Back to Daesh

We will begin with a quick contextualisation through a brief recapitulation of recent history. The group known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, also called ISIS, although the correct name is Daesh, is a jihadist terrorist group which, at its peak between 2014 and 2019, controlled vast swathes of territory in Syria and Iraq, establishing proto-state structures and forms of governance based on fear and brutality. 

At its peak, it ruled over some 12 million people, established certain state institutions and a tax collection system, minted its own currency, and built military structures using a combination of irregular and conventional warfare tactics. However, after years of intense military operations by the Global Coalition against Daesh, the group lost its territorial control in 2019. And this is where we find the first mistake. 

Despite its territorial defeat, Daesh has demonstrated a remarkable ability to adapt, transforming itself into a decentralised insurgent force with enormous potential to recruit new members and even attract groups previously linked to al-Qaeda. It is capable of seeking new areas of settlement and continues to pose a persistent threat, not only in the region but far beyond. 

Since its territorial defeat in 2019, the terrorist group has adapted and abandoned its territorial caliphate model to become a mobile and highly decentralised insurgent force. This transformation has been fundamental to its persistence, allowing it to adapt to military pressure and exploit its main asset, the vulnerabilities and shortcomings in governance and security in large areas of Africa. 

In early 2024, Daesh was estimated to have between 2,500 and 3,000 active fighters in Iraq and Syria, while UN estimates in 2021 suggested the presence of up to 10,000 militants in both countries. 

The group operates mainly in two key regions of Syria: the Syrian Desert (Badiya Al-Sham), which covers more than half of the country, and the Jazira Region (northeast Syria), largely controlled by Kurdish forces. These remote areas, with little or no state control and a total lack of infrastructure, making them very difficult to access, serve as a safe haven for the group to regroup, establish new training camps for new recruits and as a base from which to launch terrorist attacks. 

Daesh's ability to operate in clandestine, independent cells and exploit power vacuums demonstrates that it has a well-thought-out long-term survival strategy that defies conventional military approaches. The group has learned from its mistakes. Its adaptability is a critical factor in its persistence, as it allows it to take advantage of regional instability and internal divisions to establish itself in increasingly larger areas, but without giving the appearance of a ‘quasi-state’ actor, which put it in the international spotlight and prompted a joint and coordinated response. This new modus operandi makes its complete eradication even more difficult. 

The question we ask ourselves, and which we consider key, is: How has Daesh evolved in both Syria and Iraq, and what is its current situation? 

In Syria, the threat has escalated sharply in recent years, especially after the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime in December 2024. The group has exploited the situation of instability and uncertainty, as well as the resulting security vacuums, to rebuild its capabilities and, in some cases, seize weapons and equipment from the former Assad army and possibly the Russian army. 

Until its defeat, Daesh's actions in Syria have mainly targeted Assad's forces, his Shia allies and Kurdish armed groups (Syrian Democratic Forces, SDF), using all the group's traditional tactics, which are always characterised by extreme violence. 

Daesh's activity has clearly been on the rise over the last three years. In 2023, it was responsible for more than 200 attacks, causing hundreds of casualties, including more than 285 soldiers and more than 231 civilians killed; in 2024, the group tripled the number of actions, reaching a figure close to 700 attacks, resulting in more than 750 deaths, including both military and civilian personnel. Between January and June 2024, taking into account the territory of Syria and Iraq, the organisation claimed responsibility for a total of 153 attacks. 

So far this year, as of 15 May, the group has claimed responsibility for 33 attacks in Syria. Although the rate of attacks was initially low at the beginning of the year (approximately five per month), a significant increase has been observed since April, reaching 14 attacks per month, coinciding mainly with the reduction in the presence of US troops, although religious rivalry with the new Syrian government cannot be overlooked as a determining factor. 

In contrast to Syria, Daesh's violent activity in Iraq has seen a steady decline in recent years. 

In 2023, it claimed 151 attacks on Iraqi territory, although according to various sources these did not exceed 134. During 2024 (up to 14 November), the number of attributed actions fell to 66, reaching 75 by the end of the year. Clearly, by our standards, these figures are somewhat disproportionate, but they represent a 49% decrease compared to 2023 and a 94% decrease since 2019. 

The group remains active in both Syria and Iraq, that much is beyond doubt, but the data shows that the overall trend in Iraq is downward, proof that, in a way, the threat is contained. And this, which may seem somewhat meaningless, hides the key to the problem. Despite all its problems, Iraq remains a more stable country than Syria, which makes it difficult for Daesh to establish itself. Although its actions are mainly targeted at the security forces, these are considerably more capable than their Syrian counterparts. 

All this highlights the importance of government stability and the capacity of local security forces. While Iraq has managed to strengthen its counter-terrorism capabilities, the collapse of the Al-Assad regime in Syria has created an environment conducive to the reconstitution of Daesh. This indicates that the threat is highly contextual and exploits weaknesses in each country's governance and security. 

Although Daesh's ‘experiment’ in establishing a territorial caliphate ultimately collapsed, key elements of its central leadership still maintain a presence in some areas of Iraq and Syria. 

The organisation has evolved into a highly decentralised structure, operating through smaller, autonomous cells or affiliates spread across the globe, including Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia, with a particular prevalence in the Sahel. These affiliates receive operational guidance and funding from the four regional offices of Daesh's General Province Directorate, which gives the group a broad reach and global capacity for action. 

On the financial front, a key factor, Daesh has shown remarkable resilience. In early 2025, the group's reserves were estimated at around 10 million dollars, using virtual assets to raise and transfer funds to finance its operations. In 2024, illicit activities such as kidnapping for ransom, extortion and donations from supporters generated around 8 million dollars for Daesh, with more than 500,000 obtained through the use of virtual assets. 

The financial model, which combines traditional illicit revenue streams (kidnapping, extortion, donations) with virtual assets (cryptocurrencies), is a sophisticated and resilient financing strategy that poses a huge challenge for security forces, not only in tracking them and linking them to specific individuals, but also in effectively dismantling the network. 

This financial adaptability is a very effective backup for the organisation's decentralised structure, allowing Daesh to maintain its global capacity to act and its operational flexibility even when its central leadership in Iraq and Syria is under attack. This suggests that a purely military approach to combating this threat, as we have highlighted on other occasions, is insufficient; a comprehensive, holistic strategy is required, including robust counter-financing measures, especially in the virtual sphere, and, of course, a robust ideological counter-narrative to achieve a lasting defeat. 

Unfortunately, the situation in Syria following the defeat of the Al-Assad regime, despite appearances to the contrary, is creating optimal conditions for a resurgence of Daesh in the region. All the factors that favour it are once again converging in a terrain it knows well and where it has never ceased to be present. Forgetting the threat posed by Daesh is one of the biggest mistakes we can make.