force, ironically using no other than American air power to hit and destroy ISIS targets in Mosul.
After the killing of Soleimani and the accession of General Esmail Qaani to the leadership of the Quds Force, a climate of disunity emerged and frictions grew between PMF’s factions. Nearly moribund Iraqi political forces came back to life. The Quds Force under the leadership of Qaani is a ghost of the Corps that was under the command of Soleimani. Donald Trump knew what he was doing. This time the change was not a decision of the Supreme Leader.
In another case, the decision was taken by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. When it became clear that there was no benefit to be gained from Muhammad Javad Zarif remaining in the position of foreign minister, and that the nuclear file was closed shut until further notice, Zarif, the architect of the Iranian nuclear agreement and the pivotal figure in the world's negotiations with Iran, was replaced. Iran had entered another phase, and Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, a close associate of Qassem Soleimani, was appointed as new foreign minister. There are no doves in the Iranian foreign ministry, only hawks.
The most consequential reshuffles in Iran took place in 1989. When the leader of the Iranian revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, felt he was nearing the end of his life, he took two controversial decisions that changed the course of Iran’s history. The first was to remove his previously ordained heir Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri. The second decision, which was quite a complex and difficult move to make, was to appoint Ali Khamenei as his new heir. Khamenei did not have the jurisprudential rank that entitled him to the position. His promotion and designation caused many ripples, which the Assembly of Experts was able to contain under the careful guidance of the Speaker of Parliament and subsequent Iranian President, Ali Akbar Hashimi Rafsanjani. When Khomeini died, Ali Khamenei became the Supreme Leader.
The personality of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was crucial in the evolution of Iran into what we see today. There is no comparison between the chaos which used to prevail during the Khomeini era and the organised system put in place by Khamenei. The Khomeini project would have come to an end if Montazeri stayed on as heir to Khomeini, and it would have been another story altogether had any other figure other than Ali Khamenei acceded to the position of supreme leader.
Khamenei transformed Khomeini's ideas into a strategic project and took advantage of every crisis in the region. In defining moments, he turned the setbacks of the Iraqi-Iranian war into Iranian victories in the region, especially after the collapse of Iraq as a result of its invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent war of liberation. The current Iran, which prides itself of the clout it exerts over Arab capitals, is a project diligently pursued and achieved by Khamenei. For Iranians who wasted years of their lives in wars, struggling and bearing the brunt of sanctions, Khamenei is the embodiment of the Iranian catastrophe. However, it is difficult to imagine the Iranian regional project succeeding or reaching the level it has attained today without Ali Khamenei.
At a defining moment in modern American history, as the Vietnam War ended and a new chapter was opened with China, US National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger’s influence overshadowed that of Secretary of State William Rogers. Eventually, Kissinger and his projects carried the day.
Kissinger combined national security and foreign affairs during an important transitional phase. He wielded great political powers during a period of particular weakness in the American administration that accompanied the Watergate scandal, Richard Nixon's resignation and Gerald Ford's assumption of the presidency.
It can be safely said that the weak Republican Ford paved the way for the coming of Ronald Reagan in the early eighties to the White House. The transition represented by the presidency of Democrat Jimmy Carter, and his poor performance at various levels, including dealing with Iran, was a passing phase that proceeded the period of momentous change under Reagan.
It does not make sense to compare a US government ruled by institutions and checks and balances to a revolutionary state driven by a religious mindset buttressed by drones, missiles and a nuclear programme.
But Iran is on the verge of changes that may be no less fateful than Khomeini's 1989 decision to bequeath his position to Ali Khamenei. The Supreme Leader is a charismatic, powerful figure and statesman who keeps watch of the smallest details. However, a simple look at the circle of people around him reveals a weak political edifice where the issue of succession has not been settled yet. There is no political-religious figure today that can be described as pre-ordained to hold the position of Supreme Leader.
On the other hand, the powerful institution of the Revolutionary Guards in Iran has become entrenched. The crucible for Iran would be when a Revolutionary Guard dominated power structure moves in into the driver's seat while the Supreme Leader's role turns into a religious position that replicates the model of the high religious authority in Iraq's Najaf or competes with it. As embodied by Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, this model has been influential and beneficial to politicians in Iraq. It was able to coexist with the conditions and problems of Iraq before and after the 2003 US invasion. The Iranian Revolutionary Guards will not miss the opportunity of stepping in during the post-Supreme-Leader Iran. The centrality of the Supreme Leader's role in the constitution can be dealt with. The Assembly of Experts had previously amended the constitution in favour of Khamenei in 1989.
Where would Ali Shamkhani fit in this maelstrom? He could play a key role in setting the rules of the game or being a candidate of the Guards in any future power structure of the post-Leader’s era. It is difficult to predict anything, especially considering that his successor is his veteran and stubborn deputy, Ali Akbar Ahmadian.
There is not much information available about Ahmadian and the reasons for his choice. But there is a consensus that the man has nothing to do with Shamkhani's pragmatism, despite being the latter’s companion-in-arms during the eighties and having worked with him in the Revolutionary Guard Corps and in national security matters. If the available information is accurate, Ahmadian was a student at the faculty of dentistry who did not complete his required course load to obtain his degree. He subsequently joined the Iraqi-Iranian war fronts in the early eighties, then returned afterwards to military and intelligence service. These are indications of a personality that is driven to settling accounts with everything and everyone and unlikely to easily overcome the narcissistic wound of not clinching an academic degree. Narcissism is not a desirable virtue for a national security advisor to have, but it certainly defines the mood of the Revolutionary Guard Corps on its ascent to supreme power.
All one hopes is that the investment in Ali Shamkhani is not for nought. But the Guards are coming.
Dr Haitham El-Zobaidi is the executive Editor of Al Arab Publishing House.