Afghanistan: what happens now?
Afghanistan has been under Taliban rule for two months. During this time, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (the country's official name for the Taliban), is experiencing a growing humanitarian crisis that, if not alleviated soon, will most likely cause a famine and refugee crisis on the eve of winter. It is also experiencing a terrorist crisis: ISIS-K - the Afghan branch of the Islamic State - is poised to weaken the Taliban. Proof of this are the three brutal suicide bombings this month against mosques in Kabul (3 October), Kunduz (8 October) and Kandahar (15 October). These three attacks show that the country is not as safe as the Taliban claimed, something that will most likely provoke waves of refugees that will create tension within neighbouring countries (especially Pakistan and Iran) and will certainly open a new chapter in the already tense relations between the EU and the states bordering Afghanistan, as Brussels will most likely ask these countries to take in refugees, something that will be unwelcome by these economically not very prosperous states, where Afghan refugees are the subject of social conflicts.
The shadow of a possible humanitarian crisis and the insecurity caused by ISIS-K makes us wonder what moves the international community has made. There is a major dilemma here: how to get humanitarian aid into the country without giving legitimacy to the Taliban, which until recently was a terrorist group. Based on this dilemma, we can identify two camps: the Western camp, with the US, the EU and the UN, which want to deliver humanitarian aid, but at the same time block financial reserves to the Taliban, and the camp of the bordering countries: Russia, China, Pakistan and Iran. While for the West this group is the bad guys - as they always question the West's actions - in the Afghan case their interactions with the Taliban are justified, as they would certainly be the first countries to suffer the effects of the collapse of the Taliban government, not only the terrorist threat but also drug trafficking, as Afghanistan is the world producer of opium, from which heroin is extracted1.
The actions of the Western bloc reflect the contradiction of giving humanitarian aid without recognising the Taliban. The EU, the US and the UK have maintained contacts with the Taliban, while Brussels and the G-20 have promised to invest in the country, as evidenced by the G-20's decision to invest 1.3 billion in the country, of which 1 billion from the EU and 300 million from the US.2 While this action at first sight seems to indicate the willingness of the bloc to alleviate a humanitarian crisis that will most likely affect it, especially Europe, we find actions that will surely contribute to worsening the situation. I refer to the US Treasury's decision to deny the Taliban access to $9 billion of Afghan central bank reserves, despite the Taliban's demands to that effect3. Such a decision is not only likely to complicate the solution to the foreseeable humanitarian tragedy looming over the country this winter, but also to increase Taliban frustration at negotiating, as it is well known to both sides that making humanitarian aid conditional on respect for human rights is a pipe dream, as the Taliban - though not as violent as when they first came to power in 1996 - are not respecting the rights of women and minorities. Such frustration will most likely lead them to seek more "tolerant" partners in their governance, especially those for whom the promotion of democracy and human rights is not a political priority.
This is where the second bloc - that of neighbouring countries with interests in the region - Russia, Pakistan, Iran and China, comes into play. At first glance, the characteristic that unites these countries is their criticism of Western foreign policy, especially their promotion of democracy and human rights, and most importantly their proximity to Afghanistan, as Pakistan, Iran and China border Kabul, while the Central Asian republics - Moscow's allies - act as a retaining wall for Russia. It is the proximity to Kabul that probably explains why these countries maintain their embassies in Kabul despite not recognising the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. But also the interests of certain countries, especially China and Pakistan - both allies and most likely key players in Afghanistan's future - are a reflection of the likely geopolitical realities at play in the region.
Beijing is interested in Afghanistan's natural resources, especially untapped copper and lithium - key minerals in today's technology - and the possibility of making Afghanistan a component of its Silk Road. The Taliban is also likely to be interested in these minerals as a source of revenue with which to consolidate its statehood and would also be interested in the commercial possibilities of the Silk Road in a region with a strong culture of exchange of goods. As a result, it is not surprising that in the short term (six months/one year) China will become the first major country to recognise the Taliban, probably through an agreement based on a trade and security exchange4.
In the case of Islamabad, its historical, cultural and ethnic ties, its long border with Afghanistan, the fear of Kabul falling into the sphere of influence of New Delhi - Islamabad's number one enemy - and the large number of Afghan refugees on its territory will most certainly explain why Pakistan will once again recognise the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in the short term5. Such calculations will depend on the aforementioned challenges, but it is highly likely that, should such recognition not come - which can happen in a region where an attack or any diplomatic gesture by either actor can sour the other - that Islamabad's influence on Afghanistan's future will remain present through its powerful and controversial secret services (ISI) and its role as a sanctuary since the Soviet-Afghan war. Both factors give Pakistan the opportunity to be a relevant actor on the ground, something that Iran, Russia and China have taken into account, as the four countries have met to discuss the future of Kabul and how to coordinate their diplomacy with the Taliban6.
In conclusion, with a humanitarian crisis approaching the gates of winter and insecurity increasing due to ISIS-K, Afghanistan faces a bleak scenario two months after the Taliban came to power that will most likely result in a refugee crisis unwanted by both neighbouring countries and Europe. Faced with such a scenario, there are two opposing camps in the diplomatic arena: the West, led by the US, faced with the dilemma of giving humanitarian aid without legitimising the Taliban, resulting in contradictory messages such as the G-20's decision to give 1.3 billion in humanitarian aid and then the US Treasury's decision to deny the Taliban access to Afghanistan's central bank reserves. Such a contradiction will most likely worsen the humanitarian situation in Kabul and probably discourage the Taliban from continuing to negotiate with the West, as it is well known that demanding respect for human rights in exchange for humanitarian aid is not to the liking of the Taliban, who are not respecting them.
Russia, Iran, China and Pakistan make up the second bloc, bordering Afghanistan and with commercial, mineral and political interests in Afghanistan. In this quartet, the interests of China and Pakistan stand out, both allies, but with more realistic interests than those of the West. For Beijing, Afghanistan is a source of natural reserves and trade routes to exploit, while its interest in preventing an unstable Afghanistan from becoming a sanctuary for Islamist radicals to influence the Uighur minority bordering Kabul makes it highly likely that China will recognise Afghanistan a year from now. In Pakistan's case, its cultural and ethnic ties, its long border, the Afghan refugees on its territory, its fear of India - its biggest rival - influencing the Taliban, and its role as a sanctuary for terrorist groups since 1979 give it a voice in Afghanistan's future, something that neighbouring countries have taken into account by inviting Pakistan to their meetings on what to do about the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.
We will have to see what happens in the coming months to see which bloc has played its cards right and how they react to the more than likely unstable Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.
References:
1 Heroin addiction is an evil that affects not only the West but also neighbouring countries.
2 El G-20 aprueba una inversión de 1,300 millones en Afganistán que coordinará la ONU, El País, October 2021, https://elpais.com/internacional/2021-10-12/el-g-20-aprueba-una-inversion-de-1300-millones-en-afganistan-que-coordinara-la-onu.html
3 The US denies the Taliban access to Afghanistan's reserves, El País, October 2021, https://lectura.kioskoymas.com/article/281612423597271
4 China is also interested in the Taliban controlling Chinese Islamists of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement who could take advantage of a weak Afghanistan to infiltrate Sinkiang, a region bordering Kabul where the Uighur minority, repressed by Beijing, is located.
5 Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia were the only countries to recognise the Taliban in 1996.
6 Iran to host multilateral conference on Afghanistan on October 27, Al Jazeera, October 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/10/18/tehran-to-host-multilateral-conference-on-afghanistan