Iran briefly

Like other revolutionary states, the Islamic Republic of Iran has far from exhausted its radical potential.  Subject to strong internal political tensions, located in a region that is traditionally and for assorted reasons in permanent turmoil and chaos, one of Tehran's traditional aspirations is to become the dominant power in West Asia.

Por todo lo anterior, la República Islámica de Irán, sea cual sea el resultado de las crisis más inmediatas (armas nucleares, guerra de Gaza, Líbano etc.) seguirá siendo durante mucho tiempo años una fuerza poderosa e inquietante en la región. 

For all these reasons, the Islamic Republic of Iran, whatever the outcome of the most immediate crises (nuclear weapons, Gaza war, Lebanon, etc.) will remain a powerful and unsettling force in the region for many years to come.  

For most Iranians, both aspirations are terribly similar in substance, and this sense of imperial entitlement has more to do with cultural hegemony than any kind of territorial claim. The result, however, is that when they enter into a review of the conflicts that have pitted them against other countries, they are often quick to invoke a very broad historical perspective: the Russians came and went after two hundred years, the British and French exerted their influence for only a few decades, and the Americans for an even shorter period of time.  

In their view, however, Iran has been a determining power in the region for almost three thousand years, and eventually, from Central Asia to the Mediterranean, it will play this role again. Of all the countries in the region, only Egypt, India and Türkiye are put on an equal footing with Iran in terms of legitimacy. The others, whether Pakistan, Iraq, or Israel, are seen as mere vestiges of colonialism that will at some point be swept away or subordinated within the broader historical and strategic power structures that determine the region's politics. When it comes to the Afghans and the Arab Gulf states, the sentiment is almost contemptuous, for they have nowhere near the historical significance of your nation, nor can they compare to the millennia-old civilisation and destiny of Iran.  To try to understand the nature of the current political system in Iran, it is necessary to put it in the context of history. Only then can the origins of the system be understood.

After several turbulent years in Iranian politics, the 1970s saw a further move towards the consolidation of an absolutist-tinged regime when the Shah dissolved the only two parties and announced the formation of the Resurgence Party, which was to be the sole state party and an agent of popular mobilisation for his government. Moreover, to combine the authoritarian benefits of a one-party system with the appearance of legitimate debate in a two-party system, the Shah created the fiction of two wings within the party, the ‘progressive’ wing, and the ‘liberal’ wing, although the leaders of both were in fact handpicked by the Shah himself.  

Despite his efforts, the idea of the Resurgence Party was an utter failure in the face of the Shah's objectives. It only managed to win the support of those whose only interest was to get a job in the public sector. The reaction in certain quarters was not long in coming and several insurgent groups, both secular and religious, organised themselves to challenge the Pahlavi government.  

Another step towards the total destabilisation of the situation came from the Shah's consideration of the clerical establishment. His view was that the clerical establishment was eminently medieval and backward-looking and that it was only a brake on the modernisation of the country. The clerics, except those he had attracted to his circle, opposed his modernisation programmes, and thus earned the status of political enemies. In another attempt to keep control of the situation, he tried to buy off the business elite by allowing them to enrich themselves on condition that they stayed out of politics, which only deepened social disaffection with his regime.  

The economic crisis of the 1970s also contributed to the further deterioration of the Shah's regime, whose government in 1978 made the grave mistake of criticising Ayatollah Khomeini, who was already immensely popular among Iranians and whom it had previously exiled. This triggered a wave of popular unrest that could no longer be stemmed as all opposition factions joined together in an alliance with the aim of overthrowing the monarchy with the end that we all know. 

When studying the current Iranian political system, and more specifically its political parties, one cannot lose sight of the fact that the nature of political parties and groups in Iran is vastly different from that in the West. In post-1979 Iran, the common ground for all political groups is ideology, which can be Islamist, Marxist or liberal. On that basis, sometimes, given economic or social contexts, economic or political interests in a particular period led to the emergence of political groups on the scene.  

The 1979 Revolution also brought about a fundamental change in Iranians' attitude towards politics. Under the previous regime the political culture had been elitist in the sense that all important governmental decisions were made by the Shah and his ministers, and most of the population remained oblivious to politics and accepted this approach.  

The fusion of traditional Shia Islamic ideals with political values during the Revolution led to the emergence of a more popular political culture. The main characteristics of this political culture are the widespread sentiment that the government is obliged to ensure social justice and that all citizens should participate in politics. These sentiments are recognised by political leaders, who constantly express their concern for the welfare of the mostazafin (oppressed or needy people) and persistently praise the work of the people in a multitude of political and religious associations.  

Ayatollah Khomeini's aim was not only to overthrow the monarchy, but to replace it with a new political system based on Islamic values. Khomeini was firmly convinced that the long-term success of such an ideal Islamic government depended on the commitment and involvement of the masses in politics. He also believed that politics could not be separated from religion. He saw the clergy as responsible for providing religious guidance, based on their knowledge of Islamic law, to the people as they worked to create a new society in which religion and politics would be fused.  

Collective and mass political participation has been both a goal and a feature of Iran's post-revolutionary regime. However, this participation is not through political parties, but through religious institutions. The mosque has become the most important popular political institution. Participation in weekly community prayers, where a political sermon is always delivered, is considered both a religious and a civic duty. For political aspirants, attendance at the weekly prayers is mandatory.  

Numerous religious and political associations revolve around mosques. These organisations carry out a wide variety of activities, from distributing ration coupons to vetting the religious credentials of local office seekers, conducting classes on subjects ranging from the study of Arabic to superpower imperialism, and setting up teams to monitor shop prices and personal behaviour. They are usually all-volunteer associations whose members devote several hours a week to their activities. While most of these voluntary associations are for men, several are specifically for women.  

Article 26 of the Iranian Constitution sets out the basis of the political party system in Iran. It reads as follows: ‘The formation of parties, societies, political or professional associations, as well as religious societies, whether Islamic or belonging to one of the recognised religious minorities, is permitted. However, they must not violate the principles of independence, freedom, national unity, the criteria of Islam and the foundations of the Islamic Republic. No one may be prevented from participating in the groups or forced to participate in them.’  

The provisions of the article are further developed in the Law on Parties and its Regulations, where all the regulations relating to political parties and groups are specifically set out. The functioning of these, as is obvious, is only possible by following their provisions.  

The Islamic Consultative Assembly ratified the Law on the Activities of Political Parties, Associations and Societies, as well as Islamic and recognised religious minorities and various associations in its session of 29 August 1981. These regulations were subsequently confirmed by the Guardian Council on 4 October 1981.  

As is evident, and this is an especially important fact to understand the almost absolute control exercised by the regime to curb any hint of dissidence, it is the religious organisations and not the secular ones that play the most important political roles. Production centres, educational establishments of all kinds and other workplaces also have Islamic associations that perform functions like those of voluntary associations in mosques. 

Still, there are many secular groups, mostly associations such as industrial and professional unions, university clubs and trade organisations, but in one way or another, they have gradually acquired religious connotations. These organisations are often staffed by religious advisors who guide their members on prayer ritual, Islamic law, and Shia history. Any such body that seeks to avoid mixing religion with business or its own activities is automatically suspected of being anti-Islamic and therefore disaffected by the regime, which identifies it as a potential source of dissent, and therefore runs the risk of having its statutes revoked and thus having to cease its activity, with the added risk for its members and of course its leaders.  

It is therefore a political system with deep religious roots designed to always ensure control of the population and of protest movements. And, as we have seen in the introduction, with the objective of a hegemonic vision of Iran in the region. A hegemony that, although religiously based, is rooted in the sentiment left by the ancient Persian empire over centuries, which, although not openly stated, is the mirror in which the current Iranian political class looks at itself.