North Korea, the never-ending story

Among the many hotspots of tension in the world today, one of the most dangerous for escalation is on the Korean peninsula. A dictatorial, hermetic regime that keeps its people isolated from reality and in impoverished conditions, investing a huge amount of its meagre budget in disproportionate armed forces and whose disastrous economic planning has already caused several famines. Faced with such a situation, and the permanent need to offer an external enemy to blame for all its ills, the possibility of a flight forward with no return seems increasingly plausible. 

In this context, and other considerations aside, if there is one thing that can be credited to the previous US administration, it is the success of its policy towards the North Korean regime. 

President Barack Obama warned President-elect Donald Trump that North Korea's nuclear weapons programme would be the greatest danger he would face as president.

Once in office, the Trump administration launched a policy of "maximum pressure" against the Kim family's regime in North Korea, seeking to force dictator Kim Jong-un to end his pursuit of a nuclear arsenal. The comprehensive set of sanctions was unprecedented in its scope, and was even publicly supported by the People's Republic of China (PRC), North Korea's closest and almost sole ally. 

As part of this pressure, and coupled with economic sanctions, the United States undertook a massive build-up of military power in and around the Korean peninsula to ensure readiness for a possible military operation against North Korea. US Forces Korea (USFK), especially the US Eighth Army, were at the centre of these preparations that occupied several months in 2017. Stockpiles of supplies, especially ammunition and medical supplies, were significantly increased and a plan was put in place to train, receive and integrate other units from the US into the USFK so that they could, if necessary, operate alongside South Korean forces.  

All these preparations were carried out openly, so that for the first time in a long time it was clear that the United States was seriously considering military options for ending North Korea's nuclear programme. The North Korean dictator, like everyone else, witnessed these moves, and probably had further information through the intelligence that the People's Republic of China shares with his regime, so his conclusions were the same. 

It is impossible to know whether this action alone was the decisive factor that pushed the North Korean leader to seek the opening of diplomatic channels with the United States, but it is certain that this was the end result. One possibility is that North Korea came to the conclusion that its nuclear programme had only served to bring the US and South Korea closer together, with a particularly significant impact on their military alliance, and that it was time to adopt a new path with better short-term prospects, taking into account such an important perception as Trump's acknowledged dissatisfaction with the burden, in terms of economic cost, that the US assumes in defending South Korea. On this point there are clear parallels with the previous US president's position on NATO and the cost his country bears in comparison to other members that do not assume even minimal commitments. Similarly, the fact that the then South Korean President Moon Jae-in was progressive and much more open to dialogue and improved relations with North Korea also played a role, as did the timing: the Winter Olympics were to be held in South Korea in February 2018, and this was a global showcase and a fantastic opportunity to reduce tensions and improve the image of the North Korean satrap. 

Regardless of his exact calculation, throughout 2018 and until his final meeting with Trump in the Korean demilitarised zone on 30 June 2019, Kim demonstrated the wiles and skills to preserve his regime and further boost his nuclear programme.

There is no doubt that Kim Jong-un is not the ludicrous leader he is often made out to be. It is true that his image does not help. His great virtue is that practically from the moment he came to power he has been able to read the United States very well and calibrate his actions. And the steps taken by both his southern neighbour and the US have made it clear to him that Washington does not want a military conflict and that South Korea and the US restrain each other at times of heightened tension. It knows full well that neither across the border nor across the Pacific will take any action that would trigger a war, and this certainty must be coupled with the firm conviction that Beijing would not abandon its ally in the event of a crisis. 

All of the above, for now, puts North Korea at an advantage. Hence its positioning in conflicts such as the war in Ukraine, where it has clearly sided with the invader, supplying Russia with large quantities of ammunition. It is not yet clear what the quid pro quo is, but it is probably in the form of the supply of energy resources, something much more useful to North Korea than hard currency. 

The reality today is that the North Korean problem is in a new and potentially dangerous phase. Kim Jong-un has shown himself to be ruthless and very clever. For more than 10 years he has played his cards right, skilfully manipulating two world powers to his advantage, and is adapting his regime and his country's economy to ensure dynastic control. 

On the nuclear front, he has not only settled for the ability to strike the US with nuclear weapons, his steps are now directed towards developing a ‘second response’ capability to prevent pre-emptive strikes against his nuclear or any other weapons programme. This would put the country on a par with the world's leading nuclear powers, exponentially increasing its deterrence capability. 

In parallel to its nuclear capability, North Korea possesses an enormous conventional deterrent capability, based primarily on its long-range artillery. This makes the war option against Pyongyang simply unacceptable. A simple conventional response against Seoul, which is within range of North Korean artillery, would cause thousands of deaths and injuries, while devastating one of the world's major economic centres. And that is precisely the key to the current situation. Korea's economic weight and its role as a global technology production centre mean that no option that would jeopardise its production capacity can be considered. The effects on the world economy would be tremendous, and no one wants to face that spectre.

Kim Jong-un is too smart to think that reunification of the two Koreas, evidently under his regime, is impossible. However, he is perfectly aware of the situation on the world geopolitical chessboard, and he will continue to use it to make as much profit as possible, on the one hand, and, on the other, to advance his deterrence capacity and thus ensure his and his people's stay in power, as well as the continuity of the regime at any cost. The state of affairs shows that the regime is much more rational than we want to believe, but it is increasingly dangerous, as it feels more secure than perhaps at any time in recent decades.