Return to the south

And that phrase, applied to our field, which, although it may sound pretentious, tries to disseminate and educate on issues that are not usually dealt with in other media, is what tends to guide my weekly publications, although for obvious reasons it is not always possible. Hence we focus our attention on issues, conflicts or situations somewhat removed from the dazzling news of the day. 

And once again, when the whole world has its focus on the United States, on the election of Donald Trump, on the statements and gestures of Elon Musk, to a lesser extent on Gaza and Israel, because of the delicate agreement reached, and in a less interested way in Ukraine, waiting for the movements of the new tenant of the White House, we travel to the southern border. To the forgotten southern border. 

A region so forgotten that it was not even mentioned by Donald Trump in his speech... well, it has not been mentioned by the new US president at least in the last two months, which gives us some idea of the importance he attaches to it. 

We are familiar with the general lines of the new US government's foreign and security policy. We know that its main interest is in the Asia-Pacific axis, and not with warmongering intentions as many may think, but to emerge victorious from the real power struggle, which is none other (it always is) than the economic one, with that power that is looking for its moment and that is China. 

Here we can digress. We all know that wars are fought on the battlefield, but they are won or lost in the offices, and generally in those that hold the reins of the economy. And in this respect it would be very interesting to analyse the real reasons why Donald Trump seems to be backtracking on everything related to the electric car industry (despite having Musk as a fundamental part of his administration) and returning to promoting the traditional national car industry. We must pay attention to the struggle that is going to be unleashed on the economic and industrial level between both nations to take the lead or recover positions in the industrial field and particularly in the technological field. There we will have the key to this confrontation. 

Meanwhile, as far as Europe is concerned, I get the feeling that we are immersed in a situation equivalent to the one that ended the USSR. At the time, in the midst of the arms race, among other things, the Soviet Union's inability to follow in the footsteps of the United States in the famous ‘Star Wars’ programme contributed in an exceptional way to the economic collapse of the entire system and the fall of the communist regime. 

Applied to Europe and to our times, it seems that the stubborn insistence (conveniently instigated by external actors) on imposing on ourselves a series of rules and restrictions that directly hit the waterline of a large part of our industry has put us squarely in a race in which, under these conditions and with these restrictions (which our direct competitors do not observe) it is impossible not to end up in the abyss, or to put it other words, economic irrelevance. 

It should go without saying but, for those who we might consider our rivals, and even for those who in other respects are our allies, the idea of a strong, truly united, technologically advanced and productive European Union is not at all to their liking. It would be admitting a formidable rival into the equation. 

And what does this have to do with that look to the south that we were talking about at the beginning? 

Probably everything. Because we should start to accept that we are alone on that front. And not only that, but that aforementioned obstacle, which prevents us from advancing at the same pace as others, also prevents us from becoming aware of the problem we have. Of how important security is, especially on our southern flank. 

The Trump administration inherits a policy of waning US influence in Africa, exacerbated by the lack of personnel and resources during the previous administration, as well as by the political evolution of some countries in the region, and that is the drift we can expect. One of the consequences of the above has been the prominence gained by Russia in the military juntas that govern most of the countries in the area which they support, arm and back. And this support has been accompanied by the abandonment or expulsion of the European troops who, until recently, contributed to the fight against radical groups. 

In this state of affairs, with an economic and industrial panorama in which we can expect nothing but obstacles from those who have no interest in a strong competitor, with a government in the United States whose main priorities are far removed from Europe, today our presence and capacity to influence the region most important for our security is practically non-existent. 

And what do we have facing us? Well, we will make a brief summary that will put us in context. 

On the one hand, we have the groups ‘affiliated’ or franchised by al-Qaeda. The main one of these is Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), led by Iyad Ag Ghaly and whose actions reach Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and certain areas of Mauritania. Its modus operandi is based on its division into several previously independent factions that have come under its leadership and its close collaboration with organised crime groups. Among these factions we find Ansar Dine, formed mainly by Tuareg communities and operating in Mali. 

The group of the late Mokhtar Belmokhtar, alias Mister Marlboro, Al-Mourabitoun, a group with a long history behind it and responsible, among other things, for the assault on the Radisson Blu hotel in Bamako (2015), which also has Mali as its main area of operations. 

We find the Katiba Macina, in this case led by Amadou Koufa, which also extends its operations beyond the border with Burkina Faso. Its members are mainly from the Fulani ethnic group, a subject we dealt with a few weeks ago, and their actions are not always related to religious motivation, but have their roots in ancestral ethnic and social conflicts (the ancient struggle between nomadic herders and sedentary farmers). 

What we know as AQIM (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) is also integrated into the JNIM, at least its leadership. This is the group with the most extensive area of action due to its age and history, operating in Algeria, where it originated, although currently in a very sporadic and tangential way, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and occasionally in Chad and Mauritania. 

That is as far as al-Qaeda is concerned. To this we must add the groups loyal to Daesh and which compete with the former for control of resources and territory. 

Among these we have the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), founded and led until 2021 by Seid al-Sahrawi. Successive leaders have not always been identified, but its operational structure has not only remained intact, but has grown. It operates mainly in eastern Mali, northern Burkina Faso and western Niger. It is probably the most prominent group in the region affiliated with the Islamic State in the Sahel. 

Also part of the network is the one known as the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWAP). It was originally part of Boko Haram, but there was a split in which some of its members officially joined the Islamic State in 2016. The other part is known as the Jamā'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da'wah wa'l-Jihād (JAS). 

Its main area of activity is Lake Chad, although small groups operate under its acronym throughout the Sahel. The countries where they are most active are south-eastern Niger, Chad (in regions close to Lake Chad) and occasionally Mali and Burkina Faso. Following the well-known modus operandi of Daesh, numerous local cells operate under its acronym. These are usually made up of local combatants in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. Their loyalty to Daesh is mainly based on propaganda and a certain tactical coordination of their actions with the leadership, but with less hierarchical organisation than ISGS. 

It is clear that we are facing a plethora of groups that are increasingly numerous, better armed and better prepared, operating in ever larger regions and with a greater capacity for destabilisation. 

If there is a key region, in addition to the aforementioned Lake Chad, it is Tillabéri in Niger, also known as the ‘three borders’ (Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso). Control of this region is made difficult, not only by its orographic characteristics and the lack of troops and technical resources, but also by the occasional lack of collaboration of the three governments, which prioritise particular governmental or even personal interests, as corruption is a common currency. 

With this panorama, we must also face what has happened in Syria, which, despite initial appearances, is not at all a scenario that invites optimism. And the possible scenarios range from a government and consequently a failed state that increases chaos in the region and increases the flow of arms and combatants towards the Sahel, to the consolidation of a government led by those who until recently professed to be close to al-Qaeda, and who are determined to support groups related to the organisation in the Sahel. 

Be that as it may, the one who always loses out is Europe, and we have to be aware that, as well as being alone in this situation, we are absent from the region. And that could be our biggest mistake.