Mali, paradox and crossroads of the European Union
The success of the EU mission has placed it in an almost impossible situation, as it has laid the foundations for a coup d'état whose success makes the continuity of the aforementioned mission difficult, if not impossible.
Only a couple of years ago, in 2018, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita was re-elected to the presidency of the Malian government, obtaining 42 per cent of the votes in the first round and 67 per cent in the second. But from that moment on, and until a little less than a month ago, support for the president and his administration waned, turning into criticism at first and open discontentment later, until it led to an outburst of protests and demonstrations resulting from the dissatisfaction of the Malian people.
This feeling cannot be attributed to a single reason, but is the result of a series of factors that have been converging until the events of 18 August. These include the population's perception that corruption was reaching unbearable levels at the same time as the socioeconomic crisis was deepening, hitting practically all sectors (education, health, justice...).
At the same time, the situation of instability and insecurity in the centre and north of the country generated by the insurrection of 2012 and the subsequent entrenchment of Jihadist groups aligned with both al-Qaeda and al-Daesh that not only fight the government but also currently do so among themselves, increasing the population's suffering, helped increase disaffection towards the government. And of course, the anomaly and damage at the social and economic level caused by the COVID 19 pandemic has been another determining factor.
The protests that broke out were not without violence, which further exalted spirits and made the situation more difficult. At the beginning of July the opposition movement known as the M5-RFP even called for civil disobedience to force the president to resign. This triggered another outbreak of violence with accusations of illegal actions and summary executions by elements of the security forces. The initiative did not have the expected result, and even one of the visible heads of the opposition movement, the conservative cleric Mahmoud Dicko, expressed his opposition to the path of civil disobedience adopted by most of the opposition. He even went so far as to call for restraint in the face of the increase in violent clashes.
On 18 August, after weeks of intense demonstrations and riots in the capital and other major cities, a coup d'état took place. Although in the confusing initial moments it did not appear to have been successful, in a few hours the rebels announced that they had managed to arrest President Ibrahim Boubacar Keta, Prime Minister Boubou Cisse, the army chief of staff and other members of the government, who were all taken to the military installations in Kati.
The main reason given by the coup leaders to justify their action was the insecurity and lack of resources of the army, which, although totally true, seems a bit of a pilgrimage to motivate such a serious and decisive step. However, this can be perfectly explained to the outside world and to the population for reasons that will be explained later.
That same night the situation began to take shape and the triumph of the coup was definitively confirmed when President Keita announced his resignation, the dissolution of the National Assembly and the resignation of the entire government in a televised address.
The main reason for his resignation was that he gave in to the demands of the coup leaders to avoid a bloodbath, lamenting his failure to exercise effective control over the armed forces. This statement is not without interest, since it is a fact that the rebels did not need to fire a single shot to achieve their purpose and no FAM unit opposed the coup, so this alleged "bloodbath" was somewhat utopian, and even more so considering how the population received the news of the event in question. It could be argued that there was unanimity in both civil society and the military in supporting the coup, if not collusion and collaboration. Otherwise there is no justification for the absence of confrontation.
The following day, 19 August, the military perpetrators of the coup announced the creation of the National Committee for the Salvation of the People. The purpose of this body was to ensure the country's stability and call free and democratic elections "within a reasonable time", something that experience dictates is still a euphemism in this type of situation. Colonel Ismael Wague, hitherto deputy chief of the air force general staff, presented himself as the spokesman for the rebels.
During the statement, and in a vain attempt to avoid condemnation and secure the support of the international community, aware of course of the importance of Mali and the operations conducted on its soil to combat Jihadism, the colonel stressed that all past agreements would be respected, and that therefore the UN mission MINUSMA, the French force of Operation Barkhane, the G5 Sahel and the special force Takuba continued to operate and ensure that the Algiers agreement signed in 2015 between the Bamako government and the armed groups in the north of the country was maintained in full.
The visible head of the above-mentioned National Committee for the Salvation of the People was Colonel Assimi Goita of the Malian army. As can be seen, it is striking that at no time was any reference made to the opposition movement that until a few dates earlier had been demonstrating against the government or that the latter had taken an active part in one way or another in the coup. Equally significant is the absence of any mention or prominence of the charismatic and influential Mamaoud Dicko. Only a few hours later, Issa Kaou N'Djim, who is responsible for coordinating the organisations and movements close to the clergy, acknowledged that contacts had been maintained with the coup leaders and that a priori they shared their demands.
And after the coup, what will happen?
There are many questions currently in the air regarding the situation in Mali after the coup. But the most worrying thing is that, owing to its current geostrategic importance and to the fact that it is the key element in the European Union's fight against Jihadist terrorism and its expansion into West Africa, there is much greater uncertainty regarding the role the EU should play.
The first question that assails any observer is: How is it possible that in a country where there are several international missions led by different organisations, military units from several African countries and from practically all the members of the EU and even the USA, as well as intelligence agencies of all kinds, absolutely nobody noticed that a movement of the importance and magnitude of a coup d'état was being prepared? Given the importance of Mali, as stated above, this question becomes even more relevant. And even more so given that the coup triumphed in just a few hours and without any armed confrontation, which denotes that the rebels were perfectly aware of the support they had and should have given. In other words, it was not something that can be considered improvised in any way.
It is not the purpose of this paper to answer this question, but at least it is clear that at the very least there were serious intelligence failures. On the other hand, it is a fact that the coup has been well received by the Malian people. The explanation for this can be found in the deep dissatisfaction throughout the country with the situation they were experiencing. The results of several surveys carried out by the Afro-Barometer showed a total disaffection with the political class, which was considered unreliable and corrupt, as well as a perception that the country was not on the right track.
What is most interesting is that the same study shows that the highest levels of confidence are placed in the armed forces and traditional leaders. Therefore, while the lack of confidence in an elected government and weariness at what they consider to be a disastrous management have grown exponentially, a majority of Malians appear to have viewed the coup d'état of 8 August as the best way of breaking a downward spiral.
However, this cannot be interpreted in a simplistic way, because despite this support for the coup and for a government led by the military in the short term, the people of Mali reject the military dictatorship as a permanent form of government.
The data shown by the study are unquestionable. 74% of those surveyed say that corruption has increased over the last year, while eight out of ten define the country's economic situation as bad or very bad. Eighty-two per cent show their confidence in the armed forces while 47 per cent say they trust President Keita. Furthermore, over the past few years opinion of the uniformed personnel has been improving steadily, and a majority of the country's inhabitants consider that their army performs well in protecting the country from both internal and external threats. And a very significant fact: almost 70 per cent consider that they act professionally and respect the rights of other citizens.
One of the main explanations for this change in perception of the armed forces can be found mainly in the EUTM-MALI mission. After years of occupation in Iraq and after the first stages of the various missions in Afghanistan, the organisations leading these missions began to adopt a different model of operation. This model was launched in 2004 in Iraq, but has been improved and refined, and consists mainly of transforming what were previously direct interventions in conflicts into support missions and mainly of training the armed forces of the countries in which they were to intervene for one reason or another.
In this way they avoided their own casualties, or at least minimised them, but at the same time handed over the responsibility for solving their problems to the country's own forces, creating the conditions for acting against future threats and, more importantly, giving them a leading role in operations and in resolving the conflict, thereby increasing the population's confidence in their armies and the image of their components, which, in general, in the theatres we are referring to, was not exactly the best in the eyes of the people they were supposed to serve.
This model has become a model of success, and has been implemented in Iraq, Somalia and, in this case, Mali, where the data from the aforementioned survey leave no room for doubt.
But in this African country, the combination of a government perceived as corrupt, accused of making pacts with the Jihadists that the army itself fights in the north, with a borderline economic situation and a successful mission sponsored by the European Union that has boosted confidence in the armed forces and their image of professionalism has led the population to look to the military as the only ones it trusts to pull the country out of the pit it is in.
And this is the great paradox: without seeking it and without pretending it, the success of the EU mission has placed it in an almost impossible situation, as it has laid the foundations for a coup d'état whose success makes it difficult, if not impossible, to continue the aforementioned mission, as continuing as if nothing had happened would mean giving the green light to a government that emerged by undemocratic means, setting a very dangerous precedent.
If a failure is to be found in the EU's action in Mali, it could perhaps be found in its failure to give further impetus to the measures to improve governance by ensuring that Malians' confidence in their institutions reaches at least the same level as they have in their army at present.
But we cannot be mistaken. This support and confidence in their armed forces is not a carte blanche. For, as pointed out, despite everything, the Malian people have a keen sense of democracy, and the same surveys show strong support for democratic practices and institutions. And although the combination of a feeling of being fed up and confidence in the armed forces has made the coup of 18 August look good to the majority of the population, this same majority continues to support the democratic system.
The military uprising can be understood as a temporary solution or as the lesser evil, but only if it has an expiry date. It is an immediate solution, but the rejection of a prolonged military dictatorship as a solution to the country's problems is also a fact. This support should therefore be understood as temporary and will only be tolerated if the military now in power fulfil their promises of a rapid transition and restoration of democracy.
This is where the EU has its opportunity to exert pressure and influence to win the support and confidence of the people in the institutions, taking advantage of this desirable transition to introduce improvements in governance in the same way as it has been able to do in the army.
If this does not happen, if those who have now seized power delay more than necessary the steps that will lead Mali back to the democratic path, discontent will once again surface, only now it will be necessary to add to it the frustration of the hopes lost, and this could be fatal, leading in the worst case scenario to a civil war and even a failed state. We have seen very similar situations in the not too distant past and the outcome is well known. Only this time we are talking about the key element in containing Jihadism. And one can be sure that there are many interested in seeing precisely that happen.