Russia leaves Mali behind in its bid for Algeria
- Algeria's role
- Could the end of the Wagner Group in Africa be near?
- The Tinzaouaten massacre
- Consequences of the ‘low cost’ war
- What will happen in Mali and the Sahel?
Corruption, increasing terrorist attacks, political incapacity and economic mismanagement have provided the perfect breeding ground for Russia, through the mercenaries of the Wagner Group, now Africa Corps, to impose its influence in the Sahel region with an iron fist in recent years. A period in which coups d'état have been a constant (14 in 8 countries in the region), two of which took place in Mali in 2020 and 2021.
Although Russia's influence spans the entire Sahel region, its main ally has been Mali, which it has helped militarily on several occasions in the war against separatist rebels in Azawad in the north of the country. Months of fighting have established a political chessboard that is difficult to sustain, with the latest victory falling to the Azawad separatists.
The rise of military juntas in the governments of Sahelian countries has led to the exit of external actors such as France in Mali in 2022 and Burkina Faso in 2023. As a result, relations between Mali and Russia could damage the credibility of Russia and its alliances in the Sahel region and Africa as a whole.
Algeria's role
Algeria has been one of Russia's main allies since Soviet times. Its political situation, natural resources and, above all, its access to the Atlantic Ocean are the circumstances that have attracted the attention of successive Russian governments.
There is complete harmony between the Algerian administration led by President Abdelmadjid Tebboune and Vladimir Putin's Russian government. In fact, Russia has decided to renew and maintain its economic support for the North African country despite the fact that Algeria did not attend the last BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) meeting and that Russia's image in the region could be weakened.
Algeria has repeatedly criticised that the presence of mercenary groups in the region, operating outside the realm of international responsibility, only leads to a deterioration of regional security. This is what many experts, such as Algeria's representative to the United Nations, Ammar Benjameh, point to as ‘the reason for the shift’ in Russian interests. It is worth noting that relations between the Wagner mercenary group and Vladimir Putin broke down after the defiance of the organisation's late leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin.
Could the end of the Wagner Group in Africa be near?
In recent years, the group has expanded its presence across the African continent, notably in Sudan, Central African Republic, Libya and most recently in Mali. The paramilitary company has also been present in Mozambique and Madagascar in temporary operations.
Differences between the Malian military junta and the Wagner Group's management could be behind it all. Vladimir Putin does not need the Wagner Group in Africa. If Russia needed to maintain its power in the region, it would suffice to mobilise its military arsenal there.
Like any symbiotic relationship, the Wagner Group and the Malian army need each other. While one gives shelter to the other and is paid by the government with gold from the mines, the other supports them in the fight against the separatists in the north. Differences aside, Vladimir Putin has pointed out on more than one occasion that one of the Wagner Group's great successes was key to France's departure from the region. It is estimated that the Group could raise resources worth 10.8 million dollars a month.
It has also served as Russia's foreign policy platform on the African continent. As a result, the perception of the Wagner Group among the big cities and the rest of Mali, as well as published opinion in the West, is of less and less interest to the region's citizens.
However, the situation has taken a 180-degree turn after the latest defeat in Tinzaouaten, which could serve Assimi Goita, leader of Mali's military junta, as a way out of the problem he has with the group of mercenaries dancing around his territory. These problems seem to be multiplying for the Malian leader, who is currently at war with Islamic terrorism, mainly sponsored by the Islamic State of the Greater Sahara (ISGS), and separatist rebels in the north.
But to do so, it will first have to remedy the holes that, until now, have been taken care of by Russian mercenaries. In any case, the absence of the Wagner Group hitmen would not affect Russia's presence and image in the region, as all the Sahel countries have received a great deal of governmental support from the Russian administration. Everything seems to indicate that we are heading towards a scenario similar to the Syrian case.
The Tinzaouaten massacre
The Algerian-Mali border is a battlefield where Russia is fighting battles whose importance sometimes surpasses the battles on the Ukrainian front. Mali is seeing an extraordinary increase in terrorist violence this year, making it one of the deadliest in its history despite the fact that it is still months away. Since Mali's first coup d'état in 2020, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso have suffered 38% of the world's terrorist deaths.
Although the Wagner Group took the city of Kidal, following the Tinzaouaten massacre last August, where some 50 Russian soldiers were killed in clashes with pro-independence factions called the Strategic Framework for the Defence of the People of Azawad (CSP-DPA), belonging to Azawad, a large military column was created with Malian soldiers, members of Wagner and other armed groups with the aim of capturing Tinzaouaten and avenging the fallen.
The military column took almost a week to get from Kidal to Tinzaouaten, but returned without having accomplished its mission. The military junta claimed to have found the bodies of the soldiers killed in August, but the CSP-DPA denied this and shared a video showing otherwise. This will be a major drain and economic cost as the Goita government will have to deploy more troops to the north, which will lead to more jihadist attacks.
Consequences of the ‘low cost’ war
Russia's strategy in the Sahel is based on a low-cost approach. The Wagner group tends to operate in unstable scenarios. After the debacle of the Tinzaouaten battle, the approach of strategic benefits compared to material costs is one of the reasons why Wagner's withdrawal from the region is at its peak.
Given that the Wagner Group's mission in Mali is to eliminate any viable alternative to the regime, the proliferation of rebel and terrorist groups in the region has complicated and hardened the situation. As in Syria, Russia's low-cost strategy could, as in the Arab Spring, restore Moscow's position in the region.
After three years of presence in the region, Russia's commitment to a low-cost war economy has led to more deaths of military officers from other nations, such as France and the US, than of Russian nationals, so the possibility of Russia losing power in the region will not depend on whether or not the Wagner Group leaves.
What will happen in Mali and the Sahel?
Since the 2012 Tuareg revolution led by the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) in northern Mali and the subsequent instability, violence has spread across the Sahel. In response, the leaders of the military juntas of Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso consolidated their march and rejection of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and consolidated the Alliance of Sahel States (AES).
The events in Tinzaouaten have changed the way Russia's military presence in Africa is viewed. The perception of invincibility against insurgent groups has obviated the need to demonstrate not only that they are vulnerable, but that they can be defeated. A situation that other military powers in the region will take into account for future conflicts.
Russia's current domestic political situation could hinder further withdrawals of its military outpost in Mali, affecting the capabilities of the military junta that depends on these security forces. However, Russia's presence, even if weakened in Mali, will not be affected in the region and the continent as a whole, as its influence expands in more than 15 countries across the continent, from Libya in the north of the Sahel region to the Central African Republic in the south.