Daesh: will it rise from the ashes?

2022 got off to an abrupt start with a war in Europe and the French decision to withdraw its troops from Mali. But these have not been the only shocks we have experienced so far this year. At the beginning of February, the Middle East -Syria to be more precise- was once again in the spotlight. Two events explain why: the assault by Daesh on the Hasaka prison in northern Syria, in Kurdish-occupied territory, in the last week of January, and the death on 3 February by the United States of the leader of the Islamic State, Abu Ibrahim al-Hashemi al-Quraishi, in northern Syria, specifically in territory controlled by Hayat Tahir al-Sham, formerly Al-Nusra Front, formerly an affiliate of Al-Qaeda in Syria, dominant in Idlib, a stronghold of the anti-Assad rebels and bordering Turkey. It was also in this area, again by the US, that Abubaker al-Baghdadi, founder of the Islamic State, was killed in November 2019.

These two events demonstrate that eight years after the creation of the Caliphate, Daesh is still present despite its defeat in March 2019. This raises the possibility that the group could regain its strength and return to being the global threat it was in the middle of the last decade. Can the Islamic State rise from the ashes?

At first glance, if we take into account the territorial extension of the Caliphate at its peak (2014-2017), the propaganda activity and the flow of foreign volunteers into the territory controlled by the Islamic State, we could say that it is highly unlikely that Da'esh will re-emerge. Today the group roams the Syrian-Iraqi border, where it is harassed by both the Iraqi army and all factions in the Syrian conflict. Nor has there been a steady flow of foreign volunteers into its ranks since the elimination of the Caliphate in March 2019, unlike in the years 2014-2016 where the influx of volunteers from Europe alarmed countries such as the UK, France and Belgium about the impact of jihadist radicalisation on their territory.

Benchmarking what a terrorist group was versus what it is now is not a reliable gauge for predicting what will happen to the Islamic State. True, it does not control territory in Syria and Iraq, but this group, more than a local faction born in the heat of the 2003 Iraq war and the 2011 Syrian civil war, is a global brand. And while it is in the doldrums in Iraq and Syria, it is striking hard in Afghanistan, where it has destabilised the Taliban, and in the Sahel, with Burkina Faso as its main victim. Moreover, in Syria and Iraq there are still 60,000 people with links to IS in the Al-Roj and Al-Hol refugee camps in Syria, while the Kurds hold 12,000 ISIS-linked prisoners, of whom 4,000 are foreigners.

The appalling living conditions in Syrian refugee camps and prisons are a key factor contributing to the resurgence of the Islamic State, as they are likely to fuel feelings of revenge in individuals already radicalised by the group's effective propaganda at its peak in the middle of the last decade. The Hasaka prison attack, though unsuccessful, may motivate them to attack, as in the eyes of detainees and refugees it demonstrated that IS still has the capacity to attack, more than enough motivation to inspire them to keep fighting. It is also very likely that the media coverage of the prison raid will serve as a vector to radicalise sympathisers of the group in Europe. Although the Islamic State's propaganda capacity is no longer what it was in the middle of the last decade, we cannot ignore the fact that in Europe the socio-economic conditions that inspired many Europeans to join the Caliphate are still present and have most likely worsened (especially xenophobia towards Muslims). Add to this the fact that Islamic State terrorist attacks have been characterised in recent years by low sophistication, going from the use of weapons of war in the Charlie Hebdo attack in January 2015 to the use of a knife in New Zealand in September 2021, and attacks avenging the death of the Islamic State leader are highly likely.

The low sophistication of the attacks, especially the use of knives, should be of concern to law enforcement agencies. These tools can easily be bought in any supermarket. Nor is it necessary to buy one as we can pick one up at home as well. As a result, we have an object that is sure to be used by a terrorist to spread panic in society at his fingertips. Limiting such a tool from being used by a terrorist will require measures to be put in place to limit its purchase. Examples include the sale of knives and cutting equipment (cutters, saws) in specialised shops or that they can only be purchased on request from the shop assistant. Even if these measures are inconvenient for users, they should be informed that it is for their safety, to prevent them from becoming victims of a future terrorist attack.

In conclusion, while Europe is living through a war on its continent and France is retreating into the Sahel, the Middle East has also been in turmoil. The Islamic State has been in the news as it showed that it is still capable of causing harm by storming a prison in northern Syria and its leader was killed by the US in early February. Both events, opposite sides of the same coin, show that three years after the end of its Caliphate, the Islamic State is still alive. Alive and kicking, for despite being weakened in Syria, it is on the offensive in Afghanistan and the Sahel, fertile ground for the establishment of local Caliphates. Nor can we ignore the fact that there are still a considerable number of Daesh acolytes in refugee camps and prisons in northern Syria, people who are very likely to be ready to attack at any moment. Moreover, Islamic State-inspired terrorist attacks are still possible as socio-economic conditions and weapons are still present despite the demise of the Caliphate. If left unaddressed, a terrorist attack may be at risk.