Trump challenges Khamenei: ‘Let's make a deal or see if I was right about regional war’

1. Scale of protests and regime response
2. Internal confrontation and regional effects
3. Geopolitical dimension and US stance 
   • Attempts at de-escalation and narratives of resistance
4. Prospects for change and persistence of conflict

The January 2026 uprising did not come out of nowhere, but rather was the culmination of decades of unrest, both locally and nationally. Events in 2009, 2017, 2019 and 2022 showed a clear trend, each more forceful and far-reaching than the last. 

Initially, the sharp devaluation of the Iranian rial was the source of the protests, but the repression that followed, with thousands of deaths acknowledged even by the Iranian dictator, was greater than the massacres of 1981 and 1988. In this context, the UN rapporteur for human rights in Iran has documented more than 30,000 political prisoners executed in 1988, 90% of whom were members of the PMOI/MEK Mujahedin Organisation. 

However, this uprising is characterised by its high level of organisation: thousands of resistance units, mostly young people, spread the protests, confronted the security forces and protected the demonstrators, often at the risk of their own lives. This is the culmination of more than six decades of continuous efforts. It is the result of the struggle against the dictatorships that succeeded one another in the country: first the Shah's monarchy, then the Islamic Republic. 

Scale of protests and regime response

There have reportedly been some 4,000 protest sites and up to 100 demonstration or confrontation points in Tehran alone. The recent massacre made it clear that the regime's real enemy is not Israel or the United States, but the Iranian people themselves. 

Despite the brutality, the uprising is not dead: it has entered a new phase of urban guerrilla attacks by young insurgents and resistance units directly challenging the Revolutionary Guard across the country. News of these clashes occasionally filters through when internet access is briefly restored. 

Internal confrontation and regional effects

There is an existential confrontation between the regime and its own Iranian people. Faced with enormous challenges and a discontented population, the Iranian regime acted as it has on other occasions: diverting attention from a revolt and alluding to the possibility that US intervention could lead to a large-scale conflict in the Middle East. 

However, the conflict has had very harsh consequences for the regime. Its regional allies in Syria, Lebanon and even Palestine have been weakened or have disappeared, leaving its fragility even more exposed. 

Geopolitical dimension and US stance 

The situation in Iran goes beyond its borders; it has become a source of geopolitical friction involving Iran and the United States. The basis of the conflict is an essential confrontation between the theocratic government and its own people, which has reached unprecedented levels of organisation and radicalisation.

The United States, under President Donald Trump, has put on the table the possibility of military action if violence against protesters continues or if Iran advances its nuclear programme. Trump has spoken of ‘strong options’, deployed the USS Abraham Lincoln naval strike group to the Persian Gulf as a warning, and kept negotiations open, but with clear ‘red lines’. 

Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has responded with warnings of a ‘regional war’ in the event of any attack, positioning it as legitimate defence while denying being the aggressor. 

Attempts at de-escalation and narratives of resistance

The head of Iranian diplomacy has attempted to lower tensions by stating that a war would be ‘catastrophic for everyone’ and that an agreement on nuclear non-proliferation could be explored. For decades, the regime has used its intelligence agencies and massive budgets to marginalise Iranian resistance abroad, spreading manipulated narratives to divide the population and weaken movements such as that of 2022. 

However, the weakening of the regime does not guarantee its downfall through international pressure or foreign military intervention. Only the Iranian people, through organised, national and combative resistance capable of confronting one of the most violent repressive forces in the world, can achieve genuine change. 

Prospects for change and persistence of conflict

Iran will not return to the pre-uprising status quo. The root causes of discontent remain unresolved, and the regime's countless crimes have only deepened social instability. 

A return to the past is unthinkable for a nation that has paid such a high human cost; it exists only in the imagination of a regime that has lost all legitimacy and capacity for long-term survival. 

The situation is evolving in a delicate balance between external pressure, internal needs and regional strategic risks, but the engine of real change lies in the internal resistance of the Iranian people.