Gaddafi's shadow that Libya is unable to overcome
After the overthrow and subsequent death of Muammar al-Gaddafi in 2011 and after a bloody civil war in which several foreign countries have intervened, Libya is living in a context of great political insecurity.
Khaled al-Mishri, who has been in charge of the Council since 2018, announced his candidacy in the face of opposition because some members of the House alluded that the power granted by the office was being used for their own benefit.
Of the 131 members present (out of a total of 145), 67 voted in favour of Takala in the run-off, 62 voted for Al-Mishri and two abstained.
Voted to be the new leader of the state, Mohamed Takala would replace former leader Khaled al-Mishri, a powerful figure who had been instrumental in negotiations over the country's electoral laws. Deeply corrupt and unable to do anything but collapse in on itself, Libya's current political system is hopelessly broken.
Takala was born in Khums 120 kilometres east of Tripoli in 1966 and grew up there. He started working as a computer engineer. When he was elected to the local council of his hometown in 2011, following the overthrow of former president Muammar al-Gaddafi, he began his political career. In 2012, he was elected to the General National Congress, the legislative body at the time. Four years later, in 2016, he joined the dialogue committee of the Council of State. In 2020, he joined the Libyan National Dialogue Forum (LPDF), which in February 2021 went on to elect Abdul Hamid Dabaiba.
One of the leading figures of Libya's Muslim Brotherhood, as well as one of the most vociferous critics of the Tripoli-based prime minister, Al-Mishri would thus leave the political scene. To prevent Al-Mishri's re-election, the prime minister has been negotiating for days, according to sources in the Libyan Chamber who spoke to "Agenzia Nova", in order to establish a new "mini-government" charged with guiding the nation towards elections. The latter had joined forces with Aquila Saleh, the speaker of the House of Representatives (the lower branch of parliament based in the east). Takala declared in his opening speech that he wanted to work for the elections.
Disparity of opinion
While half of Libya's political representation sees Takala as a possibility they have been waiting for since the end of 2021, in the country's western wing, sentiments are mixed. This is illustrated by the analyses provided to Agenzia Nova by: Jalel Harchaoui, associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute; Claudia Gazzini, senior analyst at the International Crisis Group; and Tarek Megerisi, senior policy researcher at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR).
Tarek explains that the close link that has existed for the past two years between the House of Representatives and the Council of State "is expected to come to an end with this election". While views may differ, divisions between Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, the western and eastern regions, could become more pronounced as a result of the change in the High Council of State. The ECFR researcher predicted that Takala's victory would widen the gap between east and west while bringing the Senate closer to Prime Minister Dabaiba's office.
Megerisi says Saleh, speaker of the House of Representatives, "will surely look for ways to pursue his plans", which, he says, include installing a new unified government to replace the current one.
"It seems that Dabaiba sponsored the new president, which undoubtedly contributed to his electoral victory. In addition to using money and easy access to public funds as leverage, the Prime Minister can also instil fear in his subjects". "Prior to significant events attributed to the prime minister, there have been cases of state councillors being harassed," Megerisi continues. At this point, the path of election looks more like the path of damnation.
For Gazzini, however, it is too early to predict what the new president of the High Council of State will do. "I am aware of Takala's serious nature. He was one of the signatories who backed Fathi Bashagha's proposal to lead a new executive until the Council of State withdrew its backing a few days ago, and he previously supported the idea of establishing a new unitary government," he concluded.
Harchaoui says ratification of the new electoral laws by the two chambers is now "highly unlikely" and that Al-Mishri's departure from the scene "strengthens Prime Minister Dabaiba's position" more than Takala's inauguration. Harchaoui notes that "many Libyans indicate that Takala has friendly relations with Dabaiba", emphasising that it is still a victory for the prime minister because "Al-Mishri will cease to exist politically".
Moreover, Harchaoui continued, "the newly elected President Takala will need time to study all the files of the Council of State, in particular regarding the 6+6 committee composed of six senators and as many members of the House of Representatives to draft electoral laws.
Gaddafi's Libya (1969-2011)
Never before had a leader managed to hold on to power in the North African nation like Muammar al-Gaddafi. Only death could remove him from the power he held for almost 42 years (1969-2011). Coming to power in a coup d'état, Gaddafi abolished the monarchy and thus proclaimed the Libyan Arab Republic. Far from the ideas of a dictator, the nation's new leader began to revolutionise the country's economy with major educational and health reforms, the latter of which enabled the Libyan population to achieve one of the highest life expectancies on the African continent at 77 years of age.
It was decided to create the General Secretariat and the General People's Committee. As Secretary General of the General Congress, Gaddafi maintained the first decision-making body, while in the General People's Committees the citizens discussed the regulations and the decisions were approved by the Congress, being the embodiment of what Gaddafi called "people's power".
Characterised as a clear-thinking leader, Gaddafi based the economy of the Libyan revolution on oil revenues. However, Libya's oil reserves were small compared to those of other major Arab oil-producing countries. Libya was therefore less willing to reduce its demands for price increases and more willing to impose restrictions on production to safeguard its natural resources than other countries. It was believed that oil could be used as a political weapon in the Arab conflict with the state of Israel, as well as a way to finance the economic and social advancement of a severely underdeveloped nation.
The surge in production that followed the 1969 revolution coincided with Libyan demands for higher oil prices, a further reduction in profits and greater control over the development of the country's oil industry.
Post-Gaddafi Libya, (2011-Present)
After the Arab Spring uprisings, a new Libya was born, characterised by power dispersion, fragmentation and political instability, which persists to this day. Such was the political landscape that not even the party born during the Civil War, the National Transitional Council (NTC), won the support of the people because they had not been elected by the voters, most of them were pursuing the interests of foreign nations, and there were still members of Gaddafi's former leadership.
The expected political instability did not come. Although elections were held in 2012 with a 62% turnout, continuing power struggles meant that two years later elections had to be held again. The people then decided to show their disagreement with the political establishment and barely 600,000 people, 18% of the electorate, exercised their right to vote. Such was the division and tension that it was these elections that divided the country in two: the East and the West.
Until the emergence of the UN-backed government within this conglomerate of actors in December 2015, two distinct centres of power would emerge, responding to geographical, historical, economic and cultural elements. Tripolitania, based in Tripoli, and Cyrenaica, based in Tobruk. An emergence of political and military elites out of a desire for control over state resources because of the difficulty of regulating them separately, coercively. This is the main dynamic.
Libya's future looks uncertain 12 years after Gaddafi's overthrow. His demise brought with it the institutional order that had imposed a state of disorder and unrest on the country. In an elite nation, power struggles tend to be more manageable as resources end up in a small number of hands, resulting in a greater concentration of power.
Beyond the 2011 uprising, the atmosphere in the air lacked a fixed direction and authority as those who had priority access to resources were those who enjoyed privileged status either by ideology, location, military prowess, etc. Therefore, the power resources that allowed the system to function were destroyed when the leader died.
Moreover, in a rent-seeking nation where hydrocarbons are the main source of revenue, power would have to be concentrated in a few hands. Whoever controls the oil will let his privileged nature shine through. Thus, it is suggested that alliances and oil are the key factors that have allowed Eastern elites to position themselves above the rest.