What threats does Israel face?

In the latest edition of the programme "De Cara al Mundo", on Onda Madrid, we had the participation of Marta González Isidoro, journalist and international analyst, in an interview with Javier Fernández Arribas to analyse the situation in Israel after the massive protests against Netanyahu's judicial reform, Pedro Sánchez's support for these protests and the latest clashes in Gaza.

Why do you think that a President, however much a representative of the Socialist International, can make a video criticising a friendly country? 

He cannot and should not. I would go so far as to say that the character of Pedro Sánchez has, in a way, surpassed the character he invented for himself. In any case, it is curious because one cannot dissociate the opinion that a leader of the Socialist International has with the role he exercises, in the case of Pedro Sánchez, as president of a sovereign and friendly nation.  

It should be borne in mind that in the Spanish government there are partners who are considered anti-Semitic, and this is an objective fact because there are reports submitted to the European Union. But the fact that a President of the Government, in his capacity as leader of a Socialist International and with a government in which certain partners have such profoundly anti-Israeli positions is not only a diplomatic problem with Israel, but also suggests that Spain itself is in favour of this type of arguments and ideology.

I don't think Spain is anti-Semitic. 

It is not, but it gives the impression. When one reads the most aggressive press against Spain in Israel and outside the Middle East, the focus is precisely on words that have gone beyond the character and the quality of the institution they represent.  

I read an article of yours in Vozpópuli on Israel's 75th anniversary. Perhaps the conditions are not what we had all hoped for to be able to celebrate this anniversary. 

Indeed they are. Israel is celebrating its 75th anniversary, it is a very young state, it is not the only young state in the region, because they were all born and emerged in the same conditions after the Second World War. We are not going back in history, but it is true that it is going through a particularly difficult time for two reasons. On the one hand, because very important changes are taking place at the regional level. Not only with the Abraham Accords and the recognition of Israel in the region, but also with the renewed strengthening of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which could turn this relationship and this new order that is opening up around. Israel may have a window of opportunity here, but if the internal crisis worsens, it may miss the train.  

On the other hand, the internal crisis, which is being seen in the polarisation of a sector of the population that is tired of Netanyahu's excessive leadership and somehow perceives that it is not comfortable with the new composition of the government that emerged after the November elections. On the other hand, it is true that there is a sector of the population that is concerned not so much about the drift, but about the consequences that a judicial reform approached in a very aggressive way could have on Israeli legislation as a whole. Then we also see that there is a cultural change and a demographic change in Israel that may in some way define the country's next 25 years. 

Is there a risk that Israel will be perceived as weak because of the political crisis and that this could change attitudes in some countries, such as Iran? 

It is a risk. In fact, any internal weakness or fracture is viewed with particular delight by Iran and the proxy militias it funds. Not only Hamas and Islamic Jihad, but also Hezbollah, the Houthis in Yemen or the Syrian militias, which are more worrying than the Iraqi militias. 

I believe that there is no risk of fracture in Israel, however much the international press continually talks about fracture. These are movements that are part of Judaism's own baggage. They are used to leading and dealing with causes they don't like and it is part of democracy itself. I don't think the country will end up or drift into a theological, theocratic or undemocratic state, as is being suggested in Europe.  

So there is no animosity against the ultra-Orthodox as published? 

There is no written constitution in Israel, but what the basic laws show is that there is a balance that has been maintained, especially in the first and second phases since the creation of the state, that is, during the first years until the 1980s, there has been a balance between the more secular movements and the more orthodox movements. 

From the 1980s until now, let's say that the country has become conservative in its practices; it continues to maintain Jewish practices as a cultural and also religious heritage in a sector that is demographically growing, but there has been no rupture or danger of Israeli democracy moving towards a theocracy as is suggested. What is true and what does seem to me to be a turning point is that there is a new demography, not only in the ultra-Orthodox sector that is growing, but also in a very secular sector, which is in some way moving away from the part of cultural conservative Judaism and is trying to assimilate into the secular movements of Western countries. That clash could be important in the coming years. 

We thought it was only a matter of time before Saudi Arabia joined the Abrahamic Accords. Now, with the recovery of relations with Iran, there are more doubts. How do you think this might be playing out right now? 

I don't think the relationship with Israel is going to change. In fact, the Abraham Accords are here to stay. I don't think there will be a regression; on the contrary, I think they will open up over time to more countries, including countries that have a majority Shia Muslim population, such as Azerbaijan and other places. In the case of Saudi Arabia, it is biding its time. It is true that the Israeli coalition government is not the most appropriate for Saudi Arabia to take significant steps because the region is very much on fire. The Palestinian issue is in a very effervescent form. 

Is there anyone who is interested in this effervescence and in stirring up the crisis with the Palestinians again? 

Iran is interested. It is interested because it is closing the circle. It has been trying for a decade now to position itself as a political actor in the region and beyond, not only with the nuclear programme, but with the ballistic programme. It is the medium- and long-range missile programme that worries Israel more than the nuclear one, which is easily neutralised. It is true that Iran has used proxy militias, mainly Hezbollah and the Houthis in Yemen, to encircle and create this Shia arc. A strategic arc of seeking an exit to the Mediterranean Sea, and that is why it is looking for a land corridor, but also the Hezbollah militias as a form of pressure. 

But then we also have on the Palestinian side that not only is there no unified leadership, but from a structural point of view it is a society that is broken, divided, without leadership and which, moreover, is not interested in having an independent state because it lives off subsidies from the international community. If you look closely at where the funds have gone in the international community, not only in the international organisations based in the United Nations, but also in the individual cooperation of countries, they have not gone to strengthen Palestinian institutions so that they are strong in terms of education or infrastructures; in other words, there is a very bloody corruption in the leadership and there is no change.  

So, the question is that there is an important part of the Palestinian leadership, of young Palestinians, who are finding support precisely in Iran and in pro-Iranian militias such as Hezbollah. And that is a destabilising factor both on the Palestinian side and on the Israeli side. We will see what role Saudi Arabia can play after it has restored its diplomatic relations with Iran, which I believe will serve to soften the focus on the Houthis, and may also serve to soften the situation with Hezbollah and, in the long term, reach an agreement with the Palestinians. I believe that the question of an agreement with the Palestinians, like the rapprochement with Saudi Arabia, is a question of time.