Venezuela: a pandemic, a state?, a party

"The United Socialist Party of Venezuela is much more than a party." The phrase is not (just) an electoral slogan of the political formation founded by Hugo Chávez. It is the last sentence of President Nicolás Maduro that shows how, in the midst of a pandemic, he is pushing the PSUV towards symbiosis with the State.  The State or States, since Venezuela is a country in which there have been many complaints and reports that the authorities have lost control of some areas of the territory in which criminal gangs, dissident groups of the FARC and the Colombian guerrilla, the National Liberation Army (ELN), impose their law. 

In any case, Maduro's political dream seems closer than ever, and his desire for a party and a state, state and party, to be one, rubs shoulders with the PSUV's medical brigades chasing COVID-19 and military personnel who solidify his dream. 

With this panorama, the Doctor in Political Science and professor at the Simón Bolívar University Daniel Varnagy considers that the model followed by the PSUV is a sort of "tropical post-Stalinist" with references far removed in time and space, but adapted to the cultural characteristics of the Caribbean. 

As he explains, the party founded by Chávez has in its DNA "many characteristics of a communist party of a Central European nature" after the Second World War. "It is a very cohesive party, very homogeneous, with a structure that combines civil militancy with military leadership because a good part of those who have historically held the highest positions in the party are career military men," he says. 

For this reason, he considers that it is a party that, "both in ideology and in practice, combines the military mentality, hierarchical decision-making and the highest voices are also the voices that are in the leadership of the country. "In such a way that it has migrated to a hegemonic system where the party has a central and medullar preponderance but which is not too different from an Eastern European, rather post-Stalinist, communist party. There are different voices, not just one, but they are homogeneous,' he sums up. 

Maduro's latest attack against the separation of the PSUV and the state was seen by Health Minister Carlos Alvarado and one of the main organizers of Chavism, Dario Vivas, head of the Caracas government. Surprisingly, he commissioned Vivas, as leader of the PSUV, to organize medical brigades composed of his co-partisans to locate COVID-19 patients. The biggest challenge to Venezuela's health, economy and society will not be faced by the Health Ministry, but by the PSUV, "more than a party," Maduro said in front of Alvarado. 

That Chavismo is a civilian party in which the military has an essential foundation is evidence from its founding by Chávez, then a retired lieutenant colonel. However, the public and official displays of affection for Chavismo and socialism continue to multiply. The last case was a graduation ceremony on July 6, when, in addition to defending the homeland, the new military swore not to surrender "their weapons until they see the emergence of a free, sovereign and socialist Venezuela. 

Moreover, as usual, Maduro was received at that ceremony with a military guard who welcomed him proclaiming himself "Bolivarian, socialist, anti-imperialist and, more than ever, profoundly chavista. This is the latest example of how the Venezuelan soldiers have left impartiality aside under the cry they repeat in every act of "independence and socialist homeland," one of the slogans of the PSUV. 

The last and most evident case is that of the number two in the party, if one considers that Maduro is the maximum leader, Diosdado Cabello, a retired captain. Every week he broadcasts on his programme exclusively from the armed and security forces. Somehow he has become the government's stiletto and the fundamental right-hand man, without any official position. He is only the party leader, a fundamental position in Venezuela, and president of the National Constituent Assembly (ANC), a power, according to the role, separate from the Executive. 

For Varnagy, all this shows a model for which, he recalls, both Chávez and Maduro have shown their admiration, that of North Korea. Not in vain did Nicolas Maduro Jr. pay a recent visit to Pyongyang. Seeing that system, he considers that one can "understand a little bit where Venezuela is going" as far as decision making is concerned, although it is very necessary to understand that they are two very different cultural contexts. 

In fact, North Korea has a hegemonic party, the Workers' Party, and two practically unknown abroad that are hardly ever heard of, the Korean Social Democratic Party and the Chondoist Chong-u Party, which also form a coalition with the former. 

At present, the PSUV is competing in the elections with several formations, but for the next legislative elections it will count as opponents three judicially domesticated parties that today have a good part of the opposition leadership: Justice First, Democratic Action and People's Will. 

All of them have been removed from their leadership by a judicial decision and handed over to expelled former militants who their former comrades have accused of having been bribed by the government. Therefore, in the next legislative sessions, their logos and colours will be on the ballot, but with leaders who are far from being fierce detractors of the Government. 

Also on everyone's mind are the good relations that Venezuela has with China, one of its most important allies in the world and which the leaders of the PSUV refer to more and more frequently as a reference point. 

In Varnagy's opinion, "there was an important flirtation with the possibility of incorporating many (Chinese) elements into the practice of the hegemonic system being promoted in Venezuela. Among them is the understanding "that the economic and political system are separate, and added together they make up what one understands as a social system". 

"There is an inherent need in the Venezuelan system for control. It is a system in which control is very important and when (in Venezuela) you feel that you are letting go of control, as in the change of prices, (...) control tends to appear again," says the political scientist. 

For this reason, he explains that in China "the systems were clearly separated" to give way to an economic liberalism that is not in the Venezuelan line, where he considers that there will be "a more closed system where some freedoms will be allowed". However, from a political point of view, Varnagy believes that "there will be many similarities" with "a very centralised system" after the December votes. But he believes that the presence in Venezuela for years now and the historical reference that Cuba represents also weigh heavily. Not so much Nicaragua where "there was a slightly greater institutionality". 

With a military-type hierarchy, militants among the uniformed and now "medical" brigades composed of party sympathizers, Venezuela and the PSUV are building their own model with distant axes in the geographic.