Algeria: back to the centre of the geopolitical chessboard
Algeria's foreign policy has emerged from its lethargy caused by the instability of 2019
Handshakes and congratulations in the offices of Ramtame Lamamra's ministry after the closing of the Arab League summit in Algiers. For Tebboune's government, many of the objectives have been achieved. Despite criticism from its opponents and the absence of a significant number of Arab heads of state, Algeria feels strong and back on its feet to gain importance on the international stage.
The storm of instability that hit Algeria in the twilight of the Bouteflika era left the diplomatic machine in Algiers virtually paralysed. In the face of this, Morocco's hyperactive external action has weaved networks and built solid relations with African states further south, giving Rabat a very favourable position in the sub-Sahelian region. Algeria is now active in catching up with its main international rival and neighbour.
The last major milestone of Algerian diplomacy in the pre-Tebboune Sahel took place in 2015, with Algiers' declarations and its commitment to Mali to work towards the country's stabilisation. Mali, mired in the chaos of Islamic terrorism, owes much of its current problems to Bouteflika's management of the country in the 2000s. As suggested by the French journalists Pascal Airault and Antoine Glaser in their book Le Piège Africain de Macron (Fayard, 2021), the tacit peace agreement between Bouteflika and the Islamists at the end of Algeria's Black Decade leaves enough room for insurgent groups to run wild in the far south. The lack of control by the Algerian state, the corruption of the military authorities in the area and the porous borders have allowed Algerian Islamists to gradually penetrate northern Mali, making pacts with Tuareg groups, the big losers in the organisation of the territory by France during colonisation.
The Tuaregs are a key player in Algerian diplomatic action in Africa. According to analyses by Noamane Cherkaoui and Youssef Tobi for the Policy Center for the New South, Algeria's influence over the Tuareg populations spread across the Sahel is one of Algiers' high cards in African diplomacy. Despite this, Algeria has never managed to make as much of a mark in the field of regional policy implementation through its Sahel diplomacy. According to Cherkaoui and Tobi, more is expected of its role as an economic actor through its development projects, notably the major trans-Saharan highway and gas pipeline that it intends to pursue in partnership with Nigeria and which directly competes with the parallel Moroccan project.
In 2019, the newly appointed Abdelmajidd Tebboune inherits a country marked by the Hirak protests. The popular movement, with slogans such as "Throw them all out", massively mobilised Algerians in the big cities against an outdated and corrupt regime. The emergence of the Algerian people in national politics is preventing the status quo from being maintained in Algeria. Profound reforms are needed to calm civil society. The Algerian military, arguably the faction in the country with the most power and influence over institutions, abandons Bouteflika to his fate. Elections marked by a record abstention rate of 61% ended up placing Abdelmajid Tebboune, who was Bouteflika's prime minister in 2017, in the presidential palace of El Mouradia.
Hirak, which does not get much support from outside and fails to transform the mobilisations' intention into a candidate or political party, loses steam after the elections. The authorities cracked down hard on the movement, forced many activists and journalists to flee to France, and silenced the demonstrations. Finally, the reform of the Constitution in 2020 brought civil society to its senses and restored order to the streets of Algeria. In this constitutional reform, Article 91, which includes the additional powers of the President of the Republic, is extended by a second point that provides for the first time in Algeria for the sending of troops of the National People's Army abroad, by presidential decision approved by at least two thirds of each chamber of Parliament.
Tebboune thus breaks with the non-interventionist trend, giving the tools for possible military action beyond the borders. The article is a declaration of intent regarding the new government's ambitions for geopolitical relevance. Second, Algeria needed a reshaping of its foreign policy. It began with the reappointment of Ramtame Lamamra as head of Foreign Affairs. Lamamra returns to the post he held from 2013 to 2017 and again for a brief period during Bouteflika's last months. But in this new phase, Lamamra looks much more determined, and with more wings, to carry out reforms in the ministry. Within three months of his appointment, 70 embassies and diplomatic delegations changed heads. The pieces began to be put in battle order to regain influence.
In 2022, a year marked by the war in Ukraine and the problems it poses for the global economy, Algeria maintains its forced march. Instead of slipping into recession, despite obvious problems in food supply, the Algerian economy plans to grow by 4.1% by 2023. State revenues are growing and benefiting from higher hydrocarbon prices. Europe's reconfiguration in terms of gas supply is making Algeria shine, especially in the face of France and Italy. In the case of the latter, a series of agreements and memorandums signed between the governments and administrations of ENI and Sonatrach have strengthened relations between the two countries.
This gas position prevented Algeria from playing the energy blackmail card with Spain during the crisis between the two countries following Spanish declarations of support for Moroccan claims over the Sahara. It did not save Spanish suppliers from an upward revision of supply prices.
In the same year, Algeria achieved an important objective that reinforces its role as mediator. Before hosting the Arab League summit in October, he managed to create a climate of peace between the various Palestinian factions. Its support for the cause of independence makes it even more confrontational with Morocco since Mohammed VI's kingdom signed the Abraham Accords and normalised relations with Israel. The trench is deepening for Algiers and its main objective is for Arab countries to maintain their commitment to the 2002 Saudi Initiative charter. If perhaps only for show, it succeeds. Algiers trumpets this success. Adlene Mohammedi, a doctor and researcher in geopolitics at the Sorbonne, interprets the outcome of the summit more as a communicative than a diplomatic achievement. Algeria succeeds on paper in maintaining the status quo on the Palestinian issue, but Israel continues to hold the upper hand thanks to the support of the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Morocco, among others.
From this new starting point, it remains to be seen what Algerian diplomacy will do next. Several experts questioned, such as Kader Abderrahim, Khadija Mohsen-Finan and Adlene Mohamedi himself, agree that it is difficult to speak of an Algerian "project". Unlike Morocco, which is characterised by its medium- and long-term plans, ordered through Mohammed VI's well-known "royal guidance", Algerian power is often described as "clandestine", and therefore the destinies it sets and its policies are more opaque to the outside eye.
Emmanuel Dupuy, president of the Institut Prospective et Sécurité, is clear that the next step for Algerian diplomacy is to play a leading role in mediating the Libyan conflict that has pitted two parallel governments against each other since the last conflict and the death of the dictator Gaddafi.
At a press conference on the sidelines of Macron's state visit to Algiers in the summer of 2022, Algerian Prime Minister Aimene Benabderrahmane assured that France and Algeria share a common vision on a large number of regional issues, including the situation in Libya. In this respect, Benabderrahmane maintained to the media that the Franco-Algerian summit allows a common roadmap to be drawn up with a view to the 2030 objectives. Along with the fight against terrorism and French concerns in the Sahel region, the Libyan dossier was the main security issue discussed by the leaders.
In principle, both Algeria and France would agree that elections in Libya, as secure and reliable as possible, are necessary for the North African country. Both governments would maintain a consensus on the resolutions of the Berlin Conferences (2021) on the inviolability of Libya's territorial integrity. Because of their long shared borders, Algeria is one of the countries most concerned about stability in Libya. For Algiers, the political disaster in its neighbouring country translates into displaced persons, refugees and a serious threat to its internal security. In 2021, Tebboune's government tried unsuccessfully to position itself as a mediator between the National Unity Government and the Marshal of the Libyan National Army, Khalifa Haftar.
According to Dupuy, Moroccan attempts to mediate in this crisis are interpreted by Algeria as lacking legitimacy. The muscle of Lamamra's ministry is said to be actively working to thwart Moroccan efforts and overtake Rabat in this field.
As for Algeria's role in Mali, Dupuy dismisses the hypotheses put forward by Moroccan diplomat and analyst Mohamed Loulichki in an interview with Le 360. Loulichki, who represented Morocco at the United Nations in New York until 2014, warned of Algeria's intentions to export its armed forces to Mali under its new constitution. This was the explanation he gave for the tremendous increase in the budget allocated to the People's National Army. Dupuy denies believing that such a situation will come about. "It's a working hypothesis, which has been around since 2009, but for now there is nothing to confirm the beginning of a movement of Algerian troops to Mali," explains the international analyst. "It wouldn't make any sense. Armed groups have become much stronger in the region. Algeria has no interest in getting involved militarily, nor would it be in a position to reduce violence in the region," adds Dupuy.
all the transitional governments that have been formed in African countries subject to coups d'état over the past two years. In a context of French withdrawal and the weakness of the Francophonie, Algeria can use this situation to its advantage if it does not confront these actors who are holding power in Burkina Faso, Mali and Guinea Conakry.
For Dupuy, the increase in Algerian defence spending in 2023, which the Algerian parliament approved at the end of last week, is underpinned by two main, much more obvious points. The first is the reinforcement and innovation of the Algerian armed forces' equipment. This objective is part of the need to stay ahead of Morocco's capabilities. The second is to increase military interoperability with Russia and to strengthen the bilateral cooperation agreement that exists between Moscow and Algiers. This objective has motivated Algeria's participation in several military exercises with Russia, from Vostok 2022 to the most recent Desert Shield 2022, in the province of Béchar.
Algeria continues to play its cards cautiously vis-à-vis other powers and tries to remain in limbo. A characteristic feature of Algeria's foreign policy has always been to maintain good relations with distant powers - the United States, Russia, the Gulf states - while encouraging provocations with its neighbours, Morocco and Spain.
It remains to be seen where the policy of rapprochement with Russia, which is increasingly arousing suspicion in the European Parliament, will lead.