Algeria, a country sick of its leaders 

The Algerian population has shown its discontent through Hirak

Algeria continues to face many political and social difficulties and the authorities of the North African country have failed to remedy the problems besetting the population, which continues to demonstrate its discontent through mass demonstrations under the Hirak movement, which has been repressed by the Algerian security forces.

The Algerian government is bent on regaining control after the Hirak² earthquake, ignoring the demands of the street: Rule of law, democratic transition, popular sovereignty, and independent justice. The turnout rate was revised downwards to 23%, the lowest in Algeria's history, in all elections. This historic abstention testifies to Algerians' distrust of a largely discredited political class. The electorate had already massively shunned the polls during the 2019 presidential elections and the 2020 constitutional referendum (60% and 76% respectively). In the last legislative elections in 2017, voter turnout had reached 35.7 per cent. However, President Abdelmadjid Tebboune¹ preferred to ignore this low turnout, "it is not important", he said.

Arrests are multiplying as the popular movement known as the Hirak seems to be fading and demonstrations are dwindling. But the government of Abdelmadjid Tebboune has been following up on these arrests at an accelerated pace, not only of Hirak militants but also of journalists and human rights lawyers. The most powerful man in Algeria, however, is not President Abdelmadjid Tebboune, who was badly elected in December 2019 in an election marked by a historic 60% abstention rate. The country's real "strongman" remains its chief of staff, Saïd Chengriha³ as the de facto leader of the military "decision-makers" who, in one way or another, have monopolised power for decades. In the same month of December 2019, when Tebboune acceded to the Mouradia, the Algerian equivalent of the Elysée, Chengriha succeeded Ahmed Gaïd Salah as head of the Algerian military. It was Gaïd Salah who forced President Bouteflika to resign in April 2019, in the hope of appeasing the pacifist Hirak protest, before pushing Tebboune's candidacy to put an end to the popular protest once and for all.

History repeats itself and what is happening in Algeria is nothing more than the legacy of the past. Can Algeria escape this curse? Certainly if its leaders had been more honest and more concerned with the interests of their nation than with their own, more skilled at setting up development programmes for the country than waiting to receive commissions for this or that, Algeria would not be suffering from the evils of corrupt shadow politics. It is necessary to rewind and delve into the history of this huge country to understand why we are today revisiting scenes from the past and not necessarily the colonial one.

This was the year of the discovery of oil in the Sahara, in the communes of Edjeleh⁴ and Hassi Messaoud⁵.

Six years later, Algeria gained independence. Everything suggested that life would be much better as a nation rich in thousands of barrels of oil and cubic metres of gas that would make the population happy. But alas, it was not to be. The problem was and is its system of government and leadership that gives all the power to one person and a handful of generals. That is why Algeria today is neither democratic nor popular, let alone a republic.

With the passage of time, those men who claimed to have fought French colonialism with patriotic ideas to set their people free, and who called themselves the defenders of war widows and orphans, are now the new colonisers of a nation in total decay. Between 1956 and July 1962 (Algerian independence) there was a period of war and oil. In January 1956, the French were overjoyed to have discovered a major oil field at Edjeleh, not far from the Libyan border, with a simple drilling operation. In the same year, the SN Repal/CFP⁶ association discovered the largest oil field in Algeria at Hassi Messaoud, with reserves estimated in millions of tons of about 7 million barrels. The exploitation of this "French" oil would mean that the metropolis was no longer dependent on having to import almost all of its consumption, which explains the decision of the 4th and 5th Republic to continue the all-out war against the Algerian independence fighters of the National Liberation Front (FLN) who had uncorked the insurrection in November 1954. Energy independence from France had to be guaranteed by all means, and they were not going to lose the Sahara. In 1958, therefore, a legal framework was put in place to allow oil activity through a fundamental law known as the "Saharawi Petroleum Code" (CPS), promulgated in 1958, six months after General de Gaulle came to power. Under this code, the French state had a right of control and supervision over exploration and exploitation operations, as well as over the capital committed, especially when foreign capital was involved. Foreign companies could only invest in the search for oil and gas if they were in partnership with Frenchmen who had legal control over the operation, a situation that still existed for some time after the Evian agreements⁷.

On 5 July 1962, after 132 years of colonisation, Algeria was finally independent. There was joy everywhere, in cities, in the countryside and in the mountains, a whole haïk as a demonstration of victory and joy. But this jubilation was not to last long, as the quarrels and the settling of scores for power began. This situation still persists to this day. Two characters were the real protagonists here, one of them, who was in command at the time, Ahmed ben Bella⁸ , and the other, Houari Boumediene⁹ , who carried out the coup in 1965.

On 16 June 1965, Ben Bella went on a visit to the west of the country. He visited his hometown Maghnia near the Moroccan border and from there to Oran by road. He inaugurated the newly completed road of some 150 kilometres and in Oran he attended the Brazilian exhibition football match. Ben Bella liked the football he played in his youth and in the evening he returned to his residence in Villa Joly, from where he was taken 24 hours later by a military commando led by Colonel Tahar Zbiri to be locked up in prison where he spent some 15 years.

Houari Boumediene, a man of strong personality with the mystery that accompanied him all his life, was the one who inaugurated the first military regime with a civilian aspect. A system that others after him improved until it became "a dictatorship that does not say its name" and which is still in force today.

Boumediene, however, was a builder who deliberately wanted to use oil money to initiate various economic development programmes in Algeria's poorest regions. On the industrial front, he initiated ambitious projects in the field of hydrocarbons and iron and steel, but he also made mistakes, such as his policy of agrarian revolution in imitation of the Soviet one. However, the masterstroke came with the nationalisation of hydrocarbons in 1971, which we will now comment on...

On 24 February 1971, Algiers drew a particularly symbolic line in the colonial period by nationalising the exploitation of its oil, until then largely controlled by French companies. "We have sovereignly decided to nationalise hydrocarbons". With this direct formula, Algerian President Houari Boumediène announced on 24 February 1971, fifty years ago, the decision to regain control of oil and gas production, one of the main sources of income for independent Algeria, much of which was still under French control.

During his speech at the headquarters of the General Union of Algerian Workers (UGTA), whose fifteenth anniversary was being celebrated that day, the president added that it was a matter of "bringing the revolution to the oil sector and making the country's fundamental choices in this area concrete". "On 29 July 1965, we signed an agreement with the French government that was to take into account the mutual interests of the two parties. The question we are asking ourselves five years later is: has this agreement been implemented? We can affirm that it has only been applied by the Algerian side and that the French counterpart has not respected the terms of the agreement (referring to the negotiation of the price as the basis for the calculation of the tax). Therefore, from now on, Algeria's share in all French oil companies will be 51% in order to ensure effective control, in addition to the nationalisation of all natural gas fields and land transport. "This would be more equitable for investment in oil exploration," he continued, "if the profits made in our country were at least spent locally.

The 1960s was indeed the decade of decolonisations and also of the oil-producing countries' realisation of their weight in the world economic system. This began in Iran in 1951 with the nationalisation of the AIOC (later British Petroleum) oil fields in 1954. In Italy, Enrico Mattei's ENI had an unprecedented initiative until then aimed at the third world countries where ENI operated: to establish a company in which 75% would correspond to the host country and 25% to ENI in the countries where ENI operated (Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco) but this would cost him his life on 27 October 1962, in a crash of his private plane as a result of an alleged sabotage probably by the oil lobbies.

But the most important event of the decade was the creation of OPEC, of which Algeria became a member in 1969, and it was in this context that Sonatrach was born. Few oil-producing countries at that time had a state-owned oil and gas company, perhaps Mexico with PEMEX in 1938 and Iran with NIOC in 1951. Belaid Abdessselam was its promoter and chairman and a man of Ben Bella's absolute confidence. A man of integrity who did not take advantage of his position to enrich himself as others did later, and a convinced nationalist, he took the reins of Sonatrach.

By becoming the exclusive owner of the soil and subsoil resources, the Algerian state abandoned the concession system in favour of a 51% takeover by the two French oil companies present, Elf (formerly Erap) and Total (CFP). Following this decision, only Total, which had been operating in Algeria since 1952, remained.

The National Company for Research, Transport, Transformation and Marketing of Hydrocarbons (Sonatrach) obtained a monopoly on oil activities through the exclusivity of research permits and exploitation concessions. "A radicalisation of the strategic choices of power at the political level". (According to Benjamin Stora) 

After the Six Day War, in June 1967, Algeria decided to nationalise the refining and distribution activities of Mobil and Esso. And in August 1968, Sonatrach benefited from a series of operations that gave it a monopoly on the marketing of petroleum products and control of the entire petrochemical sector.

Subsequently, on 19 October 1968, the Algerian company signed an agreement with Getty Oil (American) which returned to Sonatrach 51% of its interests in Algeria. After this agreement, "the claims against the French companies became more pressing".

Especially since in 1969 Algerian oil accounted for 20% of Total's production and 79% of Elf's production. Almost a third of the oil used by the French economy comes from the Saharan oilfields, with 25.4 million tonnes, making Algeria France's largest supplier, well ahead of Iraq and Libya. After the Getty Oil agreement, Algiers denounced the non-respect of the Algerian-French agreements, with figures to back it up: French investments fell from 363 million dinars in 1965 to 198 million dinars in 1968. On 30 January 1969, the tax on French companies was to be revised but was postponed. Boumédiène did not fail to mention this in his speech of 24 February 1971: "The French did not want to discuss prices again. We therefore decided, as a sovereign and free state, to set the prices ourselves. From that day on, the price per barrel rose from 2.08 to 2.85 dollars. Following the announcement of the nationalisation, foreign companies, whatever their nationality, can no longer invest in research and production of liquid hydrocarbons without Sonatrach. For tax reasons, companies were also required to create a company under Algerian law to benefit from these advantages. 

Since the 1970s, Algeria's dependence on hydrocarbons has increased steadily. Sonatrach's share of oil production rose from 31% in 1970 to 56% in 1971 and 82% in 1980. In the 2000s, the sector accounted for 40% of Algeria's GDP.

The nationalisation of Algerian hydrocarbons inspired other states. Ten months later, Libya nationalised the assets of British Petroleum, while on 1 June 1972, Iraq expropriated the Iraq Petroleum Company (a foreign consortium).

Algeria was traumatised by the assassination on 29 June 1992 in Annaba of then President Mohamed Boudiaf while he was giving a speech, which was captured live on national television. The public wondered how this was possible in a country with a reputation for effective security services that were not prepared to prevent the assassination. It is speculated that the assassination was plotted by certain generals when M. Boudiaf began to inquire into the corruption practised by these generals and the fortunes they had amassed during the Chadli Bendjedid years¹¹. 

The Algerian civil war or black decade (also called the decade of terrorism, the years of lead or the years of embers) is a civil war that opposed the Algerian government, including the National People's Army (ANP), and various Islamist groups since 1991. The conflict ended with the victory of government forces with the surrender of the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS) and the defeat in 2002 of the Islamic Armed Group (GIA). In ten years, the violence has caused between 60,000 and 150,000 deaths, as well as thousands of missing persons, one million displaced persons, tens of thousands of exiles and more than $20 billion in damages.

Abdelaziz Bouteflika (AB) disappeared after rejecting an offer to become a supreme judge in 1994. He had been living in exile in the United Arab Emirates for some 15 years, where he was an adviser to the Emir of Abu Dhabi and President of the Emirates Federation, Sheikh Zayed Ibn Sultan al-Nahyan. From there he followed political developments in Algeria with interest. It was Larbi Belkheir12 who for the second time proposed to Abdelaziz Bouteflika the possibility of running for the Algerian presidency. And so it was. Bouteflika ran as an independent candidate. Here the generals set another trap for him: they manipulated the matter in such a way that the other candidates, realising that the dice were rigged, decided to withdraw from the presidential race on the eve of the vote. And thanks to DRS13 he was unsurprisingly elected on 15 April 1999 with 73% of the votes counted. More than 35 years after his first ministerial post, Bouteflika triumphantly took over as Algeria's leader in 1999, with the country torn apart by civil war. Twenty years later, the army, a pillar of the regime, unceremoniously dismissed him under pressure from an unprecedented protest movement (Hirak). Boutef", as his compatriots familiarly call him, threw in the towel on 2 April 2019, after an improbable attempt to run for a fifth term despite the stroke that put him in a wheelchair and left him almost inert six years earlier. This candidacy was perceived as one humiliation too many by millions of Algerians. At independence in 1962, at the age of 25, he became Minister of Sports and Tourism, before inheriting the coveted diplomatic portfolio a year later, which he held until 1979, a time when Algeria was emerging as a leader in the Third World. In 1965, he supported the coup d'état led by Houari Boumédiène, then Minister of Defence, which overthrew President Ahmed Ben Bella. He set himself up as successor to Boumédiène, who died in 1978, but was removed from the succession by the army, and then disappeared from the political scene amid accusations of embezzlement. He went into exile in Dubai and Geneva. However, it was the army itself that imposed him in 1999: he won the presidential election after his opponents withdrew citing fraud. 

His health has not prevented some intellectuals and academics from demanding justice for the corruption that has plagued Algeria during his 20-year presidency. Since his forced retirement, Algerian justice has opened a series of corruption investigations and convicted and/or imprisoned former politicians and influential businessmen accused of having benefited from his privileged links with the Bouteflika clan. In El Harrach prison languish two prime ministers, numerous ministers and politicians, and leading businessmen, who have been graced with public contracts thanks to their proximity to the president-bis, Saïd Bouteflika (brother).

The history of contemporary Algeria, from the end of the Boumediene era to the present day, is peppered with public - and more rarely judicial - accusations against former leaders or even executives of public companies. These accusations often coincide with changes of government or power struggles. The death of Houari Boumediene brought to light the mechanisms of corruption during his reign. But it was with Bouteflika's presidency that the phenomenon reached unprecedented proportions. Cases such as Brown & Root-Condor (BCR), an Algerian-American joint venture associated with Sonatrach at the heart of the corruption, was nothing more than a transmission belt for its parent company Kellogg-Brown & Root (KBR), the armed wing of Halliburton USA in Algeria, with BCR being a source of enrichment for the political-financial mafia, which included generals, political figures and businessmen in the entourage of the president of the Republic and his family. To mention also the Orascom affair. Orascom Telecom Holding (OTH), an Egyptian mobile phone company, which after an initial extension in Jordan in 1999 took advantage of Bouteflika's rise to power to establish itself in Algeria and thus accelerate the company's international development. The past links of its man in Algeria, Mohamed Shorafa (Palestinian by origin), with Abdelaziz Bouteflika were decisive for its development in the country. Favoured with loans from Algerian public banks on very favourable terms thanks to the favourable treatment that Bouteflika demanded from the banks for this company, it was able to create a mobile telephone network under the Djezzy brand that would soon become the country's number one in terms of subscribers and that 10 years later foreign investors, mainly French, bought it for billions of dollars. OTH, also with Bouteflika's blessing, entered the cement field in various operations to purchase public cement companies at a lower price than that offered by Lafarge (France), and also entered the hydrocarbon sector by partnering with Sonatrach to operate an ammonia and urea complex in Arzew. The Bouteflika brothers certainly benefited greatly from this new agreement. Within Sonatrach, these situations of corruption were even more serious, reaching high levels of decrepitude, marked by an internal management system based on cronyism and nepotism, with career management marked by instability in management positions that forced many of them to emigrate abroad. Several hundred million dollars were allegedly emptied from Sonatrach's coffers to illegally finance Bouteflika's 2009 election campaign. Add to all this the lack of professionalism with which certain strategic issues in the energy sector were handled in the 2000s, and the deterioration of the situation within the company can be explained. Not to mention gas, where Algeria lacked a strategic policy, contenting itself with simply selling gas when the Russians, Iranians and Venezuelans were beginning to think about a gas OPEC. What was Algeria's policy in this regard? It merely observed when it could have been a major player given its reserves and 50 years of experience in the field.

Today Algeria seems to be at a crossroads: the country was the first gas exporter in Africa and the third largest gas supplier to the EU27 in 2019. But its energy consumption, fuelled by a generous system of public subsidies, has skyrocketed in the space of 20 years: final electricity consumption (more than 99% produced from gas) increased by 231% between 2000 and 2019. The growth in domestic needs has reduced the volumes of gas available for export. 75% of the country's gas production was exported in 2000, compared to 50% today. In the absence of an ambitious development of renewable energies and a reduction in consumer subsidies (politically explosive at a time when the Hirak is already putting pressure on the government's immobility), this downward trend risks continuing in the medium term, as the decline in Algerian natural gas production seems to have begun. The relaunch of exploration activities is currently one of the government's strategic priorities, but the dispersion of resources in the south of the country does not allow for the development of isolated fields located far from transport infrastructures and difficult to protect in the event of an attack (ie: hostage-taking in Amenas14 January 2013). A new hydrocarbons law (Law 19-13) was adopted at the end of 2019. This legislative provision is much more favourable than the previous one for foreign companies. It allows Algeria to have relatively similar taxation to other equivalent oil-producing countries. The aim is to attract foreign investment, which is essential to relaunch the country's oil and gas exploration and production. In the meantime, Sonatrach is unable to finance the necessary investments even to maintain production. 

Fourteen international companies have signed a memorandum of understanding with Sonatrach since 2020, including Russia's Lukoil and Zarubzhneft, US companies Chevron and ExxoMobil, Turkey's TPAO and China's Sinopec. But two other obstacles to supporting foreign investment in Algeria's oil and gas sector need to be removed: 1. the impossibility for foreign companies to hold more than 49 per cent of the shares in a joint venture with Sonatrach, and 2. the difficulties related to the business climate.

Is there any remedy to this Algerian "Dutch disease¹⁵ "? What other sufferings await the Algerian population? Is there anything more horrible than a civil war that has cost the lives of more than 200,000 of its children? Young Algerians have well understood that the hydrocarbon wealth of their country does not belong to them and they only dream of one thing: to emigrate abroad, even risking their lives on the high seas, "better to be eaten by the fish of the Mediterranean than by the worms of Algeria". Change is a difficult word to pronounce in Algeria and in a Machiavellian regime like theirs. Life-long regimes mostly for those who are in the shadows of power and in some cases those who exercise it, which is why in Algeria more than half of the population under 25 years of age has long been led by septuagenarians. 

"Only when the word returns to the people and they can choose their leaders freely and without fraud will oil be a blessing and only democracy will be able to cure Algeria of its Dutch disease" (Hocine Malti¹⁶).

1. Abdelmajid Tebboune (born Méchria, 17 November 1945) is an Algerian politician, since 19 December 2019 President of Algeria and Minister of Defence. He was Prime Minister of Algeria from May 2017 to August 2017. He previously served as Minister of Housing from 2001 to 2002 and again from 2012 to 2017.
2.   Hirak is an Arabic word meaning "movement". Political or social movement: haraka. Thus, in Algeria, if the national movement that led to independence is evoked, the expression haraka wataniya (national movement) will be used. It is considered to be a linguistic innovation, coming from the root h-r-k. For some months now, the movements that have been asserting themselves in the Arab world have been called hirak. A neologism that proves that the Arabic language, like the world of the same name, lives, manifests itself, transforms itself, and refers in this case to a series of sporadic demonstrations that have taken place since 16 February 2019 in Algeria to protest initially against Abdelaziz Bouteflika's candidacy for a fifth presidential term, and then against his plan, also contested by the army, to remain in power after his fourth term in the framework of a transition and the implementation of reforms. Subsequently, the demonstrators demanded the establishment of a second republic and the departure of the regime's dignitaries, especially since the latter organised the next elections with the candidacies of the chieftains of the previous regime, which led to the election of former Prime Minister Abdelmadjid Tebboune, who was contested by the demonstrators.
3.   He was appointed acting chief of staff of the National People's Army on 23 December 2019 by President Abdelmadjid Tebboune, succeeding General Ahmed Gaïd Salah, who died the same day.
4.   Edjeleh is a village in the commune of En Amenas, in the district of Amenas, Illizi Province, Algeria, located near the Libyan border.
5.   Hassi Messaoud is a commune (baladiyah) in the Ouargla province or valiato of Algeria. 
6. It is located in the southeast of the country, in the Sahara Desert, near the border with Tunisia.
7.   The Société nationale de recherche et d'exploitation de pétrole en Algérie (or SN REPAL) was created in 1946, in partnership with the Algerian general government, by the Bureau de recherche de pétrole (BRP, which became Elf Aquitaine in 1976) based in Hydra, above Algiers.
8.   The Evian Accords, pacts signed on 18 March 1962 between the French government and the provisional government of the Republic of Algeria, which put an end to the Algerian war of independence. The negotiations, which began on 18 May 1961 and resumed on 7 March 1962 in Evian, France, ended with the signing of the agreements and a ceasefire. Algeria was henceforth a sovereign and independent state. A provisional regime was installed pending the vote on self-determination, Europeans (more than a million) were allowed to stay in Algeria with certain guarantees, and cooperation between Algeria and France was provided for.
9. In the hope that the war would resume, the Secret Army Organisation (OAS), a clandestine movement that tried to oppose Algeria's independence through violence, redoubled its terrorist actions, which compromised the future of Europeans in Algeria.
10. The French citizens, by referendum on 8 April 1962, and the Algerians, by referendum on 1 July 1962, approved these agreements.
11.   He founded the FLN (National Liberation Front) in mid-1950. In March 1962, he became the first president of Algeria, whose constitution provided for a single-party system, in September of the same year. From then on, Ben Bella began to work for the nationalisation of services and the modernisation of the country. However, discontent within the FLN, the personalism of the system and external pressures - border problems - led to a coup d'état in 1965, in which he was overthrown by his Minister of Defence, Colonel Houari Boumediene, and which ended the mandate of the first president of independent Algeria.
12.   Houari Boumédiène becomes Algeria's new president after overthrowing Ben Bella in a military coup d'état. Boumédiène embarked on a policy that sought to end the powerful neo-colonialist levers maintained by France, the former colonising power after independence. His policy is aimed at putting an end to France's exclusive control over the exploitation of the country's rich hydrocarbon deposits and the withdrawal of the military bases that France maintains in the country. On the economic front, his reference point would be the socialist model, which would also serve to justify the nationalisation of hydrocarbons in 1971, which would cause serious damage to French interests.
13.   Benjamin Stora, born on 2 December 1950 in Constantine, Algeria, is a French historian and former professor at the University of Paris-XIII.
14.   Chadli Bendjedid (Arabic: شاذلي بن جدديد) (Bouteldja, 14 April 1929 - Algiers, 6 October 2012) was President of Algeria between 9 February 1979 and 11 January 1992.12 He served as an officer in the French Army before defecting and joining the National Liberation Front (FLN) at the start of the War of Independence. He was Minister of Defence from November 1978 to February 1979, and was appointed President of the country upon the death of Houari Boumédiène.
15.   In 1999, Larbi Belkheir confirmed that he was still active. It is he who pushes Abdelaziz Bouteflika's candidacy with his general peers. And he becomes the new president's chief of staff; he serves as a buffer between the newly elected official and the army. But things go wrong. Larbi Belkheir does not get along with Said Bouteflika, the president's brother, and quickly falls out of favour.
16. "Exiled" in his Moroccan post, feeling useless, Larbi Belkheir became depressed. Sick of his lungs, he eventually returned to Algiers, but only to die there.
17.   Department of Intelligence and Security / Department of Security of Argelia
18.   The In Amenas hostage crisis, also known as the Tiguentourine hostage crisis, was a massive hostage-taking operation carried out from 16 January 2013 to 19 January 2013 by "The Signatories of the Blood", an armed Islamist splinter group of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, at the Tiguentourine gas exploitation site, located 45 km west of In Amenas, in the Sahara region of southern Algeria. This long-prepared operation allowed the perpetrators to call, among other things, for an end to the French military intervention in Mali, which had begun five days earlier.
19.   Dutch disease, or Dutch disease, is a term that came into being in the 1960s when foreign exchange earnings in the Netherlands rose sharply due to the discovery of large natural gas fields near the North Sea. The export of this gas led to an increase in foreign exchange earnings. The Dutch currency appreciated, hurting the competitiveness of exports. Any economic event that generates large foreign exchange inflows, if not sterilised, will have such consequences.
20.   Hocine Malti was a petroleum engineer and participated in the creation of Sonatrach. This chronicle is based in certain sections on his memoirs about Algerian oil and its secret history

Bibliography 

•    Bouteflika l’histoire secrete. Farid Alilat
•    Bouteflika ses parrins et ses larbins. Mohamed Sifahoui
•    André-Paul Weber, 1830-1930, La France en Algérie : une malheureuse aventure
•    Hocine Malti, Histoire secrète du pétrole algérien
•    La Guerre d’Algérie : Genèse et engrenage d'une tragédie (1954-1962)
Pierre Montagnon
•    Histoire dessinée de la guerre d'Algérie.  Benjamin Stora  (Auteur), Sebastien Vassant (Illustrations)
•    Coface risque pays
•    Algérie : la répression sous Tebboune est-elle plus sévère que sous Bouteflika ?
29 juin 2021 à 14h46 | Par Farid Alilat
•    Il y a cinquante ans, la nationalisation du pétrole algérien
24 février 2021 à 10h13 | Par Olivier Marbot
•    Mis à jour le 20 mai 2021 à 15h05