Dark clouds in the east

Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk holds an extraordinary government meeting at the Chancellery with military and emergency services officials following violations of Polish airspace during a Russian attack on Ukraine, in Warsaw, Poland, on 10 September 2025 - REUTERS/ KACPER PEMPEL
Someone once told me: ‘Once is chance, twice is coincidence, three times is enemy action.’
  1. Violations of NATO airspace
  2. Russian military actions and hybrid warfare strategy
  3. Strategic implications for NATO
  4. Broader conflict between Russia and the West
  5. Hybrid warfare doctrine
  6. Russian perception of existential threat
  7. Future scenarios for NATO

Violations of NATO airspace

If we look at what has happened in the last two weeks, both on NATO's eastern flank and at several European airports simultaneously, this statement could not be more accurate.

To be specific: 19 drones entered NATO airspace, forcing the activation of air defences, including the participation of fighter jets from several countries, which, incidentally, were only able to shoot down four of them. Three Mig 31 fighter jets entered Estonian airspace, forcing Italian fighter jets to take action to expel them. A cyberattack caused chaos at airports in Brussels, Berlin and London by crashing check-in services.

Russian military actions and hybrid warfare strategy

The military and hostile actions carried out by the Russian Federation against the territory of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) countries since the start of the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 do not constitute a series of isolated or accidental incidents. On the contrary, a minimally exhaustive analysis of these incidents reveals a pattern that indicates they are part of a deliberate and calculated strategy of what has come to be known as ‘hybrid warfare’ or, more appropriately, ‘conflict in the grey zone’. The aim of these actions is none other than to test the Alliance's resolve, study its reaction times, identify the deployment of certain resources and expose its vulnerabilities without crossing the clear threshold of a direct attack that would have an immediate and disastrous outcome for Russia: the activation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte holds a press conference at a NATO summit in The Hague, Netherlands, on 25 June 2025 - REUTERS/YVES HERMAN

Strategic implications for NATO

There is a clear pattern of escalation in the nature of these incidents. Initially, there were routine violations of the alliance's airspace by manned military aircraft, a practice that dates back long before the conflict. This tactic evolved into the dropping of missile and drone fragments on neighbouring countries, including the sporadic overflight of NATO territory for short periods of time by unmanned aerial systems, and has now culminated in a massive and deliberate incursion by such systems, forcing an active defence response from NATO.

The strategic implications of this series of provocations are varied and multifaceted. On the one hand, they have had the opposite effect to that desired, as they have served, in a way, to reinforce NATO's cohesion and raison d'être, prompting traditionally neutral countries such as Finland and Sweden to join the Alliance. Similarly, they have forced NATO to adapt its doctrine, review and update its defence plans, strengthen its structure with the creation of a new JFC (Joint Force Command), JFC North, headquartered in Norfolk, Virginia, and, as a result, to strengthen its eastern flank with advanced land and air defence deployments. But the other side of the coin of the effects of these incidents is that they have also served to highlight the ambiguity inherent in the response to threats in the grey zone, forcing the Alliance to seek a delicate balance between deterrence and the prevention of uncontrolled escalation. The risk of miscalculation, where an ‘accidental’ incident triggers a direct confrontation with unpredictable consequences, remains the main threat to security, not only in the region, but globally.

The NATO logo is seen at a meeting of the North Atlantic Council - REUTERS/JOHANNA GERON

Broader conflict between Russia and the West

It may sound strange, but there are still those who do not understand that Russia's current aggression against Ukraine did not begin in February 2022, but is part of a broader conflict with roots dating back to 2014, with the annexation of Crimea and the start of fighting in eastern Ukraine, in the Donbas region. From that moment on, the relationship between Russia and the West entered a phase that could be likened to a rollercoaster ride, never better said, but with a progressive deterioration marked by an escalation of military and diplomatic tensions. Preparations for the large-scale invasion of 2022 began with supposed exercises that served to justify a disproportionate increase in Russian military presence on the border with Ukraine in 2021. Even then, in view of this deployment and its prolongation over time, as well as the observation of the movements of the units, which gradually occupied what are known as ‘staging bases’ (positions prior to an attack), some of us asserted that the invasion was imminent, contrary to what recognised voices were propagating, assuring us that it was all in our imagination. During the period prior to the invasion, negotiations between the United States and Russia in Geneva in early January 2022 revealed Moscow's main demands, which called for a halt to NATO's eastward expansion and an end to the Alliance's activities in countries such as Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and the Baltic states, but also with a series of demands on Ukraine, which they wanted to be negotiated by external actors, which, in a rare display of common sense, did not happen. Only Ukraine is the master of its own destiny, and it was unacceptable for others to decide for it. The predictable lack of agreement in these talks was the final and decisive indicator that the invasion would begin shortly thereafter.

Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk holds an extraordinary government meeting at the Prime Minister's Chancellery with military and emergency services officials, following violations of Polish airspace during a Russian attack on Ukraine, in Warsaw, Poland, on 10 September 2025 - REUTERS/ KACPER PEMPEL

Hybrid warfare doctrine

The root of Russian actions on NATO's eastern flank is best understood through the prism of the misnamed ‘hybrid warfare doctrine.’ But regardless of what we call it, and as we have detailed many times, it consists of a combination of conventional and unconventional tactics, such as sabotage, cyberattacks and, eventually, as now, airspace violations. The underlying purpose of these tactics is to assess the true cohesion of the allies, attempt to destabilise them internally and increase pressure on the Alliance's member states. These actions are designed to test NATO's determination and response capacity, while avoiding direct confrontation that could escalate into large-scale conflict (we cannot overlook the fact that the 19 drones turned out to be decoys, devices without actual explosive payloads that are used alongside real ones to saturate defences). Ambiguity is a central component of this strategy, as incidents can often be attributed to ‘mistakes,’ ‘deviations,’ or, as in the latter case, to the electronic warfare actions of the attacked country, i.e., blaming the victim for what happened, which is the culmination of this type of action, allowing Russia to deny direct intent to attack.

Emergency services personnel work at the site of a Russian missile strike, amid Russia's attack on Ukraine, in Sumy, Ukraine, on 13 April 2025 - REUTERS/ SOFIIA GATILOVA

Russian perception of existential threat

In addition, there is another very important reason for what is happening. From the Russian perspective, and even though we are convinced that they are wrong, their perception of an existential threat from NATO is real. According to the analysis of the United States Air Force, Russia is aware of its limitations (many of which have become apparent over the last three years) and has been deeply concerned for years about the West's growing conventional aerospace superiority. From their perspective, NATO's air combat force could neutralise up to 90% of their strategic nuclear forces in a matter of minutes. This anxiety explains the frequent use of airspace violations, both by fighter jets and drones, as a way of assessing NATO's defences and gathering information without direct confrontation. And, at the risk of sounding absurd, we must suspect that this is precisely what has happened over the skies of Poland.

Russia needs to know as accurately as possible not only the reaction times, the location of anti-aircraft systems, the effectiveness of the means employed, etc., but also the determination of the Alliance and the true capacity to activate common defence systems.​

A lorry burns at the site of a Russian missile strike, amid Russia's attack on Ukraine, in Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine, in this image released on 16 September 2025 - Zaporizhzhia Regional Military Administration via Telegram via REUTERS

Future scenarios for NATO

What would happen if, instead of 19 drones, more than 200 or 300 had entered Polish airspace? What if, instead of three fighter jets, 12 or 15 penetrated simultaneously or successively through different locations and in groups of three or four?

It should also be borne in mind that missiles costing more than two million pounds were used to shoot down drones costing a few tens of thousands of pounds. How long could the Alliance sustain successive waves of drones, both in terms of cost and the number of missiles available?

This is also a way of diverting resources that are being supplied to Ukraine, because in the face of a real threat of other possible ‘mistakes’ or a deliberate attack, NATO needs to hoard all possible resources.

Ultimately, this puts us in a situation that, while not impossible, is very complicated, where the Alliance's determination and capabilities will be put to the test.​

A Polish police officer stands near a fragment of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) after Russian drones violated Polish airspace during an attack on Ukraine and some were shot down by Poland. This is seen in Czesniki, Lublin Voivodeship, Poland, on 10 September 2025 - Polsat News via REUTERS.

If we add to all of the above the underlying reluctance in Western societies to enter into any kind of conflict, an attitude that we dare say borders on cowardice, and the instigation of all kinds of movements that involve altercations, confrontation and division within those societies, we have all the pieces of the puzzle to determine that nothing that is happening is accidental.

Russia knows that a conventional confrontation with the Alliance would be suicide, but it is also well aware of our society's reaction to the possibility of armed conflict with the world's second nuclear power. For now, it is playing on the nerves of the West, of its society; it is gradually creating a sense of insecurity and an atmosphere that suggests a pre-war situation, which will make many think and others worry. Among its calculations is the belief that a localised and limited combat, for which it could also attribute responsibility to NATO (provoked, for example, by the downing of one of its aircraft), could perhaps bring it certain benefits and return it to the place it considers it deserves. We cannot ignore the fact that, after three years of war and sanctions (although not as effective as they should be), Russia's situation is not good, but it has adapted to living in a state of war, and perhaps its only way out of failing in the eyes of everyone and itself is to provoke that which we have mentioned before and which was so controversial: escalate in order to de-escalate.