Algeria, a key player in the Sahel

This actor is none other than Algeria, and it is important to understand the situation of a country that we can consider a neighbour, as it is only a few miles from our shores, that is vying with Morocco for the role of regional power and that, like the Alawite kingdom, is the bulwark against Islamic radicalism. 

In recent decades, Algeria's concern for security issues in the Sahel has increased significantly, as the region has become a refuge for terrorists. And if anyone has experience in the area fighting this scourge, it is the Algerian state. 

The Sahelian states, which share extensive borders with Algeria, have witnessed a disproportionate increase in insecurity due to various factors such as the instability of their political systems, the difficult economic situation, the lack of development in various regions, the proliferation of arms, the activity of organised crime groups, and the illegal trafficking of people and all kinds of drugs. Likewise, political instability has been the seed of various crises that have led to coups d'état that have affected several countries in the territory, Mali among them. 

The Algerian state itself faced, after the resignation of President Bouteflika, a turbulent period that made us hold our breath at the possibility of the start of a civil confrontation that would contribute to the total destabilisation of the country. 

This type of weak political situation is obviously a reflection of the domino theory. In other words, the collapse of a state can cause a chain reaction that could destabilise the whole region. Algeria is a constitutional republic in which the president is the head of state and the prime minister is the head of government. However, de facto Algeria is ruled by its powerful army and a select group of businessmen and politicians known as ‘Le Pouvoir’ (the Power). For this reason, Algeria has often been described as a ‘controlled democracy’. 

The current political situation in Algeria seems relatively stable. Despite the frequent disturbances caused by the Hirak Movement, it is unlikely that these will lead to a civil war like the one that occurred in neighbouring Libya. The Algerian people have suffered greatly, the memory of the civil war (1991-2002) is still fresh and Algerian citizens are, in general, wary of provoking a repeat of such bloodshed, although the truth is that young people are less inclined to accept the current status quo, in which all political power is in the hands of the army and those linked to the National Liberation Front, the nationalist party that has ruled Algeria since its independence in 1962. 

This was the underlying reason for the increase in tensions that culminated in the emergence of the Hirak Movement, which succeeded in forcing the resignation of President Bouteflika in April 2019 after months of largely peaceful popular protests. However, since then there has been no real political change, and the regime seized the COVID-19 pandemic as a golden opportunity to put an end to the Hirak protests. 

Since coming to power, President Tebboune has replaced several influential generals, especially those related to the former Chief of Staff Ahmed Gaïd Salah, who died in December 2019, having patiently and carefully built an extensive network of influence within the Algerian government and by then managing to turn former president Bouteflika, whose health was really precarious, became his puppet. Tebboune has been dismantling some of the military influence within the government, but the old system is still in force in practice. Not even the parliamentary elections of June 2021 brought about any change in this regard. 

Even so, the Hirak Movement has been losing relevance. Firstly, because the regime took firm action against its leaders, as well as against independent journalism and other opposition groups, imprisoning hundreds of people and dissolving the civil society organisations that played an important role in the protests. However, secondly, and probably more importantly, the division within the Movement, including a faction that, although not the strongest, was the most dangerous, and which tried to turn it into an Islamist rebellion, caused the silent majority to disconnect from the movement and withdraw from the street protests, which meant a loss of momentum for the entire protest movement. 

In the elections in September last year, Abdelmadjid Tebboune renewed his mandate with just over eighty-four percent of the vote. The elections were not without controversy and accusations of irregularities by the opposition. 

If we look at the economic situation, Algeria's growth during 2023 was more than acceptable, at the same time as inflation began to slow down. GDP growth approached 4.1%, supported mainly by growth in the hydrocarbons sector, which benefited from the situation created by Russia's invasion of Ukraine and Europe's need to compensate for the interruption of Russian gas supplies due to sanctions (although this interruption has not been total). This increase in the demand for Algerian gas compensated for the successive cuts in crude oil production quotas. 

Inflation remained at 9.3% throughout 2023, moderating to 5% year-on-year in the first quarter of 2024, amid a sustained decline in fresh food prices, the strength of the dinar and lower import prices. 

The fall in hydrocarbon costs reduced the current account surplus in 2023, while increasing the fiscal deficit and the public debt/GDP ratio. The fall in export prices of hydrocarbons and fertilisers and the intensification of import volumes resulted in a rapid narrowing of the current account surplus. However, and although budget revenues from hydrocarbons have remained stable, given the strong increase in the wage bill and capital expenditure, the overall budget deficit increased to 5.2% of GDP. The deficit was financed mainly outside the banking sector, with a decrease in bond issuance, an increase in oil savings to 8.2% of GDP and a slight increase in public debt to 49.2% of GDP. 

As a result, growth slowed throughout 2024. In a context of increased imports and public spending, the decrease in hydrocarbon revenues put pressure on the external and fiscal balances once again. The variability of hydrocarbon prices remains the main risk to macroeconomic equilibriums, and the expected financing needs highlight the importance of gradual fiscal rebalancing. 

With a per capita income of eleven thousand two hundred dollars, Algerians enjoy better economic conditions than most African countries. However, youth unemployment remains the main problem. The high energy prices caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine have been a great opportunity to mitigate the economic damage caused by the COVID-19 crisis, as natural gas is a key export product. However, most of the income from hydrocarbons only acts as temporary economic relief, without leaving any margin for reinvestment to achieve long-term structural diversification of the economy. 

In a country where ethnic or tribal tensions are practically non-existent, the economic factor, together with the perception of a lack of freedom or of living in what we could call a controlled democracy, with the aforementioned indisputable leading role of the Armed Forces and the business elite, become the main risk of destabilisation, and the most radical groups are on the lookout, as we saw in 2019, to exploit this crack as soon as the opportunity arises.

An additional factor that cannot be forgotten is Algeria's position on the international stage, as a country that has always been in the orbit of the Soviet Union in the past and Russia today. And Moscow does not lose sight of the fact that Algeria is its most powerful asset in the entire region, where its presence is already evident in Mali and Burkina Faso. This position increases the risk of Russia exerting its influence to cause regional destabilisation with disastrous consequences for Europe, while at the same time depriving us, at least in part, of much-needed Algerian gas. And in the current context, where there is talk of negotiations in Ukraine, it is more than likely that Russia will take its revenge by increasing its actions in the grey zone, and in the Sahel, Algeria is the key player. We must pay close attention to everything that happens there. 

On the other hand, if we use the conceptions of the national role, we can better explain the Algerian strategy in the Sahel, also using other approaches common in the literature, such as the identity approach. 

Algeria's current manoeuvre in the Sahel is characterised by strong activism and a clear commitment to protect its national interests abroad and to expand its regional influence and soft power in the Sahel region. Therefore, to better understand Algeria's growing role in the unstable Sahel region, it is useful to consider how changes at the regional level, coupled with major security concerns, may affect intra-regional dynamics. Recent literature has attributed Algeria's involvement in its surroundings to its geographical centrality, as a neighbour of the three countries that make up the African Sahel, where Algeria has always been a regional heavyweight.