Turkey and the former al-Nusra Front, a poorly-advised "partner" in Syria

On April 10, an unofficial, filtered audio recording came to light, tearing apart the fragile seams that link Turkey to one of its most important allies in the Syrian war: the terrorist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), formerly known as the al-Nusra Front. 

The audio, which has been given credibility by expert media, reflects the voices of several of the organisation's fighters. Among them was Abu al-Fateh al-Farghali, one of its most prominent men. What was heard from those present made it clear that the group's relationship with Ankara is ambivalent to say the least.

The message that the terrorist leader was conveying to his co-religionists was not the recognition of a strategic defeat, but almost. Broadly speaking, Al-Farghali was saying that power seems to be changing hands in Idlib.

When HTS negotiated its alliance with Ankara to fight the Bachar al-Asad regime, it did so, more or less, from a position of strength. After all, it was perhaps the strongest organisation among the myriad of groups that opposed the advance of the Syrian Arab Army. In a way, they had the upper hand and the Turks were newcomers.

However, this has gradually changed. At least, that is what Al-Farghali tells us. Over the past few months, Turkey has been acting much more on its own. Sending troops to the Idlib area in the course of successive military operations - the latest, 'Spring Shield' - does not seem to have been agreed with its local partners.

The most immediate consequence is that the balance of power has naturally shifted in favour of the armed forces deployed by Recep Tayyip Erdogan's administration. Territory that was once under rebel control is now passing into Turkish hands. Not only that: under the ceasefire agreement signed with Russia at the beginning of March, Turkey is committed, at least in theory, to supporting the fight against terrorism as much as possible.

In view of this development, can it be said that Ankara has betrayed its partners? It is not clear, since, according to what Al-Farghali says, the HTS - or at least some of its sectors - never fully trusted the other party. In fact, "infidel" and "apostate" are some of the labels that the terrorist uses to describe the Turkish government in the recording.

Only a few days after Al-Farghali's statements, another leak: this time, a video. In the footage, also authenticated, several members of HTS appeared mocking the soldiers of the Turkish Army. The protagonists of the footage even threatened them with decapitation.

Too many curves in the road. The video of the rogue militia was more than the HTS dome could handle without intervening. On April 16, through Ibaa, one of its communication channels, the group issued a statement, this time official. It was written in the Turkish language, so it was clear who it was aimed at.

The letter reaffirmed that the Turkish army is "a partner in the war of the Syrian revolution against the regime and its allies" and stressed that the soldiers provided by Ankara "have fought in the trenches [...] giving their blood in defence of the liberated lands". The group added that it was investigating who the fighters on the video were to clarify their motivations.

The question that arises is quite clear: who is telling the truth and who is lying; should one believe Al-Farghali and the critics who deny their "partner" or the official version, which focuses on appeasing the allied theorists? Perhaps, in part, both positions are valid.

Why? Actually, HTS, especially since it began having Turkey as a partner, is not a monolithic bloc. It is made up of a more pragmatic sector, represented by its leader Abu Mohammad al-Golani, and a more intransigent one. 

The official branch seems to have assumed the undeniable: that Turkey has come to dominate the situation, at least in the field of opposition to Al-Asad. For that reason, at least in the short term, it has shown itself more willing to continue cooperating and, to a certain extent, to agree with the strategic lines of action that Ankara dictates. There are analysts, such as the Turkish journalist Fehim Tastekin, who suggest that Erdogan's ultimate goal may be to integrate the more moderate currents of HTS and other terrorist groups directly under his command.

Now, what about the dissidents? The HTS base, especially the foreign fighters, is highly ideologised. For many people, fighting at the behest of a government that has been formed in the image of representative democratic systems - and clearly 'takfir', to use the jihadist terminology - is not even an option.

Precisely, there are beginning to be deep internal divisions in the organisation. Some of the most radical militants have not changed their command, but have changed their allegiance. Another prominent group established in the Idlib area is the Organisation of Religious Guards (GRO). 

This is a group with fairly strong links to the global Al-Qaeda network and, in the eyes of the more extremist fighters, could be a very attractive option against an HTS that may eventually be subjected to Turkey's designs. This is suggested by an analysis published in the newspaper Al-Monitor by Khaled al-Khateb, former professor of geography at Aleppo University.

The two organisations could even be forced to fight each other to consolidate their position around Idlib, should Turkey continue to send reinforcements.

So, the situation in which HTS has been left is not at all simple. On the one hand, it is fighting the troops of Al-Asad's Syrian Arab Army, which are also supported from the air by the powerful Russian air force. On the other hand, the military interventions of Turkey, its theoretical partner, have taken away from it a position of power that it does not seem to be regaining any time soon. 

There is no indication that Ankara, at the height of its expansionist foreign policy, will relax the pressure in the coming weeks, despite the fact that the coronavirus pandemic has caused the activities of its armed forces on Syrian soil to decrease slightly.

The heirs of the al-Nusra Front seem to be between a rock and a hard place: if they don't bow to Erdogan's plan, they may turn to him as an enemy. And if they do, it is very likely that they will continue to suffer the loss of many members who will leave for other, even more extremist, organisations.