Russia reshapes the international balance through its expansion in Africa

Taking advantage of the international spotlight on Ukraine and the Middle East, Russia continues to expand its influence in various parts of Africa. Capitalising on the strategic vacuum left by the withdrawal of European countries, and through security alliances and military presence, Moscow is redefining the regional balance in the Sahel and West Africa, turning the continent into a new arena where global powers compete for power and influence.

Within Russia's strategy to control key regions such as the Sahel, the war in Ukraine plays a key role as a distraction. In this sense, while US President Donald Trump was trying to reach an agreement with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, on the conflict, Moscow opted to delay any resolution, gaining time to consolidate its influence in other African areas. 

Thus, while Washington remains focused on Eastern Europe, Moscow is extending its reach towards the African Atlantic coast with the aim of establishing military bases and signing defence agreements, consolidating its presence on the continent.  

In this regard, political analyst Zeinab Riboua warns in an analysis published in National Interest that if the Trump administration does not act to curb this expansion, the Kremlin could consolidate a new strategic foothold on NATO's southern flank. 

Furthermore, Russia is not the only power seeking to expand on the African continent. Other countries such as China, Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran are also taking advantage of the Western withdrawal from the Sahel, especially after the expulsion of French forces from nations such as Mali and Burkina Faso. 

These two countries, like Niger, are currently ruled by military juntas aligned with Moscow. The new leaders in the Sahel came to power through coups d'état, in a context marked by the rise of jihadist terrorism and the inability of the authorities to curb this threat. 

Taking advantage of this situation, and on the basis of security and the fight against terrorism, Moscow is consolidating its position on the continent. In fact, Russia has already become Africa's main arms supplier, accounting for 40% of its total arms imports. Furthermore, during the Africa-Russia Summit held in Sochi last November, President Putin reiterated his commitment to ‘provide full support to our African friends’. 

However, as Riboua points out, Russia is not alone in this strategy, as it coordinates its actions with China and Iran, ‘forming a strategic axis that seeks to challenge Western hegemony by land, sea and air’.  

Riboua also highlights that Moscow's growing presence in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, as well as the creation in 2023 of the Alliance of Sahel States, reflects a clear strategy on the part of the Kremlin. ‘Between 2020 and 2023, Russian-backed military regimes seized power in these countries through coups, cutting ties with their former Western allies, such as France and the United States,’ he explains. 

Following Moscow's recommendations, these governments have strengthened their security cooperation by creating a joint force of 5,000 soldiers from Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali. This deployment consolidates Russian influence in the Sahel while weakening the West's presence in the region. 

In this context, Moscow has played a key role in promoting propaganda campaigns based on anti-colonialist rhetoric, with the aim of fomenting anti-French sentiment throughout the region, which has contributed to the expulsion of French troops from several countries. 

Thus, Russian-backed forces have replaced French troops in the context of Operation Barkhane, France's military mission in the Sahel to combat terrorism, which ended in December 2022 after a progressive deterioration in diplomatic relations between Paris and the new governments that emerged from coups d'état. 

At the same time, as diplomatic crises deepened and French troops left the region, the Wagner Group, a key part of Russia's strategy, became a major military player in the Sahel. With this backing, Moscow is transforming the African security landscape, providing military protection and diplomatic cover to allied regimes and ensuring their long-term loyalty. 

However, Wagner Group mercenaries have been accused of human rights violations against the civilian population, which has facilitated increased recruitment by jihadist groups among the local population. 

In the summer of 2023, Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that Russian mercenaries and Malian armed forces had ‘summarily executed and forcibly disappeared several dozen civilians’ since December 2022. HRW also claims that Wagner has looted civilian property and allegedly tortured detainees in military camps.  

In addition to being a military actor, the Russian group created by Yevgeny Prigozhin has reportedly amassed a huge fortune by protecting regimes in the region in exchange for control of gold mines. In fact, one of the main reasons for the great interest of Russia and other countries such as China in the Sahel is the abundant natural resources, especially minerals such as gold, uranium, lithium, iron and other valuable metals.  

While Moscow uses so-called hard power, Beijing tends to use investments and infrastructure projects as part of the Belt and Road Initiative to secure mining and trade agreements.  

In addition to its clear interest in the Sahel, Moscow is also extending this strategy beyond the region, even reaching the African Atlantic coast. Its actions in West and Sub-Saharan Africa are directly linked to its goal of countering Western pressure following the invasion of Ukraine. By opening new fronts of influence, it seeks to destabilise regions historically under European and US control. 

As part of this tactic, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov visited Mauritania in February 2023. Riboua notes that, although the Mauritanian government reaffirmed its commitment to international law at the time, it also expressed its ‘understanding’ of Russian security concerns, reflecting that Moscow's narrative is gaining traction on the continent.  

This has been demonstrated in the numerous UN resolutions on the war in Ukraine, as a significant number of African countries have adopted a more ambiguous or distant stance from Western positions and, in several cases, closer to Russia, showing greater affinity or understanding towards Moscow compared to the West. 

In addition to Mauritania, Russia is also looking with interest at Equatorial Guinea, where Riboua believes it has adopted an even more direct approach. Moscow has reportedly deployed some 200 soldiers to protect the regime of President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, repeating its usual strategy of offering security in exchange for geopolitical influence. 

With its oil wealth and strategic location in the Gulf of Guinea, this country, historically dominated by Western powers, represents an ideal platform for projecting power. 

According to Riboua, this expansion benefits Russia on three fronts. First, Russia's sphere of influence, which now includes Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, forms a geopolitical barrier that forces countries such as Chad, Benin, Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire – traditional allies of the West – to rethink their alliances. 

Secondly, the exclusion of the African Union and ECOWAS from the Sahel Alliance reduces the ability of these blocs to coordinate regional responses, favouring Russian dominance. ‘By eroding these frameworks, Moscow ensures that any response to instability will be on its own terms,’ the analyst notes.  

Furthermore, by hindering NATO and US forces in the Sahel, Russia is pushing counterterrorism operations towards vulnerable coastal states, hampering intelligence sharing and reducing Western capacity for action. According to Riboua, ‘this is the kind of battlefield where Russia thrives, where Western interventions are slow, while Moscow presents itself as the new guarantor of security.’ 

Russia's ultimate goal is clear: to establish and consolidate its presence on the African Atlantic coast. Although the construction of a Russian naval base in the region has not yet been officially announced, growing ties with Guinea, Mauritania and Equatorial Guinea suggest that it is only a matter of time. 

The real danger lies not only in Russia's military presence, but in its capacity for initiative and the West's loss of room for manoeuvre, as its traditional tools of influence appear increasingly ineffective. Russia, on the other hand, is acting quickly, capitalising on crises as opportunities and positioning itself to impose conditions rather than negotiate them. 

On the other hand, Moscow is also betting on soft power, opening cultural and educational centres in Africa and offering scholarships to students from the continent with the aim of building a popular support base and forming a new African elite loyal to its interests, emulating the strategy previously used by China. 

Furthermore, Riboua warns that this change strengthens Russia's strategic bloc: ‘Iran secured Nigerian uranium after a Kremlin-backed coup, while China expands its dominance as Moscow erodes Western influence.’ ‘Together, Moscow, Tehran and Beijing are forging an axis that directly challenges US interests around the world,’ he adds.  

From the colonial era to the Cold War, Africa has been a theatre of rivalry between major powers. Today, Russia is returning to the continent with a less ideological and more pragmatic approach, relying on armaments and companies such as Wagner, with the aim of regaining and expanding the influence it had during the Soviet era, adapting it to current dynamics. ‘By the time the West reacts, the balance of power may already have shifted,’ Riboua concludes.