Trump, from the Caribbean to the Arctic
Over the last two weeks, we have witnessed two events that will undoubtedly shape the course of the year that is now beginning. One was the operation carried out by the United States to capture Nicolás Maduro. The other was the Trump administration's stance on Greenland. There are obviously others (such as the protests in Iran), but today we are going to focus on the first two.
We are doing so, first of all, because we believe it is necessary to try to explain what has really happened and the background to everything we are seeing. And secondly, because the information being disseminated by certain mainstream media outlets more often than is acceptable remains superficial, does not go any further or, worse still, is directly politicised or biased.
We will start with Venezuela. As we mentioned last week, it is more than likely, and reactions corroborate this, that both China and Russia were aware of what was going to happen. It is one thing to intervene to control what one considers to be one's sphere of influence and quite another to do so by provoking disproportionate consequences. And that does not mean that rivalry and confrontation do not continue in other scenarios. It is simply that, in this particular case, neither side considers it acceptable to escalate the situation. Some may find this surreal, but situations like this are part of everyday life in international relations. Even bitter rivals talk to each other and reach agreements.
- Venezuela: the capture of Nicolás Maduro and internal dynamics
- Greenland: US interest and strategic factors
Venezuela: the capture of Nicolás Maduro and internal dynamics
What is now taken for granted is that Maduro's capture was facilitated from within the regime itself, and more specifically from the circle of the Rodríguez brothers. We cannot establish the exact moment when Nicolás Maduro became a mere pawn to be dispensed with. But that has been the reality. And that move was most certainly motivated by the simple and understandable instinct for survival.
However, what must be assumed, and what many seem not to do, is that the fact that Maduro has been removed from the equation does not mean that everything he represented has also disappeared.
Transition and limits of immediate dismantling
In a country like Venezuela, after a quarter of a century under an atrocious regime and a whole caste controlling the levers of power, the transition to a real democratic system cannot be achieved by dismantling the entire system in two days.
For things to evolve in a rational and peaceful manner, it is necessary for the process to be led from within and by those who have the real power to do so, however much we may reject this. Of course, this must be done under the control and supervision, in this case, of the United States. Delcy Rodríguez ensures administrative continuity, has control over PDVSA, over the ministries, especially the key defence and interior ministries; she also controls the financial system, critical infrastructure, ports and airports. Without tight and effective control over all these elements, the country would descend into chaos in a matter of hours or days.
Delcy Rodríguez and control of key structures
Delcy's presence also guarantees a direct channel to what is known as the hard power: the armed forces, intelligence services, law enforcement, and armed Chavista groups (let us not forget that the regime took care of arming certain collectives). Under the tutelage of the US, the new presidency can exercise control and coordination of the actions of all of them, but it will not exercise effective command. Likewise, it has the capacity to gradually demobilise legitimacy and authority to give orders, to make deliveries and concessions (for example, the recent release of political prisoners) and, above all, it is in an ideal position to provide information of all kinds.
Opposition and risks of destabilisation
Therefore, the presence of Delcy is sustained by the simple fact of her usefulness. And this is where the explanation comes in as to why the opposition, and more specifically the award-winning María Corina Machado, has not been taken into account.
María Corina currently cannot guarantee control over virtually any relevant institution in the country. More importantly, she is not in a position to guarantee that, after her appearance, violent outbreaks will not occur. Her mere presence would be a stimulus for a large number of Venezuelans eager to settle scores and confront those who have subjugated them for so many years, and an existential threat to the hardest-line Chavista groups, and the risk of an uncontrolled civil confrontation that would prevent a peaceful normalisation is too high. And although it may seem incongruous, at this stage, her lack of control carries much more weight and value than her legitimacy, her votes and popular support.
The same reasoning can be applied to Edmundo González. His presence at this stage would not be helpful.
Expected developments: institutional dismantling and elections
How should the situation evolve? Well, once the potential chaos has been brought under control and a more concrete and realistic picture of the situation has been obtained, the current structures should begin to be dismantled, replacing military personnel in other ministries with civilians, introducing competent technical experts throughout the administration and seeking consensus-building and acceptable figures to take the reins. At a later stage, then, we could talk about new elections, and that is where the figure of María Corina should come in, as she would be essential in legitimising the whole process.
In this way, Venezuela would return to normality in a peaceful manner. However, timing is crucial, and of course, if the figure of Machado is completely eliminated, then there would indeed be cause for concern. But for now, we are optimistic and it seems that everything is following a very logical script. Logical and far removed from the astonishingly simplistic view that ‘the United States has entered Venezuela to take over its oil’. For the United States, the important thing is not to get hold of Venezuelan crude oil, as it does not need it, but to prevent it from being managed by the Russians, Chinese and Iranians. More importantly, the massive entry of this oil into the market (which, let us not forget, will not happen in the next two years) would cause a fall in prices that would particularly affect Russia.
Greenland: US interest and strategic factors
The second issue we are going to address is related to the interest shown by President Trump in Greenland. After a first term in office, and almost two years into his second, we should be familiar with the US president's modus operandi. We say this because it is somewhat insufficient that there are still those who believe that the United States is going to launch a military operation to occupy the island.
Firstly, we must understand the reasons that lead the White House to show such excessive interest in Greenland. Among these are some based purely on military strategy for defence against a hypothetical confrontation with Russia; others are based on economics, and others are purely geopolitical.
Military motivations: the GIUK Gap
From a military point of view, the importance of Greenland is determined by what NATO calls the ‘GIUK Gap’. If we look at the map (let us not forget that geography continues to largely determine geopolitics), we can see that a huge stretch of sea is enclosed between Greenland, Iceland and the United Kingdom. This area is key to enabling the Russian northern fleet to break through from the Arctic to the North Atlantic in the event of conflict, placing nuclear submarines in an advantageous position to reach US territory with their missiles. Controlling this gap is essential for the United States, and maintaining control over Greenland would give it a privileged position that it does not currently have.
If we stick to economic reasons, we must return to the subject of the Arctic sea route. The geostrategic importance of this area has already been discussed on numerous occasions by other analysts, in great detail, not only because of the natural resources it holds, but also because of the importance of the sea route that crosses it.
Economic motivations: the Arctic sea route
If we stick to economic reasons, we must return to the subject of the Arctic sea route. The geostrategic importance of this area has already been discussed on numerous occasions by other analysts, in great detail, not only because of the natural resources it holds, but also because of the importance of the sea route that crosses it.
This route is not yet fully accessible, but little by little, with the advance of melting ice and the use of nuclear icebreakers, it is becoming a closer reality. And that reality means that today's main trade routes will be cut in half in distance and cost, making it the world's main maritime trade route. Once again, Greenland's geographical location makes it a key territory for controlling this route.
Geopolitical motivations and pressure strategy
Finally, we have the geopolitical aspect. In this regard, it is just as important to control areas, points and routes as it is to deny such control to the adversary. Positioning oneself on Greenland, in addition to Alaska and the Canadian Arctic coast, which is another of the US president's aspirations, would deny Russia and China a presence and control in an area that is increasingly proving to be the geopolitical epicentre of the coming decades.
Donald Trump is not threatening anyone, he is simply stating his ultimate aspirations in order to increase pressure on Denmark and gradually create the conditions, either for negotiation or, in the medium term, for a hypothetical, but more than possible referendum on self-determination, would opt for the island's independence, thus facilitating the options for an agreement or treaty that would definitively bring Greenland into the orbit of the United States.
To dwell on Trump's outbursts is a sign of short-sightedness.