The Monroe Doctrine returns: Trump, Maduro and a vulnerable region
The Monroe Doctrine returns: Trump, Maduro and an exposed region
A doctrine reactivated: President Donald Trump, the Western Hemisphere and the Caribbean energy corridor converge as US power reshapes the region's fragile energy balance
- Oil flows on hold
- Cuba feels it first
- An exposed Caribbean — and CARICOM on tenterhooks
- An unnamed doctrine
- More than Venezuela
- Calculated risk
- The question that remains
When US forces mobilised this week to capture Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro in a cross-border operation, the White House described the action as a law enforcement measure part of a broader effort to dismantle what it called a criminal state apparatus. Monroe:
But outside Washington, the consequences are read very differently.
Beyond the immediate political impact in Caracas, the operation has triggered a quieter and more destabilising chain reaction: Venezuela's already weakened oil sector has been plunged into even greater uncertainty, and long-standing vulnerabilities in the Caribbean and parts of Central America have been exposed.
Among diplomats and regional officials, the episode is increasingly seen less as an isolated action and more as a clear reaffirmation of US control over hemispheric outcomes—one that carries economic and strategic costs for small states that had no say in the matter.
Oil flows on hold
In the days following Maduro's departure, Venezuela's state oil company, PDVSA, fell into operational paralysis.
Without a widely recognised authority with the mandate to approve exports or manage revenues, crude shipments slowed, according to public industry reports and official statements. Venezuela no longer wields the global influence it once had in energy markets. Years of sanctions, underinvestment and mismanagement have drastically reduced its production.
Even so, for parts of the Caribbean, Venezuelan crude and refined fuels—though diminished—remain relevant.
There are alternative suppliers, but at a cost: commercial terms, higher upfront payments and less flexibility. For countries with narrow fiscal margins, even brief disruptions can quickly ripple through the economy.
Cuba feels it first
Nowhere is the exposure as immediate as in Cuba. Although shipments from Venezuela have declined steadily in recent years, they remain critical for the island's power generation and transport networks. Their loss deepens an already severe crisis marked by inflation, blackouts and deteriorating public services.
Havana publicly condemned the US operation, warning of regional instability. Privately, the challenge is more practical: Cuba has limited access to fuel suppliers willing to offer flexible terms and little capacity to absorb sustained spot market prices.
It is a familiar regional dynamic: political pressure falls on the target, while the economic consequences spread outward.
An exposed Caribbean — and CARICOM on tenterhooks
For the Caribbean Community (CARICOM)), the concern is not ideological loyalty to Caracas or support for Washington's actions. It is structural exposure, immediate and difficult to cover.
Most Caribbean states import almost all of their fuel. Strategic reserves are scarce or non-existent. Electricity grids are heavily dependent on oil and diesel, so fluctuations in supply or energy prices quickly impact the costs of food, water desalination, health systems and tourism — the backbone of many island economies.
For years, that vulnerability was partially cushioned by Petrocaribe, the Venezuelan oil financing initiative that allowed participating countries to defer payments, access low-interest credit, and soften fiscal shocks. Petrocaribe was never a panacea, and its scope steadily narrowed as Venezuela's crisis deepened. But even in decline, it offered flexibility—time, credit, and breathing room—that commercial markets rarely grant to small states.
Those arrangements had already weakened. Maduro's departure effectively closes the door for good.
CARICOM's response has been cautious rather than confrontational. In public statements and diplomatic efforts, the bloc has emphasised respect for sovereignty, adherence to international law, and the need to protect regional stability and energy security—language that expresses concern without provocation.
It has avoided openly condemning Washington's move, but the unease is evident. Underlying this is anxiety about the absence of a clear transition framework—one that recognises how the collapse of Venezuela's oil role, including the demise of Petrocaribe, leaves Caribbean states exposed to sudden shocks that they did not design and can hardly absorb.
Several member governments have acknowledged that they are reviewing fuel supply strategies and contingency plans, an implicit recognition that the Caribbean risks becoming an unwitting buffer for the decisions of major powers—this time without the cushion that previously softened the blow.
An unnamed doctrine
US officials have avoided explicitly invoking the Monroe Doctrine.
Even so, its logic is unmistakable throughout the region. First formulated in 1823 under President James Monroe, the doctrine warned external powers against interference in the Western Hemisphere. Over time, it evolved into a framework through which Washington asserted its primacy over political and strategic outcomes in the Americas.
Today, it operates less through rhetoric than through policy design. The Trump administration's National Security Strategy defines the Western Hemisphere as a core domain of US security and explicitly warns against the influence of rival states in Latin America and the Caribbean.
The emphasis is clear: prevent alternative centres of power from consolidating and act decisively when they try.
In practice, this has translated into sanctions, asset seizures, extraterritorial legal proceedings and now, the removal of a sitting head of state. The message is widely understood: autonomy in the hemisphere has its limits.
More than Venezuela
The operation against Maduro fits into a broader pattern. By marginalising Venezuela, Washington is weakening one of Cuba's last external lifelines and eliminating financial and energy support for parts of Central America.
Countries that previously used partnerships with Venezuela to diversify their options now face deeper dependence on markets and institutions aligned with the United States. Energy, once a tool for cooperation and development, is increasingly becoming a source of pressure.
Calculated risk
The Trump administration says it does not intend to rule Venezuela directly, but it does intend to oversee a transition while maintaining tight control over oil revenues.
Energy analysts have publicly warned that restoring Venezuela's productive capacity would take years and billions of dollars in investment. Until then, the impact is absorbed by the region.
For small states, this is not ideology. It is keeping the lights on.
As one Caribbean official bluntly put it this week: when the fuel disappears, everything else follows.
The question that remains
In Washington, Maduro's capture is being celebrated as a decisive blow against authoritarianism. Elsewhere, the reading is more complex.
What has also been dismantled is a fragile energy arrangement that kept parts of the Caribbean running.
The Monroe Doctrine may no longer be spoken aloud. But in practice, it is once again shaping outcomes through coercive enforcement, energy disruption and narrowing options.
For the Caribbean, the question now is not who governs Venezuela, but who will supply the fuel and at what cost.